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    The rise in financial crimes has resulted in a wide range of regulatory reforms to 
combat the problem. The failure of regulations to accomplish the desired objectives has brought 
regulators under pressure to justify their actions concerning political, executive and judicial 
scrutiny. One example of non-compliant behaviour subjected to extensive debate among 
practitioners, academics and regulators has been money laundering, an act of giving dirty 
money a legitimate appearance. In 2020, the amount of money being laundered after five 
rounds of international flows for the year of 2014 was estimated to be three percent of global 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) or USD 2.3 trillion. The seriousness of the problem has 
increased over time, as indicated by the uncovering of the "Troika Laundromat" by the 
Organised Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP), which involved moving billions 
of dollars of illicit Russian funds through the use of secretive offshore companies. On similar 
lines, shell companies incorporated in the U.K. alone were identified to be involved in 
laundering 80 billion pounds of stolen money between 2010 and 2014.  
As a result, an emerging interest from both researchers and practitioners has surrounded   
money laundering. In the current economic environment, regulators are struggling to stay ahead 
of fraudulent schemes, and financial institutions are being challenged to ensure that they 
identify and stop criminal activities while serving legitimate customers effectively and 
efficiently. Consequently, it is necessary to improve understanding and come up with 
mechanisms to detect money laundering. This thesis contributes to this by: exploring the 
literature in the field; synthesising existing knowledge to develop a framework for explaining 
techniques adopted to launder funds; developing a model for detecting shell companies being 
used to launder illicit proceeds of crime using publicly available information; assessing an 
opportunity created by technological innovation to commit fraud and money laundering; 
assessing the implication of cannabis regulations on money laundering; and, finally, 
developing a money-laundering attractiveness index.  
This dissertation first conducts a thematically systematised literature review to identify 
the extent of research conducted on money laundering. The complexity of techniques adopted 
to launder funds may vary depending upon the situation, with new typologies being created in 
response to changes in technology and regulations. However, no attempt is made in the 
literature to explain a launderer's choice of techniques. This research develops the new APPT 




laundering techniques used to accomplish the objective. The new APPT framework is named 
according to four factors that each play a role in explaining the choice of techniques: the Actors 
involved, Predicate crime, the Purpose for laundering, and Technological innovations. The 
framework would assist in acknowledging the continuously evolving regulatory landscape and 
would direct attention towards the need for better mechanisms in combatting money-laundering 
activities. 
Amongst the various techniques to launder funds, the review of existing literature 
identified the use of shell companies to be an under-researched technique to launder funds. 
Consequently, to address this need, the focus shifts towards developing a model for detecting 
shell companies being used to launder illicit proceeds of crime. The opportunity to detect illicit 
shell companies rested in using the networks prevalent among entities in a corrupt network and 
analysing the links and similarities. The analysis would facilitate scores of links and similarities 
that could be useful in distinguishing corrupt entities from non-fraudulent ones. Facilitating 
models to detect illicit shell companies using publicly available information quantitatively is 
under-researched.  
The use of data science techniques in coming up with new detection mechanisms is 
worth appreciating. However, as depicted in the APPT framework, the importance of 
technological innovation in undertaking illicit acts of fraud and money laundering must not be 
undermined. The thesis takes a step in this direction by exploring an opportunity, initial coin 
offerings (ICOs), created by technological innovation to give rise to a predicate crime that may 
subsequently lead to money laundering.  
To further understand the need for the APPT framework, detection mechanisms and 
being aware of new technological innovations capable of paving the way for illicit acts such as 
money laundering, it becomes critical to be aware of the magnitude of the problem. The review 
of existing literature identified a stream of research focusing on estimating the magnitude of 
money laundering. Among a range of illicit activities, the money from drug trafficking is the 
most prominent for immediate money laundering, and research work on money laundering 
would be incomplete without incorporating the contribution of drug trafficking to the amount 
of funds laundered. Considering the case of Australia, this thesis extends the literature by   
estimating the magnitude of money laundering by quantifying the amount of funds being 




Finally, acknowledging the debate in literature on lack of consensus on generated 
estimates of the magnitude of money laundering and the need to find countries attractive to 
launder funds, this thesis proceeds to construct a reliable and robust index for measuring a 
country's appeal as a destination for money laundering. It uses the Principal Component 
Analysis (PCA) to come up with a Money-Laundering Appeal Index (MLAI), thus avoiding 
the difficulty of precisely calculating illicit financial flows. 
The key stakeholders to benefit from such research would be legal and compliance 
professionals and government officials, especially tax officials and anti-corruption NGOs. 
Among experienced practitioners, the knowledge of the APPT framework would aid in 
exercising professional judgement to come up with appropriate detection and deterrence 
mechanisms. In educational institutions, such a framework would suggest a move towards the 
incorporation of pedagogical techniques aimed at improving the content value and encouraging 
the development of skills valued by academics and practitioners.  
The models developed to detect illicit shell entities could be of use to investigators, 
regulatory agencies and banks with access to transaction information. They could use the 
models alongside suspicious transaction analysis to increase the accuracy of entities they term 
as suspicious.  The models developed as part of this research would assess the risk of a company 
being involved in illicit activities and whether there is a need to investigate further.  
The work around Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs) would raise awareness around a possible 
opportunity to commit fraud as well as launder funds. Similarly, the work surrounding money 
laundered through cannabis trafficking could play a vital role in the debate around the 
legalisation of cannabis by providing an additional component for depicting harms from illegal 
markets. It may have implications for economies attempting to tackle the problem of money 
laundering by providing an avenue to consider the cannabis angle. Finally, the complex 
phenomenon of money laundering appeal can be placed into a single composite indicator and 
this might not only inform national strategies to prevent money laundering but provide an 
opportunity to use a similar approach to develop more localized hotspot maps that could move 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
As per the most recent estimates of International Monetary Fund (IMF), the level of 
money laundering ranges between 2% and 5% of the world's annual gross domestic product or 
approximately 1.5 trillion US dollars (FATF, 2012). As per the Australian Transaction Reports 
and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC), the reported figure of money laundering ranges between 
$10 and $15  billion per annum in 2011 (Singh & Best, 2019). In 2020, the amount of money 
being laundered after five rounds of international flows for the year of 2014 was estimated to 
be three percent of global Gross Domestic Product (GDP) or USD 2.3 trillion (Ferwerda et al., 
2020). The magnitude of the problem is also demonstrated by the “Troika Laundromat”, 
uncovered by the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP), that involved 
secretly moving billions of dollars of illicit Russian funds to offshore companies (OCCRP, 
2019). Similarly, shell companies incorporated in the United Kingdom alone were identified 
to be associated with laundering 80 billion pounds of stolen money between 2010 and 2014 
(Cowdock, 2017). Money laundering activities are a prominent threat to the global economy 
as proceeds of these activities may be used to fund further criminal activities and to undermine 
the integrity of financial systems worldwide. 
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) was formed in 1989 by The Group of Seven 
(G7) to further combat the growing problem. The FATF expanded the scope of money 
laundering by criminalising proceeds derived from other illicit sources such as illegal arms 
sales, insider trading, embezzlement, bribery and fraud. Since then, in an attempt to curb this 
growing problem, the scope of money-laundering regulation has been regularly widened 
further, such as to include activities financing the act of terrorism (Unger, 2013). The FATF 
serves as a vanguard in combatting money laundering by providing guidance to governmental 
bodies globally. 
Money laundering attempts to wash dirty money to give it a legitimate appearance. 






(UNODC, 2004), money laundering involves converting or transferring an asset with 
knowledge of its being derived from a criminal source, concealing the criminal source or 
helping the criminal involved in committing the crime. The objective is to disguise the nature 
and origin of the illicit income generated and integrate it into the financial system without 
drawing tax authorities or law enforcement agencies’ attention (Compin, 2008). Apart from the 
more usual underground activities such as cybercrime, corruption and drug trafficking, there 
are quasi-legal activities involving the concealment of income from public authorities. Such 
activities produce the shadow economy (Schneider, 2010; Schneider & Windischbauer, 2008). 
They contribute to money laundering as well. Buchanan (2004) categorises the process of 
money laundering into three stages, namely, placement, layering and integration. The first 
stage, that is, placement, involves introduction of the cash generated from illicit sources into 
the financial system. It is at this stage that the criminal proceeds are vulnerable to detection. 
The sources to introduce these funds into the financial system may comprise financial 
institutions, businesses and casinos. Generally, the amount of money to be laundered is 
deposited into bank accounts in smaller amounts or by purchasing goods which could be easily 
resold. Once the placement of the illicit proceeds takes place, the next step, layering, involves 
concealing and disguising the origin of such illicit funds. The illicit proceeds are separated 
from their source through a web of transactions. These are accomplished by the transfer of 
funds in related accounts or across jurisdictions, conversion of cash into other monetary 
instruments, investment in real estate or other such legitimate business, or into financial 
securities. The final stage in the process, that is integration, aims at manifesting the money 
(into cash) through normal business operations or personal transactions. The purpose is to make 
it difficult to distinguish between the legitimately derived and the laundered income. 
Money laundering exploits a web of disguised relationships and unravelling this complex 
network of connections is challenging and time-consuming. These relationships include the 
adoption of different methods of placing money, its movement between actors in the financial 
system, and the organisational entities and their owners involved in the process. Furthermore, 
specific entities, most often shell companies, may play a transitory role within the network used 
to receive and distribute money.  
Shell companies have legitimate uses such as facilitating reverse mergers, being used as 
holding companies or for protecting small entrepreneurs from bankruptcy risks. However, these 
entities have also become instruments for laundering the dirty money to make it appear 






cartels, corrupt politicians, terrorists and cyber-criminals have become some of the frequent 
users of these shell companies. The ease of setting up companies, trans-nationality involved 
and low-level of compliance towards the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) standards have 
posed a challenge for law enforcement authorities in countering crime and corruption (Martini 
et al., 2019). In 2002, an anonymous shell corporation called “Anglo-Leasing” was used to 
launder €24 million of the total €30 million as part of the contract awarded to the firm to update 
the passport system in Kenya. The information about the beneficial owners could not be 
identified because of the anonymity such form of entities provides (Allred et al., 2017; Findley 
et al., 2015). Other such instances involving the use of shell companies are that of China ZTE 
using shell companies to evade US sanctions, and SBM Offshore N.V., a Dutch-based group, 
paying bribes to shell companies owned by government officials (Hubbs, 2018). 
Shell companies, with no physical presence and economic value, have legitimate 
purposes such as use in reverse merger thus providing access to formal economy and protecting 
small entrepreneurs from bankruptcy risks. However, they may be used for illicit purposes such 
as bribery, corruption, money laundering, terrorist financing by acting as a corporate veil to 
hide ultimate beneficial owner information. Therefore, it becomes essential to detect shell 
companies being used to launder the proceeds of illicit activities. Cowdock and Simeone (2019) 
conducted a forensic analysis of over 400 cases and interviews with academics and experts in 
the domain. They pointed to the need for further corporate transparency reforms to prevent 
abuse of companies in the UK and offshore financial centres. 
It is necessary for jurisdictions such as the UK and Singapore, responsible for supplying 
opaque offshore structures and thereby reducing the effectiveness of the efforts of transparency 
and integrity, to take up more responsibility (Lasslett, 2019). Nougayrède (2019) believes 
appropriate steps need to be taken to combat the illicit use of shell companies. The steps include 
acceleration of intergovernmental measures to prevent tax evasion, money laundering and 
corruption through the exchange of financial information across borders, and by increasing 
corporate transparency. The empirical effect of these measures is yet to be ascertained; 
however, there do exist potential limitations for effective implementation of them. The 
limitation of their implementation may be attributed to resistance from jurisdictions such as the 
USA, proactiveness of national regulators and enforcement agencies and on the quality of 
information maintained by local service agents. A significant literature exists on enhancing 






no prior study exists on coming up with a model to detect shell companies being used to hide 
and transfer illicit proceeds. 
 In the current economic environment, regulators are struggling to stay ahead of 
fraudulent schemes, and financial institutions are being challenged to ensure that they identify 
and stop criminal activities while serving legitimate customers effectively and efficiently. 
Effective technological solutions are an essential element in the fight against money 
laundering. The continuously evolving regulatory landscape, in combination with recent 
instances of money laundering violations, has highlighted the need for better technology in 
managing anti-money laundering activities (Ray, 2015). An improvement in data and analytics 
would be essential in assisting investigators to focus more on suspicious activities and less on 
false positives (Newman, 2007). The representation of data in the form of graphs would 
establish the presence, if any, of a relational structure, and graph computations can provide a 
stronger relational inductive bias. Graph analysis may enable investigators to effortlessly infer 
ownership and relationships, such as common or joint ownership of businesses; this may mean 







1.1  Aim of research 
The research aims to advance the field of money laundering in terms of: 
• Reviewing the literature around money laundering and identifying key research gaps 
• Developing an understanding of the reasons behind the choice of using a particular 
technique to launder funds 
• Developing an appropriate schema of relationships to identify hidden patterns and 
relationships among entities, if any; 
• Using graph analytics and supervised learning methods to detect illicit shell companies 
using publicly available data for the UK incorporated private-limited companies 
• Identifying the emergence of a new opportunity to commit fraud and launder funds by 
means of technological innovations, in particular, Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs) as it depicts 
how FinTech innovation like cryptocurrencies is being used as means to commit fraud; 
• Assessing the magnitude of money laundering subject to cannabis trafficking given drug 
trafficking constitutes the major portion of laundered money and cannabis is one of the 
largest consumed drugs; 
• Identifying factors making a country an appealing destination to launder funds 
The main objective of this research is to improve knowledge around money laundering, 
and to develop models for the identification of shell companies being used to launder illicit 
proceeds of crime. The central hypothesis is that a useful model for detecting illicit shell 
companies can be built by analysing such entities identified in the past to be associated with 
various illicit activities. It attempts to produce findings that are widely applicable to regulators, 
investigators and other stakeholders. 
 
The main research questions that this study addresses are introduced below. 
Research Question 1 (RQ1): What factors may influence a launderer’s choice of 
technique to launder funds? 
Research Question 2 (RQ2): Does the presence of data related to entities on a graph 
database platform aid in revealing hidden patterns and relationships? 
Research Question 3 (RQ3): Are combinations of graph analysis algorithms and 






Research Question 4 (RQ4): How have the changes in technology enhanced the 
opportunity to commit fraudulent acts? 
Research Question 5 (RQ5):  How do the changes in cannabis regulations affect money 
laundering in Australia? 
Research Question 6 (RQ6): What factors may make a country attractive for a money 
launderer to launder funds?  
1.2  Main contributions of this research 
This research is first in coming up with a framework to determine a launderer’s choice 
of techniques to launder funds. Among a range of illicit activities, the money from drug 
trafficking is the most demanding for immediate money laundering, and research work on 
money laundering would be incomplete without incorporating the contribution of drug 
trafficking on the amount of funds laundered. Consequently, there is an assessment of the 
effects of cannabis regulations in Australia on money laundering. Such an understanding may 
help in being proactive to assess the effects of regulatory changes on money laundering and 
come up with suitable detection mechanisms. This research utilises a comprehensive range of 
material to develop a property graph database (a graph model representation where nodes, apart 
from connections between them, have properties associated with it) using publicly available 
information. Further to this, the data used in the analysis are not synthetically generated and 
comprise entities identified in actual cases of corruption. Consequently, findings from this 
research contribute to a better understanding of money laundering and the use of graph database 
models in detecting money laundering through illicit shell companies. Some of these findings 
include: 
• A framework for the choice of technique adopted to launder funds is provided 
• Empirical support for the use of multi-relational property graph databases platforms that 
detect money laundering 
• Empirical support for retrieval of hidden patterns and relationships using traversal queries 
• Identification of the fraudulent opportunities arising through ICOs 
• An empirical assessment of the magnitude of money laundering through cannabis 
trafficking; and, 







This research also makes a contribution to the literature on money laundering. It is 
further identified that the detection of money laundering through shell companies had received 
limited attention. The existing literature on shell companies is focused on regulations related 
to international standards aiming to achieve transparency. Additionally, the focus has been on 
implementation of these regulations on CSPs. 
Consequently, results from this research make an important contribution to a better 
understanding of the use of graph database platforms to traverse through networks of illicit 
shell companies and employ additional graph analytics to develop detection models. Some of 
the results are briefly mentioned below. 
The graph database of corporate entities shows that only 51 companies in the dataset 
had an ultimate beneficial owner and 16 companies were located at the same postal address. 
Furthermore, in the graph database of corporate entities, two individuals had executive 
appointments in 139 and 610 entities, respectively. No studies in the past have considered 
companies from multiple illicit corruption cases in the same graph network and attempted to 
investigate the links between them, and then gone on to propose a need to adopt a graph 
database structure for storing information related to corporate entities. Additionally, several 
graph algorithms were performed, mainly related to determining similarities, communities and 
node importance. One of the underlying rationales was to establish a base for the interaction 
between network structure and node attributes, rather than just considering the importance of 
nodes in a network. Such a step would permit advantage to be taken of both network structure 
and node attributes (Backstrom & Leskovec, 2011). The scores were the results of these graph 
analytics and were further exported to decision-tree software called CART (Classification and 
Regression Trees) provided exclusively by Salford Systems. The results showed that on using 
three classification algorithms, namely Decision Trees, TreeNet and Random Forests, for the 
combination of a variety of graph algorithms, the classification accuracy achieved was within 
the range of 88.17 % and 97.85 % respectively. It is important to note that variables that are 
difficult to obtain are not likely to be used in a practical context; therefore, all explanatory 
variables used in this research are publicly available (Perols, 2011a). 
Overall, new contributions are made to the current body of research on money 
laundering. A framework of money laundering, informed by several theories, is proposed to 
explain the choice of a particular technique to launder funds.  This information can be used to 






are also specific beneficiaries of this information such as regulators, company service 
providers, corporate registries and investigators who can use detection models to assist them 
in better assessing the risk of an entity involved in illicit activity and whether there is a need to 
investigate further. Additionally, financial institutions can use detection models to help them 
avoid prolonged association with fraudulent companies.  
1.3  Dissertation structure 
The next chapter (Chapter 2) introduces and provides a brief overview of the concept 
of money laundering. It includes a review of literature related to money laundering and its 
related aspects. This information is followed by the identification of the research gap in the 
literature. 
Following this overview of money laundering, Chapter 3 focuses on attempting to 
explain the factors influencing the choice of techniques adopted to launder funds. The idea is 
to propose an interrelated framework for money laundering. Such a multi-dimensional model 
of money laundering complements the knowledge about various techniques available to 
launder funds gained in Chapter 2, and it helps to provide a better detection mechanism. 
Based on the review of money-laundering literature and identification of the research 
gap, Chapter 4 lays down the foundation for the development of a model for the detection of 
illicit shell companies. It provides an overview of data used, data collection methodology and 
the development of graph database schema. Such a schema allows for identification of patterns 
using traversal queries. The chapter then presents a discussion of the results and the potential 
implications of a graph database platforms for stakeholders. The chapter then concludes with 
an overview of the modelling techniques used, analysis of data and results. 
In continuation, to emphasise the importance of technological innovations, Chapter 5 
presents an examination of a new opportunity to commit fraud and money-laundering crimes 
through Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs). It includes the use of case-study analysis to determine 
characteristics of fraudulent schemes, regulatory changes to combat such an illicit act, and the 
potential takeaways for investors, issuers and regulators. 
To justify the seriousness of the problem of money laundering, Chapter 6 focuses on 
the effects of cannabis regulations on money laundering in the context of Australia. Illicit drug 






becomes important to assess whether regulatory changes pertaining to drugs such as cannabis, 
so often a topic of debate, have an influence on money laundering. 
Chapter 7, deviating from literature on money-laundering estimation magnitude, directs 
attention to factors that may increase the appeal of a country as a destination for laundering 
funds. As established in the literature, weaker AML regulations do not necessarily make a 
country an appealing destination for money laundering.  
Chapter 8 presents the overall conclusion and suggested future work. The thesis 
structure is exhibited by Figure 1. 
Money Laundering: Facets Associated with 
detection and magnitude of the problem
RQ1:What factors 
may influence a 
launderer s choice of 
technique to launder 
funds?
RQ2&3: Do graph  
platform reveal 
hidden patterns and 
if  graph algorithms 
and supervised-
learning  techniques 
can detect illicit shell 
companies?
(RQ4: How have the 
changes in technology 
enhanced the opportunity 
to commit fraudulent acts?
(RQ5):  How do the 
changes in cannabis 
regulations affect 
money laundering in 
Australia?
(RQ6): What factors may 
make a country attractive 
for a money launderer to 
launder funds? 
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Chapter 2 Literature Review of Money Laundering 
* This chapter is based on a published paper in a peer-reviewed journal, namely: Tiwari, 
M., A. Gepp, and K. Kumar. 2020. A review of money-laundering literature: the state of 
research in key areas. Pacific Accounting Review 32 (2):271-303.  
 
Money laundering makes dirty money appear legitimate. The United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime (UNODC) 2000 Convention (UNODC, 2004) says that money laundering 
involves converting or transferring an asset with knowledge of its being derived from a criminal 
source, concealing the criminal source or helping the criminal involved in committing the 
crime. The objective is to disguise the nature and origin of the illicit income generated and 
integrate it into the financial system without drawing the attention of tax authorities or law 
enforcement agencies (Compin, 2008). Apart from underground activities such as cybercrime, 
corruption and drug-trafficking, there are other quasi-legal activities concealing income from 
public authorities. Such activities produce the shadow economy (Schneider, 2010; Schneider 
& Windischbauer, 2008). They also contribute to money laundering. Buchanan (2004) divides 
the process of money laundering into three stages, namely, placement, layering and integration. 
The first stage, placement, involves the introduction into the financial system of the cash 
generated from illicit sources. It is at this stage that the criminal proceeds are vulnerable to 
detection. The sources to introduce these funds comprise financial institutions, businesses and 
casinos among others. Generally, the amount of money to be laundered is deposited into bank 
accounts in smaller amounts or by purchasing goods which could be easily resold. Once the 
placement of the illicit proceeds takes place, the next step, layering, involves concealing and 
disguising the origin of such illicit funds. The separation of illicit proceeds from their source 
takes place through a web of transactions. It is accomplished by the transfer of funds in related 
accounts or across jurisdictions, conversion of cash into other monetary instruments, 






The final stage in the process that is integration aims at returning or converting the money (into 
cash) through normal business operations or personal transactions. The purpose is to make it 
difficult to distinguish between legitimately derived income and laundered income.   
Identified instances such as the Danske Bank scandal (Bjerregaard & Kirchmaier, 2019), 
Panama Papers (Harding, 2016), the Paradise Papers, and the Offshore Leaks (International 
Consortium of Investigative Journalists) have brought to light the scale and effect of money-
laundering activities at a global level. As a result, it becomes critical to understand the work 
done around money-laundering activities globally. Additionally, the use of shell companies to 
accomplish laundering of illicit proceeds as observed in laundromat schemes such as the Troika 
Laundromat and the Azerbaijani Laundromat gives rise to the need to review the literature on 
shell companies. 
To better understand the concept of money laundering and the availability of a wide 
range of methods to accomplish it, this chapter begins with a brief introduction. It is followed 
by a review of the multi-faceted literature on money laundering and its related areas to lay 








2.1  Brief introduction to money laundering 
In 1998, the then-director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) highlighted the 
problem by estimating the amount of money being laundered to be between two and five 
percent of global Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (Camdessus, 1998). The Organized Crime 
and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) highlighted schemes such as the “Troika 
Laundromat”, involving movement of billions of dollars of illicit Russian funds using offshore 
companies (OCCRP, 2019). Similarly, shell companies incorporated in the United Kingdom 
alone were identified as being  associated with laundering 80 billion pounds of stolen money 
between 2010 and 2014 (Cowdock, 2017). 
The term “laundering” was named after the gangster Al Capone’s use of launderettes for 
disguising illegal revenues from an alcohol business in the United States. The launderettes, one 
of the most cash-intensive businesses during the 1930s, served as an ideal location for washing 
the dirty money. However, the activities which in today’s time would be defined as money 
laundering have been in use for a long time. For instance, in earlier times, the use of a variety 
of methods by money lenders to conceal and move the overcharged amount of interest collected 
on loans, or merchants purchasing assets to hide their wealth, would be viewed as money-
laundering activities. 
The necessity to monitor money-laundering activities has gained prominence with 
growing concerns in the USA regarding the movements of funds across borders for tax evasion 
or the use of cash-intensive businesses such as casinos to conceal the origin of funds (Levi & 
Reuter, 2009; Van Duyne, 2003). However, money laundering was criminalised as far back as 
1986. The Money Laundering Control Act of that year in the USA was an attempt to tackle the 
illicit proceeds from acts of bribery, drug trafficking, extortion and fraud. The motive was to 
aid in the war against drugs by reducing the profitability of organised crime from criminal 
activities. Additionally, a prevailing global belief was that to conceal the illicit funds, they were 
being moved to offshore jurisdictions and tax havens. Subsequently, the phenomenon of money 
laundering garnered attention as a threat to legitimacy and stability of financial systems and a 
source of reputational risk (Van Duyne & Levi, 2005). All these factors paved the way for the 
emergence of a consensus among global economic powers to develop and initiate a coordinated 
response to tackle the money-laundering problem. 
The United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 






was the first global step to address the problem of money laundering. The convention made 
offenders subject to money laundering prosecution if found trying to launder illicit wealth 
earned from production and sales of narcotics. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) was 
formed in 1989 by The Group of Seven (G7) to further combat the growing problem. The FATF 
expanded the scope of money laundering by criminalising proceeds derived from other illicit 
sources such as illegal arms sales, insider trading, embezzlement, bribery and fraud. Since then, 
in an attempt to curb this growing problem, the scope of money-laundering regulation has been 
regularly widened further, such as to include activities financing the act of terrorism (Unger, 
2013). 
The next section in this chapter provides a brief overview of research on money 
laundering and its related aspects. Following this, current works investigating shell companies 
are discussed to highlight the gaps in the literature. 
2.2  Review of money-laundering literature 
A systematic approach was used to investigate the current literature on money laundering 
and shell companies. First, Pro-Quest, Scopus and Science-Direct were searched for papers 
that contained the keywords “money launder*” in the title, abstract or keywords. Additional 
articles were obtained by investigating cited references and conducting Google Scholar 
searches. After an initial review of these papers, additional searches were conducted using 
keywords found in those articles. The additional search keywords were “shell compan*”,“shell 
firm*”, “anonymous compan*”, “front compan*”, “phantom firm*”, “dormant compan*”, and 
“sham corporation*” as documented in Table 1. 
S. No Database Search String Date Access Results 
1 Pro-Quest "Money Laundering" 15-05-21 14,623 
2 Scopus "Money Laundering" 15-05-21 2,806 
3 ScienceDirect "Money Laundering" 15-05-21 3,794 
4 Google Scholar "Money Laundering" 15-05-21 30,700 
5 Pro-Quest "Online Money Laundering" 14-01-21 10 
6 ScienceDirect "Money Laundering" AND 
"Australia" 
13-04-21 690 
7 Pro-Quest "Money Launderer" 28-02-21 309 
8 Scopus "Money Launderer" 12-05-21 104 






S. No Database Search String Date Access Results 
10 ScienceDirect “Shell Firms” AND “Money 
Laundering” 
09-04-21 3 
11 ScienceDirect “Shell Companies” AND “Money 
Laundering” 
09-04-21 66 
12 Scopus “Shell Companies” AND “Money 
Laundering” 
09-04-21 18 
13 Scopus “Shell Firms” AND “Money 
Laundering” 
09-04-21 4 
14 Scopus “Shell Firms” AND “Fraud” 09-04-21 3 
15 Scopus “Shell Companies” AND “Fraud” 09-04-21 14 
16 ScienceDirect “Shell Companies” AND “Fraud” 09-04-21 117 
17 ScienceDirect “Shell Firms” AND “Fraud” 09-04-21 8 
18 ProQuest “Shell Companies” AND “Money 
Laundering” 
11-05-21 390 
19 ProQuest “Shell Firms” AND “Money 
Laundering” 
11-05-21 4 
20 ProQuest “Dormant Firms” 20-04-21 111 
21 ProQuest “Dormant Firms” AND “Money 
Laundering” 
20-04-21 15 
22 Google Scholar “Shell Firms” AND “Money 
Laundering” 
11-05-21 53 





“Shell Firms” 20-04-21 21 
24 ProQuest 
Dissertation 
“Shell Firms” OR “Shell 
Companies” OR “Dormant Firms” 
AND “Money Laundering” 
12-05-21 789 
25 ScienceDirect "Shell firms" OR "Shell 




"Shell firms" OR "Shell 
Companies" OR "Dormant Firms" 
AND “Money Laundering” 
13-05-21 392 
27 ScienceDirect "Shell firms" OR "Shell 
Companies" OR "Dormant Firms" 







S. No Database Search String Date Access Results 
28 SAGE Journals "Shell firms" OR "Shell 
Companies" OR "Dormant Firms" 
AND “Money Laundering”  
20-05-21 169 
29 Scopus "Shell firms" OR "Shell 
Companies" OR "Dormant Firms" 
AND “Money Laundering” 
20-05-21 14 
30 Google Scholar "shell compan*" OR "anonymous 
compan*" OR "transit firm*" OR 
"taxhole compan*" OR "Front 
compan*" OR “front compan*” 
OR “mailbox compan*” OR “sham 
corporation*” OR “shelf compan*” 
OR “paper firm*” OR "paper 
compan*" OR “phantom firm*” 
OR “phantom compan*" 
 
27-03-21 34 
31 ProQuest "shell compan*" OR "anonymous 
compan*" OR "transit firm*" OR 
"taxhole compan*" OR "Front 
compan*" OR “front compan*” 
OR “mailbox compan*” OR “sham 
corporation*” OR “shelf compan*” 
OR “paper firm*” OR "paper 
compan*" OR “phantom firm*” 
OR “phantom compan*" 
 
17-02-21 8,252 
32 ScienceDirect "shell compan*" OR "anonymous 
compan*" OR "transit firm*" OR 
"taxhole compan*" OR "Front 
compan*" OR “front compan*” 
OR “mailbox compan*” OR “sham 
corporation*” OR “shelf compan*” 
OR “paper firm*” OR "paper 
compan*" OR “phantom firm*” 








Table 1. Search log with keywords 
Table 1 lists the database search strings that formed the basis of this review. The review 
of relevant studies led to a thematic categorisation of the literature on money laundering and 
shell companies. The categorisation foregrounds different aspects of the money-laundering 
process. Money laundering can be multi-faceted; for instance, the use of shell companies to 
launder funds does not rule out the use of banks in aiding the illicit activity. In such cases, only 
the most prominent part of the laundering technique is used for categorisation purposes. 
Additionally, the focus on money laundering literature is derived from the fact that shell 
companies are used to launder the proceeds of illicit activities such as drug-trafficking, 
robberies, smuggling, tax evasion, terrorism, bootlegging, art theft, vehicle theft, fraud and so 
forth (Mitchell et al., 1998a, 1998b). As a result, it becomes imperative to understand the work 
done around money laundering before focusing explicitly on shell companies and its uses in 
undertaking illicit activities. 
The review of money-laundering literature led to categorisation of the literature on 
money laundering into six broad categories as exhibited in Figure 2, namely, anti-money 
laundering (AML hereafter) framework and its effectiveness, the effect of money laundering 
on other fields and the economy, the role of actors and their relative importance, the magnitude 
of money laundering, and new opportunities for money laundering and its detection. The 
classification of the literature into those broad but overlapping categories above is to showcase 
the volume of work being undertaken concerning different aspects of money laundering. Such 
a cross-horizon review helps to identify areas that might have been overlooked or that have not 
been extensively researched. The following sub-sections provide an analysis of the critical 
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Figure 2: Classification of literature on money laundering 
 
 
2.2.1 AML framework and its effectiveness 
A fast-growing body of literature exists on AML and counter-financing of terrorism 
(CFT hereafter) framework and regulations. The effectiveness of the AML regime and its effect 
on illicit activities such as money laundering, terrorism, financing of crime and crime 
prevention and detection have been of interest to scholars (Anand, 2011; Barone & 
Masciandaro, 2011; Brzoska, 2016; Chaikin, 2009; Ferwerda, 2009; Harvey, 2008; Huang, 
2015; Masciandaro, 1998; Masciandaro & Portolano, 2003; Pellegrina & Masciandaro, 2009; 
Unger et al., 2014). The interest arises out of the need to provide sufficient justification for the 
cost incurred in implementing these regulations and their effectiveness in achieving the desired 
objectives.  
 Masciandaro (1998) and Masciandaro and Portolano (2003) termed AML legislation to 






Huang (2015) provided a macro-level analysis of the AML legislation present in the USA, 
including the reasons underlying its effective implementation. The study examined the 
effectiveness of the American AML regime on the banking sector and observed it has adverse 
socio-economic effects, in terms of fear of compliance and violation of regulations. Other 
jurisdictions have also been studied. Alberto (2016) examined the effectiveness of a new 
Spanish Act of financial ownership to combat money laundering and financing of terrorism by 
comparing it with models of France and Germany. He found the Act to have shortcomings in 
terms of data protection, automation in processing of personal data, and access to information 
by third parties without consent. Aurasu and Aspalella (2018) conducted a comparative 
analysis of Money Laundering Acts between the United Kingdom and Malaysia in terms of 
their forfeiture regime. These two countries share a similar legislative structure which 
facilitated comparison. It was concluded that the United Kingdom’s money laundering Act is 
more comprehensive than the Malaysian Act in terms of offences covered and the standard of 
proof. However, Norton (2018) critiqued the United Kingdom’s  AML legislative changes and 
highlighted its failure to clearly define “suspicious activity”, thus leading to a low threshold to 
report. As a result, there was a notable increase in the volume of reporting by auditors.  
Jakobi (2018) examined the global AML regime from a security governance perspective 
and concluded that AML represents the elements of security governance. Pol (2018a) extended 
this literature by focusing on AML practices and their effectiveness as a policy against defined 
outcomes as set by FATF. He found that FATF methodologies are not sufficient and a better 
implementation is required to achieve effective results. Pol (2018b) further questioned the other 
assumptions upon which the global AML/CFT framework is based, that is, whether forfeiture 
of criminal assets is a good measure of evaluating the success of AML policies and whether   
their extension as an obligation for new sectors will have an effect. 
Pellegrina and Masciandaro (2009) highlight the differences that exist between countries’ 
national legislation about the criminalisation of money-laundering activities. They suggest that 
eliminating the possibility of exploiting the differences between regulations across countries 
may help in increasing the effectiveness of the AML regulations. The need for international 
cooperation to bolster the  AML regime is supported by Ferwerda (2009). On the lines of 
assessing the AML effectiveness, Barone and Masciandaro (2011) estimated the public benefit 
for Europe from a drastic reduction in the money-laundering multiplier effect. They found the 
cost of AML regulations would increase to achieve a reduction in the multiplier effect and this 






view that a causal link exists such that effective AML regulations increase the costs for criminal 
organisations. They describe this as an efficient way to reduce money laundering. 
The debate around the AML framework and its effectiveness has led to the rapidly 
changing regulatory landscape to combat the problem of illicit activities including money 
laundering. It is demonstrated by the proposed changes made to the reforms to address the 
loopholes and effectively address the problem of money laundering (AUSTRAC, 2018; 
Bozhilova, 2018). For instance, a list of proposed changes has been suggested to the existing 
European Union’s Fifth Anti-Money Laundering Directive to address the loopholes in 
regulation. The proposed changes address aspects related to exchange and use of information 
and to the operational cooperation between financial intelligence units (FIUs) of the member 
states, as well as between FIUs and competent authorities within the member states. The goal 
is to reduce opportunities for illicit actors to take advantage of national differences in the 
definition, scope and sanctioning of money-laundering offences which result in sub-optimal 
cooperation between concerned authorities of member states. The proposals seek to incorporate 
changes in line with other policies pursued by the EU, such as the reformed data protection 
regime (Bozhilova, 2018).  
 
 
Prominent Work Key Objective Key Findings 
Ferwerda (2009) Assess the role of AML 
policies in deterring 
criminals from illegal 
activities 




Estimate the public 
benefit of reducing 
money laundering 
• In Europe, an estimated public benefit of USD 
7.71 billion for an increase of USD 5.45 billion 
in the cost of AML regulations 
Unger et al. (2014) Analyse the AML/CFT 
regimes of EU member 
states 
• Effectiveness of AML policy was dependent 
upon national institutions in member states 
Huang et al. (2015) Analyse US AML 
legislation to determine 
its effectiveness 
• The US AML legislation was found to be 
comprehensive 
• This legislation is enforced diligently, which has 






institutions in terms of adherence, and thus 
undermining their effectiveness 
Pol (2018) Analyse the 
effectiveness of the 
AML regime against 
FATF defined outcomes 
• AML policies were determined to be ineffective 
and considered as a waste of resources and 
efforts 
• The need was proposed for development of       a 
new set of strategies 




affiliations and Basel 
AML Index 
• Irregularity in guidelines used by countries to 
develop AML regulatory policy undermines 
AML security 
• Need to maintain continuing and consistent 
compliance standards across all affiliation 
groups, and facilitate cross-jurisdictional 
cooperation among financial intelligence 
agencies 
Table 2. Overview of research on the effectiveness of AML 
2.2.2 Effect of money laundering on other fields and the economy 
Apart from critiquing the AML framework, researchers have also focused on the relation 
of money laundering with various other fields and its effect on the overall economy. The effect 
of money laundering and tax havens on each other has been examined by many scholars 
(Dharmapala & Hines, 2009; Masciandaro, 2008; Rose & Spiegel, 2007). Schwarz (2011) 
extended this literature by determining the incentives for tax havens to maintain low regulatory 
standards for attracting dirty money and thus provide money-laundering services. Picard and 
Pieretti (2011) aimed at observing the effect of pressure policies such as blacklisting and 
sanctions on offshore financial centres (OFCs hereafter) and their ability to ensure compliance 
with AML regulations. Instead of analysing the desirability or harm of tax havens (Alstadsæter 
et al., 2018; Christensen, 2012; Chu et al., 2015), Picard and Pieretti focused on the incentives 
for offshore governments and banks to comply with AML regulations. They found that offshore 
banks would comply under pressure policies, provided the pressure had the potential to harm 
the reputation of investors.  
Knowledge of accounting has always been essential and used by various stakeholders in 
promoting their respective interests (Kenno & Free, 2018); with the advent of technological 






assessed the importance of accounting knowledge in undertaking money-laundering and terror-
financing activities by using a theoretical approach. He concluded that money laundering and 
terror financing differ concerning financial sophistication and psychological profile. Irwin et 
al. (2012) also found that money launderers and terrorist financiers exhibit different laundering 
techniques and launder different amounts; the techniques involved in money laundering are 
sophisticated, and the asset value involved is higher, as compared with terrorist financing. 
The importance of accounting practices in undertaking illicit activities such as money 
laundering and corruption, and facilitating a criminal network between the perpetuators, was 
supported by Mitchell et al. (1998b) and Neu et al. (2013). A large sum of money cannot be 
laundered without the help of accountants and other professionals who use their expertise to 
obscure and conceal the illicit source of funds. Mitchell et al. (1998a; 1998b)  used case studies 
to examine the role of accountants in undertaking illicit activities. Before this study, the 
scrutiny of links between white-collar crimes and accountants was limited only to social 
scientists and was neglected by accounting academics. The study emphasised the involvement 
of accountants in money laundering and the unwillingness of regulators to investigate them. 
Ravenda et al. (2017) contributed to this by extending the literature on the use of accounting 
practices for undertaking money-laundering activities to Italian Mafia firms. Further to this, 
the need to focus on the use of forensic accounting and its knowledge to combat illicit activities 
has been emphasised by Botes and Saadeh (2018).  
The effect of money laundering on the economy and vice versa has also been examined. 
According to Dowers and Palmreuther (2003) and Drayton (2002), money laundering harms 
the economy by causing monetary and socio-economic instability and economic distortions; it 
promotes corruption and a more vulnerable financial system.  Stack (2015b) examined the role 
of money-laundering organisations in Ukraine to facilitate tax evasion and corruption. He 
found that a massive amount of dirty money is generated and used to satisfy the greed of state 
actors. Similarly, Hendriyetty and Grewal (2017) found that money laundering increases 
criminal activities and the shadow economy, and also reduces tax collections. On the other 
hand, Barone et al. (2018) analysed the effect of macroeconomic cycles on illicit capital and 
money-laundering activities to determine whether business cycles can influence trends and 
activities in illegal markets and money laundering. They found that during different economic 
cycles, the capacity of illegal capital that the market can sustain varies.  






Schwarz (2011) Analyse the relationship 
between money laundering 
and tax havens 
• They coincide within the same country 
• Poorer countries are more inclined towards providing 
money-laundering services 
Balakina et al. 
(2017) 
Empirically evaluate whether 
there is a stigma from FATF 
blacklisting about banking 
secrecy 
• No stigma effect is found 
• Change in demand for banking secrecy is due to a 
change in incentives rather than blacklisting 
• Incentives may be economic, political or criminal  
Barone et al. (2018) Determine the effect of 
business cycles on money 
laundering 
• Illegal markets grow at rates that depend upon the 
condition of the legal economy 
• The pass-through effect exists since the business cycle 
influences legal markets that are used by illegal 
operators to reinvest their profits 
Mitchell et al. 
(1998) 
Investigate the relationship 
between accountants and 
regulators, and any protection 
of illicit professionals. 
• The reluctance of regulators to pursue accountants and 
larger accounting firms suggests the presence of a 
regulatory apparatus to shield the activities of 
accountancy firms from critical scrutiny 
Ravenda et al. 
(2017) 
Examine the use of 
accounting practices on 
money-laundering activities 
• Empirical evidence suggests that strategic 
management of accounting transactions is occurring to 
assist money-laundering activities within Mafia-
controlled firms  
Habib et al. (2018) Investigate the relationship 
between money laundering 
and audit fees 
• A positive association exists between money 
laundering and audit fees 
• Money laundering raises audit fees by increasing the 
overall business risk unrelated to financial reporting 
quality 
Loayza et al. 
(2019) 
Provide an economic analysis 
of illicit activities and money 
laundering 
• Presents measures to assess the effects of changes in 
government efficiency, licit sector productivity, and 
the demand for illegal drugs 
• Monitors changes in trends in volume of laundered 
assets 
Table 3. Overview of research on the effect of money laundering on other fields and the economy 
2.2.3 The role of actors and their relative importance 
Prior literature has studied the role of actors involved in money-laundering activities, 







It becomes quite vital to determine the importance of money launderers in undertaking 
such an illicit activity. Furthermore, it is critical to understand their source of motivation 
(Barone et al., 2018; Barone & Masciandaro, 2011; Barone & Schneider, 2018). Van Duyne 
(2003) and Reuter and Truman (2004) found that criminals generally laundered money 
themselves rather than hiring professionals to do it. On the contrary, Soudijn (2012) reported 
that professionals are an essential part of criminal networks, but he did not specify their 
involvement in drug markets. 
 Malm and Bichler (2013) tried to address the question of who launders money and their 
respective roles in the criminal network. The authors found the importance of money launderers 
to be higher in drug markets than any other illicit market and found support for the notion of a 
social snowball effect whereby the social circle of a person played an important role in entering 
the illicit drug market.  This notion was reiterated by Gilmour (2015) who characterised the 
importance of the social and cultural context of a person in influencing his decisions to commit 
an offence or not. On examining the importance of legal and finance professionals in money-
laundering activities, Benson (2016) found that the decision to launder criminal proceeds is 
influenced by the nature of the occupational role, social relationships and dynamics, and also 
by the circumstances leading up to and surrounding the point at which the decision is made. 
Other research supports the importance of organisational climate and financial incentives in 
influencing actions of the concerned stakeholders (Andon et al., 2018; Kumar et al., 2018; 
Murphy & Free, 2016). 
The decision to undertake a criminal activity can be attributed to cost-benefit analysis 
(Becker, 1968). McCarthy et al. (2015) attempted to address the effect of the kind of financial 
benefits being offered. The authors found that the payoff to the launderer increases when his 
legal wage rate increases, when a criminal’s legal wage rate decreases, and when the probability 
of detection increases. 
The literature has also focused on actors responsible for curbing financial crimes such as 
money laundering. On analysing the extent of auditors’ compliance concerning legislative 
changes in the United Kingdom’s AML, Norton (2018) found the level of suspicious activity 
reporting by auditors to be relatively low in comparison with professionals from other sectors. 
He attributed it to having a standardised format for reporting suspicious activity and the nature 
of the occupation whereby adverse audit reports can result in auditors losing clients. While Liss 






laundering through the concept of global governmentality, K. Murray (2018) and Howieson 
(2018) stressed the need to address wilful blindness and a lack of epistemic virtues in 
professionals’ codes of conduct to minimise the opportunities for fraud and money laundering.  
2.2.4 Magnitude of money laundering 
Understanding the magnitude of any problem is a key aspect of solving it. In the case of 
money laundering, this would imply first determining its seriousness and its effect on the 
macroeconomy, and then evaluating the effectiveness of countermeasures over time. The same 
holds for money laundering. Researchers have long attempted to quantify the extent to which 
money is being laundered (Quirk, 1997; Tanzi, 1996). One of the most notable works in this 
area is by Walker (1999). The study presented what has come to be known as the “Walker 
model of global money laundering”, and it relies upon a wide range of publicly available 
databases. The model suggested that the global amount of money subject to laundering was 
USD 2.85 billion per year in 1999 with the most flows in Europe and North America.  
Numerous researchers have since focused on quantifying the amount of money being 
laundered and by what  means (Ardizzi et al., 2014; Argentiero et al., 2008; Barone & 
Masciandaro, 2011; Barone & Schneider, 2018; Biagioli, 2008; Ferwerda et al., 2013; Hassan 
& Schneider, 2016a, 2016b; Medina & Schneider, 2018; Schneider, 2010; Schneider & Enste, 
2000b; Schott, 2006; Unger, 2013; Unger & Hertog, 2012; Walker & Unger, 2009; Zdanowicz, 
2004b, 2009). Researchers have used a variety of methods including case studies, proxy 
variables and economic models. Unger (2013) classified ways of measuring money laundering 
into two categories, namely, using proxies (such as GDP, world-wide proceeds of crime and 
balance of payments discrepancies) and through the use of economic models (such as the 
dynamic two-sector model and Walker-Gravity model). 
Prominent 
Work 
Key Objective Key Findings 
Walker (1999) Develop a crime-economic model 
from public data to determine and 
monitor the size of global money 
laundering  
• USD 2.85 billion is laundered globally per year 
• The United States was the most frequent origin and 
destination of laundered money 
Argentiero et al. 
(2008) 
Measure money laundering for the 
Italian economy 
• Money laundering accounted for 12% of GDP 
• Money laundering is more volatile than GDP and is 








Develop a model for measuring 
money laundering 
• A gravity model was presented estimating the flows of 
illicit funds from and to each jurisdiction in the world 
Zdanowicz 
(2009) 
Measure, detect and monitor trade-
based money laundering 
• Anomalies were identified in trade transaction data 
which act as a mean of monitoring, detecting and 
prosecuting trade-based money-laundering activities 
• The variables considered were country, customs district, 
product and transaction price risk 
Schneider 
(2010) 
Estimate the turnover of organised 
crime from 1995 to 2006 for 20 
OECD countries. 
• Turnover of organised crime activities increased from 




Measure the role of money 
laundering in organised crime in the 
European legal economy through 
the measurement of ownership of 
legal assets 
• Money laundering by criminals facilitates their investing 
cash in legal and illegal sectors  
• Money laundering to clean illicit funds in Eastern Europe 




Determine whether money 
laundering has decreased over time 
• There was no substantial decline in proceeds of crime 
and therefore no decline in money laundering 
• A combination of economic information and 
criminological data was proposed, to develop a new tool 
for identifying money laundering in sectors such as trade 
and real estate 
Ferwerda et al. 
(2013) 
Develop a model for trade-based 
money laundering 
• Countries with strict AML regulation experience more 
trade-related money laundering 
Unger (2013) Determine whether money 
laundering has decreased over time 
• Money laundering did not decrease over the last two 
decades 
• This was attributed to broadening of the concept of 
money laundering to include other predicate crimes such 
as tax evasion 
Ardizzi et al. 
(2014) 
Ascertain the proportion of cash 
from criminal activities deposited in 
financial institutions in Italy  
• Dirty money accounted for 7.5% of GDP in North Italy 
and 5.1% of GDP in the South. 
Collin (2019) Summarise empirical work in area 
of illegal and harmful cross-border 
financial flows 
• Literature on illicit financial flows (IFFs) can be 
categorised into methods of measuring IFFs, constructed 
risk indicators. and forensic studies that aim to uncover 






Table 4. Overview of research on the magnitude of money laundering 
However, there exists a school of thought that criticises these estimates and deems them 
to be inaccurate and misleading in estimating the correct amount of funds being laundered 
(Levi & Reuter, 2006; Pol, 2018b; Reuter & Greenfield, 2001; Reuter & Truman, 2004; 
Thoumi, 2005). Unger (2013) attributed the lack of a precise estimate of the size of money 
laundering to the concealed nature of the underlying crime and the amount of proceeds 
generated. 
2.2.5 New opportunities for money laundering 
Speer (2000) deemed the threat of cybercrime to be substantial, and correctly predicted 
that it would grow with increases in knowledge about computers and other technologies. This 
new form of criminal activity mainly comprises a computer, a network and a human interface 
that allows the perpetrators to steal money using the network (Sood et al., 2013). Researchers 
have recently directed attention towards understanding the costs and proceeds of cybercrimes 
(Anderson et al., 2013; Levi et al., 2016; Levi et al., 2017; Schneider, 2017a, 2017b; Schneider 
& Linsbauer, 2016). With a rapid transformation in crimes, it becomes imperative to 
distinguish between new cybercrimes and those that are e-enabled. Cybercrimes by definition 
do not exist outside of the cyber domain; such effects as they may have spilling over are also 
relatively low.   E-enabled crimes, on the other hand, are existing criminal acts that have 
flourished through easier use of technology (Burden & Palmer, 2003). Consequently, criminal 
activities such as hacking and malware attacks are examples of cybercrimes whereas activities 
such as money laundering and phishing are e-enabled crimes. The online platform is an 
enabling factor in overcoming the constraints of a social network such as geographical or social 
barriers, and it facilitates collaboration with perpetrators across the globe, substantially 
increasing the opportunity to commit illicit acts (Leukfeldt, 2014).  
There has also been growth in the literature based on the new opportunities for illicit 
money-laundering activities. These have come about because of rapid advances in technology. 
Barone and Schneider (2018) view as a growing threat cyberlaundering and money laundering 
accomplished through the use of automatic electronic devices. 
 Irwin et al. (2012) proposed that an understanding of the modus operandi for money 
laundering and terror financing could be used to develop typologies for the virtual world. 






methods for laundering funds. He found two fundamental forces providing opportunities for 
money laundering: online gaming, and micro-laundering, which involves moving a small 
amount of funds over a large number of transactions. He concluded that traditional methods of 
laundering funds have evolved through the online medium and an understanding of the modus 
operandi of such new methods would enable better detection. It has led to some work being 
undertaken to monitor new opportunities that may have become available to launder funds. 
By analysing E-Gold and Liberty Reserve fraud cases, Stuhlmiller (2013) found that the 
anonymity of virtual currency transactions and lack of regulatory oversight were prominent 
catalysts for their use as new laundering methods. On the contrary, Dostov and Shust (2014), 
on investigating cryptocurrencies such as Digicash and Bitcoin and the threats they pose in  
money laundering and financing of terrorism, found that the feature of anonymity is unlikely 
to make them popular among its users. According to them, cryptocurrencies have limitations 
in terms of negotiability, risk and the need for specialised training. In other words, as there is 
no universal acceptability for cryptocurrencies, the need to exchange them for fiat money arises 
at some point. Secondly, cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoins are unequally distributed and are 
highly volatile, which makes them unattractive. Dostov and Shust also stressed the importance 
of examining each cryptocurrency and its characteristics separately to develop an appropriate 
regulatory framework. The need to have a regulatory framework in place to combat the threats 
posed by cryptocurrencies towards money laundering and financing of terrorism is supported 
by Choo (2015). 
To address the problem of anonymity and untraceable nature of cryptocurrency 
transactions, Turner and Irwin (2018) attempted to de-anonymise Bitcoin transactions using a 
variety of software tools. The authors found that while it was possible to follow a transaction 
across the blockchain, the anonymity feature inherent in the system was not overcome. The 
technological innovations have paved new ways to perpetuate organised crimes. Silk Road is 
one such example that has drawn attention from academics and enforcement agencies alike 
(Barratt, 2012; Bright et al., 2012; Christin, 2012; Hout & Bingham, 2013). 
2.2.6 Detection of money laundering 
With the growing focus on illicit activities, the academic literature has emphasised 
coming up with a wide variety of automated detection systems to detect such illicit activities 
(Baader & Krcmar, 2018; Battaglia et al., 2018; Chang et al., 2008; Gepp, 2015, 2016; Gepp 






et al., 2015; Sahin et al., 2013; Singh & Best, 2019; Song et al., 2014; Van Vlasselaer et al., 
2017; Wedge et al., 2017). As per Ngai et al. (2011), although the application of data mining 
techniques has been extended towards the detection of insurance fraud, there existed a distinct 
lack of research on mortgage fraud, money laundering and securities and commodities fraud. 
Since then researchers have investigated both machine-learning and traditional statistical 
approaches to detect money laundering (Bidabad, 2017; Chang et al., 2008; Colladon & 
Remondi, 2017; Deng et al., 2009; Drezewski et al., 2012; Gao, 2009; Gao & Ye, 2007; 
Gilmour, 2017; Irwin et al., 2012; Ju & Zheng, 2009; Ngai et al., 2011; Perols, 2011b; Regan 
et al., 2017; Savage, 2017; Savage et al., 2016; Turner & Irwin, 2018; Unger et al., 2011; Wang 
et al., 2007; Zdanowicz, 2004a, 2009; Zhang et al., 2003). Zhang et al. (2003) on using the 
Link Discovery method based on Correlation Analysis (LDCA) suggested that the possibility 
of being associated with a money-laundering scheme would depend upon the correlation 
between financial transaction patterns of two persons. Zdanowicz (2004a, 2009) proposed the 
use of statistical analysis to monitor and detect trade-based money laundering. He extended 
upon the already-existing empirical evidence of trade-based money laundering to be found in 
academic and professional literature. He stated that detection of trade-price manipulations by 
identifying anomalies in trade data might help in detecting money laundering of funds derived 
from activities such as for financing the acts of terrorism, tax avoidance or evasion, dumping 
of goods, concealment of illegal commission and so forth, by focusing on country, customs 
district, product and transaction price risk characteristics. 
Chang et al. (2008) highlighted the use of a set of coordinated visualisations based upon 
keywords identification in wire transactions to detect fraudulent transactions. The authors on 
depicting the relationship between keywords and accounts over time were able to detect 
transactions and accounts exhibiting suspicious behaviours. Similarly, Deng et al. (2009) came 
up with an active learning sequential design (ALSD) approach to detect instances of money 
laundering. The study was motivated by the need to identify and prioritise relevant suspicious 
transactions among the large volume of financial transactions that occur daily. The idea was to 
help investigators focus attention and direct resources to accounts which are suspicious and 
improve money-laundering detection with minimal time and effort. The authors found the 
model to outperform stochastic approximations in detecting money-laundering transactions. 
Savage et al. (2016) presented a system for detection of money-laundering activities through 






system on real-world data found that the system was able to detect suspicious activity with a 
low rate of false positives. 
Prominent 
Work 
Key Objective Key Findings 
Gao et al. (2007) Develop a framework for data-
mining based on AML research 
• Pattern discovery techniques can deal with complex non-
numeric evidence and involve structured objects, text and a 
variety of discrete and continuous data 
• Link discovery, social network analysis and graph theory can 
be used as money-laundering detection tools 
Deng et al. (2009) Develop an active learning 
sequential design approach 
(ALSD) to detect money- 
laundering transactions 
• The model outperformed stochastic approximations in 
detecting money-laundering transactions. 
Ngai et al. (2011) Review literature about using 
data mining to detect money 
laundering 
• A distinct lack of research exists on mortgage fraud and money 
laundering 
Ravenda et al. 
(2015) 
Develop a model for detecting 
legally registered mafia firms 
• The developed model correctly classified 76.41% of firms 
within a matched sample of 853 firm-year observations. 
Wedge et al. 
(2017) 
Use an automated approach to 
reduce false positives in fraud 
detection. 
• False positives could be reduced by 54% on holdout data of 
1.852 million transactions 
Van Vlasselaer et 
al. (2017) 
Examine the effect of network 
information for social security 
fraud detection  
• Domain-driven network variables have a substantial effect on 
fraud detection 
• Improves rate of fraudulent detection by 55% 
Baader et al. 
(2018) 
Determine whether a 
combination of red flags and 
process mining techniques 
reduces false positives in fraud 
detection 
• The authors found the false positive rate to be 0.37%, which 
was lower than rates reported in other research 
Singh and Best 
(2019) 
Use visualisation techniques to 
efficiently identify patterns of 
money laundering 
• Banking transactions can be visualised using link analysis 
• Subtle indications of suspicious behaviour were identified; for 
example, transactions of more than $10,000, and multiple 
transactions below $10,000 
Table 5. Overview of research on the detection of money laundering and other illicit activities 
Overall, the literature has focused on attempting to detect money laundering being 






among others as exhibited by Figure 3. Ferwerda et al. (2013); Zdanowicz (2009) and Unger 
(2013) directed attention towards the detection of money laundering being undertaken through 
real estate and trade. Turner and Irwin (2018) found technological innovations such as bitcoin 
provided opportunities to launder money and suggested means of detection. Gilmour (2017) 
studied the use of high-value portable commodities being used to launder funds in the United 
Kingdom and abroad. Bidabad (2017) suggested mechanisms to detect money laundering being 
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Figure 3: Literature on detection of money laundering  
However, the detection of money laundering through shell companies has received 
limited attention. In other words, attempts are in the nascent stage towards identifying shell 
companies being used for illicit activities such as bribery, corruption and money laundering. 
The next sub-section will provide an overview of shell companies and the limited work that 
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Figure 5: Uses of shell companies 
A review of the literature on shell companies led to classification into five broad 
categories as exhibited in Figure 4: namely, shell companies and its legitimate uses; illicit uses 
of shell companies (as exhibited in Figure 5); the effectiveness of regulations related to shell 
companies; the importance of transparency; and the detection of illicit shell companies. The 
following sub-sections provide a brief overview through key papers in each of these categories. 
2.3.1 Shell companies and their legitimate uses 
Shell Companies, also known as front companies or anonymous companies, are entities 
with no to minimal operations and assets, and generally do not exhibit a physical presence. 
Private companies to become publicly listed may use shell companies (Aydogdu et al., 2007). 
According to Floros and Sapp (2011), the purpose of shell firms may range from gaining a tax 
advantage, avoiding legal liability, facilitating collection of income from patents and other such 
intangible assets, but the majority of these entities aim to be acquired or merge with another 
firm.  
The use of publicly-listed shell companies by private companies to go public is called 
reverse mergers. A substantial amount of literature exists examining the use of shell companies 






2007; Chen et al., 2016; Chen & Soileau, 2014; Floros & Sapp, 2011; Gleason et al., 2005; Lee 
et al., 2015; Poulsen & Stegemoller, 2008; Semenenko, 2011; Sjostrom, 2008). 
 
Prominent Work Key Objective Key Findings 
Gleason et al. (2005) Examine reverse takeovers 
to determine the generation 
of long-term wealth 
• A small improvement in operations and profitability was 
found after reverse takeover; only 46% of the sample 
survived for two years 
• Reverse takeovers may provide an alternative means of 
going public, but are often risky and may fail to 
generate long-term wealth 
Sjostrom (2008) Examine reverse mergers as 
a method of going public 
• Reverse mergers are often termed cheaper and quicker 
than traditional initial public offers, but this is not the 
case for many companies 
Floros and Sapp 
(2011) 
Investigate the value of shell 
companies for private firms 
• The performance of shell companies is irrelevant to a 
private firm. They seek a shell company with a clean 
history and a quick path to a merger 
• The expected reward to investors from a shell reverse 
merger is justified by the growth of shell firms for a 
reverse merger 
Chen and Soileau 
(2014) 
Examine the earnings 
quality of US domestic 
firms that access capital 
markets via a reverse 
merger compared to those 
via initial public offers 
• Reverse merger firms have lower earnings quality 
compared to US initial public offer firms 
• Investors, regulators, auditors and other stakeholders 
should consider the method that firms use to access 
capital markets in their investment decision-making 
process  
Lee et al. (2015) Compare the after-merger 
performance of Chinese 
reverse mergers with control 
firms rather than initial 
public offer firms 
• Chinese reverse mergers outperformed control firms 
• Chinese reverse mergers are not toxic investments 
Table 6. Overview of research on shell companies and their legitimate uses 
Aydogdu et al. (2007) deemed reverse mergers efficient and cost-effective as several 
requirements associated with an Initial Public Offering (IPO) can be avoided. They examined 
the trading activity around reverse mergers to search for market-wide stock price manipulation 






are considered positive as reflected by increasing stock prices and statistically significant 
positive returns. However, the results were inconclusive as to whether reverse mergers are 
value-increasing events for shell companies. 
Chen and Soileau (2014), on comparing the earnings quality of US-based domestic firms, 
extended the literature on reverse mergers by finding that reverse-merger firms had lower 
earnings quality compared with IPO firms during the period from 1997 to 2011. Lee et al. 
(2015) added to the knowledge of performance, financial health, benefits and disadvantages of 
reverse mergers by comparing the after-merger return performance of US control firms with 
that of Chinese reverse mergers.  
2.3.2 Illicit uses of shell companies 
Apart from being used in reverse mergers, shell companies are used as holding companies 
or for protecting small entrepreneurs from bankruptcy risks. They are also referred to as 
fictitious entities, sham companies, front companies, pass-throughs and anonymous 
companies, and are often used for a wide range of illicit activities such as bribery, corruption, 
financial statement fraud, tax evasion, terrorist financing, money laundering, sanction evasion 
and cybercrimes (Findley et al., 2013; Hubbs, 2018). The literature, both professional and 
academic, available on shell companies has focused on its illicit uses (Cooley et al., 2018; 
Cowdock, 2017; Does de Willebois et al., 2011; Findley et al., 2013, 2015; Gup & Beekarry, 
2009; Harding, 2016; Hubbs, 2018; Jancsics, 2017; Stack, 2015b, 2015c). 
Prominent Work Key Objective Key Findings 
Christensen (2011) Investigate the role of tax 
havens in facilitating offshore 
shell companies used to hide 
and disguise illicit financial 
flows 
• Tax havens have become a prominent part of globalised 
capital markets, and their activities create a criminal 
environment where illicit financial flows can be 
disguised as legitimate transactions 
Stack (2015b) Examine the role of shell 
companies in Ukraine in 
facilitating tax evasion and 
corruption 
• Shell companies generate a considerable international 
flow of dirty money and within Ukraine as well. State 
actors utilise these organisations. 
Jancsics (2017) Provide an insight into the use 
of corporate vehicles by 
corrupt officials in Hungary 
• Shell companies were used by public officials either to 







Alstadsæter et al. 
(2018) 
Determine the amount of 
wealth owned by each country 
in offshore tax havens  
• The equivalent of 10% of world GDP is held in tax 
havens 
• Most of Russia’s wealth is held offshore 
Table 7. Overview of research on illicit uses of shell companies 
Gup and Beekarry (2009) analysed the characteristics of limited liability companies and 
the extent to which they pose a threat to money laundering and terror financing. The 
characteristic traits of these entities such as secrecy, flexibility, low cost of incorporation and 
compliance requirements made them an attractive tool for illicit actors. This study found that 
LLCs provide opportunities for tax evasion, regulatory evasion, money laundering, and 
financing acts of terrorism. The authors suggested the need to focus on due-diligence 
requirements and increasing transparency. 
Additionally, they point out the limitations of FATF recommendations concerning 
anonymous entities which are limited to identification of the beneficial owner. The authors 
suggest adoption of a proactive approach towards those responsible for the incorporation of 
such entities; they also favour the employment of professionals. Singh (2010), using a case 
study analysis, attempted to identify the attributes of shell companies in India and made 
recommendations for Indian regulatory authorities. He observed that these entities were used 
for rotation and siphoning of funds, creation of equity in their names, and for holding real 
estate. Similarly, Does de Willebois et al. (2011) point towards the use of legal structures in 
the United Kingdom to accomplish such illicit activities. On observing one hundred and fifty 
cases of large-scale corruption, they found that many involved the use of shell companies to 
hide illicit wealth. 
Stack (2015c) analysed the role of shell companies in Latvian-type correspondent 
banking and resulting money laundering operations. He examined financial flows from Russia 
and the former Soviet Union, and highlighted the use of shell companies in the movement of 
funds from those associated with corruption and organised crime. He found that these entities 
moved funds from Russia, Ukraine and other Soviet countries through international 
correspondent banking relations to offshore savings accounts and business suppliers. Jancsics 
(2017) added to this discussion by describing how corrupt public officials use corporate 
vehicles in Hungary. The study aimed at understanding the reasons for using shell companies 
in fraudulent transactions, identifying the sectors in which these entities are most frequently 






context for their existence. He found that all the reported cases of corruption were related to 
public policy decisions and involved shell companies. They were used mainly in the tobacco 
and agricultural sector with the objective of distribution of resources for client-building or for 
market capture. 
The intensive use of shell companies for illicit purposes by a wide range of users was 
highlighted in the report known as the Panama Papers by the International Consortium of 
Investigative Journalists (Harding, 2016; Obermayer et al., 2016). Similarly, Cooley et al. 
(2018) detail various instances of how shell companies have been used by kleptocrats to 
launder funds.  
The literature has also emphasised the critical role that offshore centres and tax havens 
have played in the growth of shell companies (Alstadsæter et al., 2018; Christensen, 2011, 
2012; Picard & Pieretti, 2011; Sikka & Willmott, 2010; Stack, 2015a, 2015b, 2015c; Zucman 
et al., 2015). Sikka and Willmott (2010) examined the role of tax havens and shell companies 
to evade taxes. The authors observed that 26 percent of assets and 31 percent of net profits of 
American multinational corporations were in tax havens, and over three thousand major US 
companies were sheltering in the US Virgin Islands and Barbados alone. The authors found 
that entities would sell their products to trading subsidiaries at below-market prices, which in 
turn would sell the products to end customers at market prices and pocket the difference. The 
trade subsidiaries located in tax havens were generally shell companies. 
Similarly, Christensen (2011, 2012) and Harding (2016) highlighted the role of tax 
havens in facilitating shell companies to hide and disguise illicit financial flows and beneficial 
ownership, thus aiding in corruption. Zucman et al. (2015) highlighted that shell company and 
offshore accounts allow the rich to invest at home and abroad under a shroud of anonymity, 
thus facilitating evasion of taxes. According to Alstadsæter et al. (2018), ten percent of the total 
world’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is held in tax havens with most of this being held in 
the British Virgin Islands, Panama and other such tax havens where the wealth is held mainly 
in  shell corporations. 
2.3.3 Effectiveness of regulations related to shell companies 
The possible damage associated with the use of shell companies comprises financial 
losses, both direct and indirect, reputational damage, loss of operations and the possibility of 






compliance professionals, business partners and agents, wholesalers, customers, government 
operatives (especially tax officials), anti-corruption non-governmental organisations (NGOs 
hereafter), and so forth. The scholarly attention received has resulted in suggestions and 
recommendations being made as well as the reasons being identified for the failure to combat 
this growing problem (Allred et al., 2017; Bateman, 2016; Cowdock, 2017; Does de Willebois 
et al., 2011; Findley et al., 2013, 2015; Gilbert & Sharman, 2016; Gup & Beekarry, 2009; Ho, 
2017; Hubbs, 2018; Jancsics, 2017; Lee & Palstra, 2018; D. Murray, 2018; Niels & Gabriel, 
2014; Pol, 2018a, 2018b; Sharman, 2012, 2013; Vail, 2018; Vaughan, 2018; Zucman et al., 
2015).  
Bateman (2016) emphasised the need to have a legal framework for regulating shell 
companies. Efforts have been made to increase the transparency of such entities by providing 
beneficial ownership information to prevent them from being used for money laundering, 
corruption, bribery, terrorism financing and other such crimes. The FATF, the international 
institution responsible for overseeing corporate transparency, and the G20 have continuously 
urged countries to implement standards for regulating beneficial ownership information to 
increase trust in businesses, improve corporate accountability and to facilitate successful 
combatting of illicit practices (Ho, 2017). Similarly, Vail (2018) emphasised the need to have 
transparent beneficial owner information, a shared beneficial owner registry and the ways to 
accomplish it. However, despite the emphasis placed on transparency through international 
standards and recommendations, the incidence of non-compliance highlights the failure of 
policymakers and scholars to assess the effectiveness of policies. They tend not to consider the 
countervailing pressures that are faced by democratic governments as they attempt to tackle 
the problems of corruption; at times, these pressures may be related to personal benefit or 
electoral incentives.   
Sharman (2012) stated that shell companies that cannot be traced to real owners act as a 
corporate veil to conceal the proceeds of crime and corruption. The emphasis on corporate 
transparency would facilitate law enforcement agents to catch wrongdoers. As per Sharman 
(2012), the information on beneficial owners could be accessed in two ways. First, the 
corporate registry is required to collect and hold information with proofs about the identities 
of beneficial owners. Another way is to regulate the company service providers (CSPs 
hereafter) who could collect information about the beneficial owners of entities and provide it       
to regulators upon request. The CSPs may be individuals, law firms or other firms with the sole 






a developing country and take care of the formalities required for establishing a company on 
behalf of a client, the beneficial owner (Sharman, 2013). There do exist international 
regulations such as the FATF guidelines to prevent the use of legal entities for hiding and 
transferring the proceeds of crime and corruption by regulating licensing of CSPs, subjecting 
them to a legal duty of collecting, holding and verifying identification data and imposing 
penalties on failure to do so (FATF, 2012). However, as Sharman (2012) points out, it is costly 
to ensure enforcement of international standards. Additionally, there is a lack of resources in 
maintaining access to beneficial ownership information.  
The efforts and resources directed towards fighting money laundering and corruption are 
linked with restrictions placed on the formation of anonymous companies. The more 
restrictions there are on forming these, the more need there will be for directing resources. 
Findley et al. (2013) examined the effectiveness of regulations restricting the formulation of 
anonymous companies. The study was motivated by concerns surrounding the effectiveness of 
these restrictions because of different geographical locations of illicit actors and the legal 
domicile of CSPs. They found non-compliance with international standards requiring CSPs to 
obtain documentation identifying the beneficial owners. Anonymous companies were still 
being created and the presence of international standards did not increase compliance rates.  
Findley et al. (2015) extended their previous study and found evidence that contradicts 
the common notion that OECD countries are compliant with international standards while 
developing countries are unable to comply and tax havens are unwilling to comply. Overall, 
raising the standards of international law, in terms of strict regulations to comply with, was 
found to have no significant effect, with material self-interest remaining a powerful compulsion     
to violate international standards. Allred et al. (2017) extended this research stream further with 
a focus on corporate governance and its execution. They found that country-level compliance 
with international standards is not an indicator of firm-level compliance, and this is consistent 
with Findley et al. (2015). 
Motivated by the tendency of the world literature to have an overstated notion of 
compliance with international standards, Gilbert and Sharman (2016) shifted the focus of 
compliance away from firms and over to states and governments. The objective was to 
determine whether democracies would comply with international standards prohibiting foreign 
bribery.  The study employed process-tracing case studies of British Aerospace, the Australian 






Australian and British governments concerning the violation of the OECD Anti-Bribery 
Convention. The failure of democratic governments to investigate the crimes of their respective 
corporate citizens suggests a disinclination towards compliance rather than a lack of ability. 
Gilbert and Sharman also point to the need to better protect and encourage whistle-blowers, 
anti-corruption NGOs and investigative journalists. Similarly, Jancsics (2017) provides 
explanations for the failure of conventional anti-corruption policies against shell companies in 
Central Europe, thereby further highlighting the fact that compliance frameworks alone are not 
enough. Among other findings, he contended that actors do not rationally evaluate the possible 
outcome of their behaviour and so a stricter criminal code or stronger law enforcement may be 
ineffective. He also concluded that trusted individuals control domestic shell companies, and 
there is no formal relationship or contract between the fake and real owners and thus even 
accurate and updated corporate registries will fail to reveal such connections. 
2.3.4 Importance of transparency 
The relationship between transparency and financial performance has been documented 
in the literature. Akhigbe et al. (2017) observed transparency having a positive effect on the 
financial performance of banks. Despite evidence of public and private actors’ non-compliance 
and failure to implement regulations and recommended standards, efforts have been made by 
regulatory authorities and law-enforcement agencies to increase the transparency of beneficial 
ownership, on account of the widely accepted notion that greater transparency would facilitate 
prevention and detection of unlawful activities. With the Persons with Significant Control 
(PSC) regulations, the United Kingdom was the pioneer in making information available about 
the ultimate owners of a company in the corporate registry. Ho (2017) provided a brief 
background of the UK regulations and evaluated the implementation of similar regulation in 
Hong Kong. The idea behind PSC regulations in the UK was to tackle tax evasion, corporate 
misconduct and other illicit activities. Instead of legal persons, the focus was on natural persons 
who own and take advantage of assets of a legal person and exercise control or influence. 
However, the regulations did not apply to all entities. The entities with voting shares listed on 
stock markets in the US, UK, Switzerland, Japan and other European Economic Area (EEA) 
were exempted. 
Lee and Palstra (2018) conducted a study to evaluate the effectiveness of the United 
Kingdom’s ownership register and highlight issues in ensuring the quality and compliance of 






and documented the limitations of the regulation, the lack of data validation and verification, 
the poor quality of data on the corporate registry, and prevailing trends which could attract 
further analysis. Methods used to hide the real owners included filing a statement that the 
company had no owners, using an ineligible foreign company as the beneficial owner and using 
nominees or a circular ownership structure. The efforts directed to combat the problem 
associated with shell companies have been towards increasing transparency. It is essential to 
understand that achieving transparency should be one of the objectives and not the ultimate 
goal for preventing shell companies from being misused. Having a global, transparent 
governance regime is theoretically desirable, but the regulation required to apply it in practice 
could be at best challenging and possibly more damaging than helpful. Balakina et al. (2017) 
point out that the demand and supply for tax and financial havens exist because of the need for 
banking secrecy. Hence, implementing a transparent regime in one jurisdiction is likely to 
create a demand for secrecy and consequently reduced transparency in another jurisdiction.  
The existing literature on shell companies is focused on regulations related to 
international standards aiming to achieve transparency and their implementation, as well as the 
regulation of CSPs. The opportunity lies in using a more innovative approach in combatting 
the hiding and laundering of illicit proceeds rather than focusing on improving the regulations.  
2.3.5 Detection of illicit shell companies 
It is a new research stream. The only study identified to have taken a step in this direction 
was by Luna et al. (2018). The lack of accessible real banking transaction data prompted the 
authors to develop a banking transaction simulator for shell and regular companies. The 
banking transaction simulator worked on multiple parameters affecting a company's banking 
activities such as the industry sector, annual revenue category, and the number of employees, 
suppliers and utilities. Simulated incoming and outgoing transactions were analysed to look for 
patterns to help determine whether a bank account belongs to a shell company, or not. Each 
account was summarised by a set of features derived from the nature and timing of the money 
flows. Anomaly detection techniques were then used to detect variation between expected and 
observed business transaction profiles of regular and shell companies. The rationale was to 
identify shell companies that could be investigated further for any illicit activity. However, the 
model focused only on banking transactions and therefore did not make use of publicly 
available information such as the number of directors and their backgrounds, and whether 






for further research to analyse a dataset comprising real shell companies involved in illicit 
activities. There is also an opportunity to incorporate publicly available information in the 
detection of shell companies, thus avoiding the reliance upon the availability of banking 
transactions data. 




















































Figure 6: Framework for identification of research gap 
A typology on money laundering literature has been formulated, as depicted in Figure 
6. A review of the current literature led to the identification of money laundering and shell 
companies as an essential area that is currently under-researched. The existing research on 
money laundering has focused on the: 
• AML framework and its effectiveness: Researchers have critiqued the existing 
AML regime and drawn attention to its effectiveness; 
• Effect of money laundering on other fields and the economy: Prior research has 
investigated the effects of money laundering on the economy and its relationship 






• Role of actors and their relative importance: Researchers have also examined the 
role of actors, such as accountants and auditors in undertaking money laundering 
and their respective importance; 
• Magnitude of money laundering: In order to establish the gravity of the problem, 
researchers have made efforts to quantify the amounts of money being laundered 
globally; 
• New opportunities for money laundering: The technological and regulatory 
changes have also motivated works that highlight the new technology-enabled 
methods of laundering funds; 
• Detection of money laundering: There also exists some research directed towards 
the methods used to detect money laundering; 
The detection process has been further categorised into four broad groups – the detection 
of money laundering through (i) banking transactions, (ii) real estate and trade, (iii) innovative 
technologies and (iv) shell companies. It was further identified that the detection of money 
laundering through shell companies had received limited attention. The existing literature on 
shell companies is focused on regulations related to international standards aiming to achieve 
transparency and their implementation, as well as regulation of CSPs. 
The rise in financial crimes has led to a wide range of regulatory reforms to combat the 
problem. The debate over the effectiveness of regulations to accomplish the desired objectives 
has brought the regulators under pressure to justify their actions considering political, executive 
and judicial scrutiny. It has eventually led to risk colonisation, that is, risk playing an 
imperative role in defining the aspects, methods and rationale for regulations (Rothstein et al., 
2006). However, instances of regulatory failures have raised the question as to whether the 
regulatory strategies can be adjusted to the dynamics of real life to combat the problem. The 
present situation and circumstances lay down the need for highly responsive regulation through 
a combination of various regulatory instruments to address the problem (Black & Baldwin, 
2010). The attempts that have been made to identify shell companies being used for illicit 
activities such as bribery, corruption, money laundering, tax evasion and other such illicit 
activities are in a nascent stage because of the importance placed on making regulatory 
changes.  However, the need for combining risk-based assessment with compliance-based 
assessment can act as an essential tool in the fight against financial crime. The development of 






contributing to the development of a “really-responsive” regulatory framework by improving 
the performance of regulatory tasks. The different regulatory tasks encompass detection of a 
non-compliant behaviour followed by a response to such behaviour through the development 
of tools and strategies, their enforcement, and the assessment of their success or failures, and 
then modifying them accordingly (Baldwin & Black, 2008). The detection of shell companies 
being used for illicit activities would assist combatting the active use of shell companies to 
accomplish laundromat schemes such as the Russian Laundromat and Azerbaijani Laundromat. 
The motivation lies in developing an approach to detect the entities used for hiding and 
laundering of illicit proceeds, rather than focusing on improving the regulations. 
The research conducted in the past on shell companies and characteristics identified for 
detecting shell companies involved in illicit activities has been qualitative. A quantitative 
analysis would be complicated given the limited and inherently concealed data on shell 
companies, but it would help uncover patterns among connected networks of companies 
identified in money-laundering cases of the past, to develop strategies for their timely detection. 
Consequently, an approach to detect illicit shell companies through a quantitative framework 
by using traditional statistical and machine-learning approaches to develop a model would be 
a value-addition in the enhancement of regulatory effectiveness. Such a model based on 
publicly available information could act as the first line of defence for law-enforcement 
agencies to guard the wider public and economy against the harmful effects of illicit shell 
companies. The authors join the call of Dunstan and Gepp (2018) who direct attention towards 
the use of Big Data applications to analyse data for developing models for detection and 
prediction of misconduct. The technological advancements have paved the way for exploring 
relational inductive biases within deep learning architectures to facilitate insights into entities 
and for producing structured behaviours (Battaglia et al., 2018) which were not possible in the 
past, and hence taking advantage of such technological advancements could add to the breadth 
and depth of work on shell companies and the overall money-laundering literature. 
2.4  Conclusion 
The chapter highlights the gap in the existing literature and lays down the foundation for 
the need to develop strategies for the detection of such illicit shell companies. The review 
highlights additional opportunities for exploring the effectiveness of the AML regime and the 






rather than being a mere tool of compliance. The debate around quantifying the magnitude of 
the problem of money laundering and the lack of consensus around its measurement is again 
brought to light through the current study. Thus, there still exists an opportunity for researchers 
to quantify the magnitude more accurately. The review on evaluating the new opportunities for 
money laundering through the use of innovative technology, consistent with Martin (2014), 
directs attention towards the transformation of drug distribution through online portals and the 
need for a potential paradigm shift in the global war on drugs, which at present has been costly 
and ineffective. For instance, an examination of the operations of Silk Road and drawing 
comparisons with conventional drug distribution networks led to the conclusion that 
cybercrime typologies do not reflect the complexities associated with Silk Road as they treat 
activities on it as a single act rather than numerous offences linked by a common purpose 
(Martin, 2014). This sets the tone for further research work to be carried out in the area of 
money laundering, which is currently doing substantial damage to economies all over the globe.  
The review of existing literature identified various techniques available to launder 
funds. However, there seems to be a lack of research on the factors leading to a choice of 
technique adopted by a launderer. The next chapter extends the literature by synthesising 
existing work to develop a framework to provide insights into the techniques a launderer may 
adopt to launder funds. Such a framework may enable relevant practitioners and experts to be 








Chapter 3 Money-Laundering Framework 
This chapter is based on a paper under submission to a peer-reviewed journal, namely: 
Tiwari, M., Gepp, A., & Kumar, K. (2021). Factors influencing the choice of technique to 
launder funds: The APPT Frameworks. (Submitted for review: Crime Science) (Rank: Q1) 
 
The review of money-laundering literature highlighted aspects such as regulatory 
frameworks, the stages of money laundering, and ways of detecting it; however, there is a lack 
of understanding about the reasons underlying a launderer's choice of techniques. This chapter 
addresses that need by developing a new framework to provide insights into the techniques a 
launderer may adopt to wash funds among a range of available options. It is developed by 
drawing on existing literature and theories. The new APPT framework is named according to 
four factors that play a role in explaining the choice of techniques: the Actors involved, 
Predicate crime, the Purpose for laundering, and Technological innovations. The new APPT 
framework could be of use to practitioners in investigations, forensic accounting education and 
future research by incorporating the need to respond to changing circumstances surrounding 













3.1  Introduction 
Money laundering has received substantial research attention and has even been 
described as the mother of all crimes (Castells, 2011). The International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
estimated the level of money laundering to be between two percent and five percent of the 
world’s gross domestic product (FATF, 2012). Money laundering is a further threat to the 
global economy as laundered funds may be used to finance other crimes (Rusanov & 
Pudovochkin, 2018). Such opportunities lead to economic distortions, erosion of financial 
sectors, reduced government revenues, and other socioeconomic effects (Barone et al., 2018, 
Bhattacharjee, 2020, Degryse et al., 2019, Walker and Unger, 2009).  
Money laundering typically occurs after other illicit activities such as drug-trafficking, 
robberies, smuggling, tax evasion, terrorism, bootlegging, art theft, vehicle theft, and fraud 
(Mitchell et al., 1998a, 1998b). Efforts are made to disguise the nature and origin of the illicit 
income and to integrate it into the financial system without drawing attention from tax 
authorities and law enforcement (Compin, 2008). Money laundering has often been considered 
a varied and flexible process (Bichler et al., 2017b), which demonstrates the importance of 
practitioners such as investigators and forensic accountants in uncovering money laundering. 
Tiwari et al. (2020) reviewed the money-laundering literature and categorized it into having 
six themes:  an anti-money laundering (AML) framework, economic effects, the key actors 
involved, the magnitude of the problem, new opportunities and the detection of money 
laundering. Notably, their review did not find a framework to explain a launderer’s choice of 
techniques. Among a range of aspects related to money laundering, the techniques to launder 
funds have also been discussed in the literature (Unger & Hertog, 2012). Commonly identified 
techniques include the electronic transfer of funds, correspondent banking, structuring, casinos, 
real estate, prepaid cards, online banking, shell companies, and trusts. The complexity may 
vary depending upon the situation, with new techniques being created in response to changes 
in technology and government regulations (Gilmour, 2016b). However, no attempt is made in 
the literature to explain a launderer’s choice of technique. 
Gilmour (2016b) uses rational choice theory to suggest that money laundering is a risk-
diversification process involving rational decisions by launderers who make decisions based 
on personal preferences and circumstances. However, Gilmour did not specify the nature of 
these preferences or circumstances. Consequently, it would be valuable to have a framework 






choice of techniques adopted to launder funds. This aligns with the views of Cornish and Clarke 
(1987) and Marteache et al. (2015) who state that the characteristics of offences provide a basis 
for selecting among alternative courses of action and this eventually influences an offender’s 
choice. The result will be an improved understanding which may aid in the detection, and 
subsequent deterrence, of money-laundering schemes. 
In response to the gap identified in the literature, this chapter develops the new APPT 
framework of money laundering to explain the factors influencing the choice of techniques 
adopted to launder funds. The rational decision-making of a money launderer can be explained 
through the concepts in systems theory, especially structural coupling, which acknowledges 
the codependency between factors in a system (Luhmann et al., 2013; Maturana & Varela, 
1987). In this context, the factors influencing the choice of laundering technique are 
interrelated, such as the purpose for laundering of funds, the level of reliance on technological 
innovation, and personnel used to accomplish the objective.  
Howieson (2005, 2018) states that practical wisdom, which is essential for sound 
professional judgement, can be developed by providing training in the practical skill of 
decision-making. The proposed APPT framework would facilitate doing so by encouraging 
critical and strategic thinking skills when investigating money-laundering cases; the need for 
the development of such skills has been emphasized by Davis et al. (2010). Digabriele (2008) 
and Van Akkeren et al. (2016) also highlighted a need for flexible, improvised approaches 
rather than a structured plan. The APPT framework contributes in this way by facilitating a 
better understanding of the thought process of a launderer in choosing techniques to launder 
funds rather than encouraging dissemination of some type of structured plan. Such an 
understanding would allow the use of an appropriate mechanism to detect money laundering 
once a predicate crime has been committed. For instance, the COVID-19 pandemic is forcing 
drug cartels to think of techniques alternative to trade-based money laundering to move illicit 
funds. The framework would encourage forensic experts to incorporate such social and 
environmental factors which may form the basis for understanding the choice of technique 
adopted by launderers. It is an addition to the traditional stages of money laundering describing 
the process which fails to consider the social and environmental factors in coming up with a 
proactive detection mechanism (Blankstein et al., 2020).  
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Insights provided by researchers and 






techniques. The new APPT framework is then presented, followed by the use of real cases to 
demonstrate its applicability before concluding.  
3.2  Factors influencing the choice of money-laundering techniques 
In contrast to other crimes, where decisions taken by criminals may be irrational (Clarke 
& Webb, 1999), in money laundering the choices are made via a rational assessment of several 
direct and indirect factors. It is consistent with the views of Clarke (1983) to say a launderer 
will assess these factors to reduce risk and maximise rewards. This chapter identifies a range 
of factors influencing the choice of laundering techniques by synthesising prior work in fraud, 
forensic accounting, and related areas such as psychology, sociology and organisational 
behaviour. The framework is consistent with the views of Huber (2017), who stressed the need 
to consider n-dimensions of financial crime to be accounted for in a framework attempting to 
explain, prevent, predict, detect and prosecute financial crimes.   
The influencing factors are summarised in Table 8. The nature, location and the amount 
of predicate crime, the purpose for laundering, and the kind of technology available and 
required, influence the choice between criminal and non-criminal actors to launder funds. (The 
criminal launderer is the one who commits the predicate crime and is laundering. The non-
criminal launderer is someone unrelated to the predicate crime.) 
Similarly, the choice between the motive to launder funds, that is, between integrating 
the funds into the economy or financing further crimes, influences the desire to maintain 
anonymity. It, in turn, leads to playing a crucial role in deciding the actors involved and the use 
of technology, as maintaining anonymity at times may be the least of concerns. The same holds 








Influencing Factor  Sub-factor 
Actors Involved Criminal: Actor responsible for a predicate 
crime 
Non-criminal: Professionals, or banks, or other 
organisations not direct parties to the predicate 
crime 
Predicate Crime The amount involved in the crime 
The nature of the crime, which may be quasi-
legal or violent in nature 
The location of the crime 
Purpose of laundering Facilitation of integration into the economy 
Financing of further crimes 
Technological Innovations Technological intensity 
Less dependence on technology 
Table 8. Factors influencing the choice of money-laundering techniques  
3.2.1 Actors Involved 
In contrast with other financial crimes, the act of laundering funds may or may not be 
undertaken by the actor responsible for the predicate crime. The knowledge and skills of the 
actors play a critical role in determining their participation in the illicit schemes (Wolfe & 
Hermanson, 2004). At times, sophisticated techniques to launder funds may not be required 
because of the evident link between the proceeds and crime; in such cases, criminal actors may 
launder funds by themselves. For instance, for laundering drug proceeds as reported by Van 
Duyne (2003), Reuter and Truman (2004), and Malm and Bichler (2013), criminals laundered 
funds themselves using simple mechanisms. However, Soudijn (2012) found non-criminal 
actors to be an essential part of criminal networks in the laundering of funds, mostly when 
money laundering is part of the criminal activity of such networks and it requires sophistication 






The competence of actors is critical in determining the techniques adopted in laundering 
funds (McCarthy et al., 2015). For instance, the use of virtual currencies for this depends on 
whether the actor has received the specialised training needed to operate (Dostov & Shust, 
2014). The actors capable of laundering funds have a well-connected network of experts to 
undertake the illicit act with knowledge about jurisdictions that respond slowly to compliance 
requests; they have a suitable combination of incriminated and legitimate assets, and awareness 
of compliance standards in banks (Teichmann, 2020). As a result, the ability of actors, both 
criminal and non-criminal, in lending sophistication, knowledge and expertise in handling 
proceeds of crime is critical in determining the techniques they adopt. 
Concerning non-criminal actors, several other factors need to be considered to explain 
their motivation to participate in the laundering of funds; these include occupational roles, 
individual characteristics, and the organisational and social climate (Ainsworth, 2013; Albrecht 
et al., 1984; Andon et al., 2018; Benson, 2016; Broidy, 2001; Fritsche, 2005; Knust & Stewart, 
2002; Kranacher et al., 2011; Kumar et al., 2018; Langton & Piquero, 2007; Murphy & Free, 
2016; Paternoster & Mazerolle, 1994; Sykes & Matza, 1957). However, dealing in depth with 
the motivation behind their participation is outside the scope of this current work. 
3.2.2 Predicate Crime 
An illicit activity that accompanies money laundering is termed a predicate crime. It is 
the underlying criminal activity that would eventually generate proceeds subject to money 
laundering. The definition of what constitutes a predicate crime varies between jurisdictions 
(Walters et al., 2012).  Irwin et al. (2012) found that predicate crime offenders preferred 
specific techniques to launder funds. As per Bajada (2017) and Rusanov and Pudovochkin 
(2018), the predicate crime is a critical factor in determining the process of money laundering.  
The nature, amount and location of the predicate crime influences the complexity of the 
techniques adopted. It is often stated that the more socially dangerous the predicate crime is, 
the more socially dangerous and complicated are the efforts to hide the proceeds. Predicate 
crimes such as corruption need complicated mechanisms of laundering, more so than crimes 
related to property and drug-trafficking. Furthermore, higher proceeds of crime result in more 
complicated techniques adopted to launder funds (Rusanov & Pudovochkin, 2018). The same 
was highlighted by Bell (2002), who states the extent of complexity in money laundering is 







The location of predicate crime and the regulations surrounding it play a critical role in 
influencing the complexity of techniques adopted to launder funds. For instance, in a location 
where the interpretation of law requires predicate offence as an essential requirement to prove 
criminality, techniques to break those links between the crime and proceeds would be adopted 
(Murray, 2016). Similarly, the attractiveness of the actual location of predicate crime would 
influence the laundering mechanism (Unger et al., 2006).   
3.2.3 Purpose for laundering 
Rusanov and Pudovochkin (2018) observed that giving dirty money a legitimate 
appearance may not be the only objective of laundering. They stated that funds obtained from 
a criminal act are laundered, whereas, in other instances, laundered funds may be used to 
finance other crimes. Consequently, when considering the possible choice of the techniques to 
launder funds, the purpose needs to be considered. Research in the past has suggested that the 
motive influences the degree of sophistication adopted in laundering (Compin, 2008). For 
instance, Compin (2008), Krieger and Meierrieks (2011) and Vittori (2011) have documented 
the differences between money laundering and terror financing based on sources of funds, the 
direction of financial flows, financial sophistication and psychological profile. In line with the 
views mentioned above, Irwin et al. (2012) found that money launderers and terrorist financiers 
adopt different laundering techniques. 
Such a distinction stems from the difference in the complexity adopted to launder funds 
depending upon the ultimate purpose. Money laundering is oriented to legitimisation (Koh, 
2006), leading to the use of complex techniques. Launderers to maintain anonymity 
complement their actual business activities with fictitious transactions or an appropriate 
complex mechanism (Teichmann, 2020). On the other hand, terror financing is distribution-
oriented, resulting in simple methods adopted to move funds. As Hobbs et al. (2005) point out, 
offenders operate  where the benefits outweigh the risk involved; however, such an analysis 
may not be involved in the case of terrorism.  
Finally, in money laundering, the source of funds is illegal, whereas in terror financing, 
funds may be from a legal source. In terrorism financing, the anonymity of the source is not 
the primary concern, but the focus is on hiding the destination of funds. Hence, terror financing  
does not involve the complexity associated with money laundering (Bantekas, 2003) because 
of the difficulty associated with proving criminality for funds intended to be used for terrorist 






are laundered influences the need or desire to maintain anonymity. Additionally, the purpose 
of laundering is influenced by the ideology of actors, a factor considered necessary by 
Kranacher et al. (2011) in understanding the motivation behind committing an illicit act. 
3.2.4 Technological Innovations 
Richet (2013) observed that traditional techniques of laundering have evolved pursuant 
to the advances made in the online arena. The changes in technology have made it easier to 
commit cybercrime (a form of predicate crime) and laundering of funds (Bichler et al., 2017a; 
Kamps & Kleinberg, 2018; Sood et al., 2013; Speer, 2000). The increasing ease may be 
attributed to the extensive use of the online platform, which aids in overcoming the constraints 
of a social network such as geographical or social barriers. It facilitates collaboration with 
perpetrators across the globe and thereby increases the opportunity to commit illicit acts 
(Leukfeldt, 2014). Barone and Schneider (2018) view as a growing threat cyberlaundering and 
money laundering accomplished through the use of automatic electronic devices.  
The recent innovations in techniques to launder funds comprise Bitcoins, online gaming 
(usually for small amounts), encryption software, and secured browser technology such as The 
Onion Router (TOR), among others (Soudijn, 2019). They have increased the difficulties 
associated with detecting money laundering by adding more clandestine variables as a result 
of the increased association with technology (Gilmour, 2016a; Soudijn & Been, 2020). The 
unregulated transactions and exchanges that take place on 'Distributed ledger technologies 
(DLT)' have been viewed as a threat to society through their use for money laundering, terrorist 
financing and tax evasion (Scholl & Bolívar, 2019). 
The literature is full of examples of technological advances in committing predicate 
crimes such as fraud and laundering of funds (Dalins et al., 2018; Dostov & Shust, 2014; Tiwari 
et al., 2019). Smarter regulation could be aided by establishing a link between stakeholders 
(users of the technology) and the value generated from a technological innovation by drawing 
from the principles of public value and stakeholder theory, similar to cost-benefit analysis 
(Bannister & Connolly, 2014; Rose et al., 2018; Scholl, 2001; Scholl, 2004; Scholl & Bolívar, 
2019; Twizeyimana & Andersson, 2019). Until this happens, advances in technology appear 







3.3  Development of the new APPT Framework 
Looking at one factor in isolation as critical in influencing the choice of money-
laundering techniques can be misleading, as much depends on the characteristics of the crime, 
the actors, the kind of technology available and the purpose for laundering. The use of 
technology is influenced by the amount involved as part of the predicate crime. If the amount 
involved is large, the need to use virtual currencies and other innovative technologies may arise 
as a potential medium to launder funds. Another vital factor is the purpose of laundering. If the 
aim is to commit another crime such as related to terrorism, the technology adopted may be 
different. For instance, the choice of  using online gaming to launder funds was influenced by 
the amount involved and whether the final objective was to execute an act of terror (Samantha 
Maitland Irwin et al., 2012). However, the choice of technological innovation in itself is 
influenced by the availability of technology in a particular location. Additionally, the capability 
of actors involved in the predicate crime or that of non-criminal actors needs to be considered 
while evaluating the possible choice of technology that could be adopted to launder funds. 
These factors are interrelated and interdependent, except in scenarios where the end objective 
is destruction and rational decision-making is absent. Such an approach would allow bypassing 
of the limitational oversight offered by theories such as the routine activity theory (Clarke & 
Felson, 1993; Cohen & Felson, 1979; Felson & Boba, 2010) attempting to explain the 
motivation for a crime. 
The proposed APPT framework (as presented in Figure 7) addressed the 
interdependence between factors to shed light on why a particular approach was adopted to 
launder funds. The interconnected nature of the factors as described in the framework is in line 
with the views of Gilmour (2016b). Gilmour suggested that acknowledging this 
interconnection would increase holistic understanding of the money-laundering environment. 
With this better understanding, it would thereby become possible to consider the situation and 
the circumstances influencing the decisions of relevant actors. 
The predicate crime affects the decision of who is going to launder funds. 
Notwithstanding cases where the money may be from a legitimate source, the decision of 
criminal and non-criminal actors to launder funds is influenced by the purpose of laundering. 
It may be to perpetrate another crime or to obtain clean funds for legitimate use. Further, if the 
amount involved is substantial and the criminal actors do not possess the required capabilities 
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Concerning the purpose of laundering funds (as presented in the APPT framework), if 
it is to commit further illicit acts such as funding a terror attack, discerning the money trail 
between the predicate crime and the laundering of funds may not be the primary concern. On 
the other hand, if the aim is to integrate the funds into the economy and give them a legitimate 
appearance, the use of sophisticated and complex techniques is common and it makes the 
money trail challenging to follow. The decision to use laundered funds for financing crimes in 
the future or to give them a legitimate appearance is influenced by the ideologies of the actors 
involved, a critical factor emphasised by Kranacher et al. (2011). 
Concerning the use of technological innovations, as shown in the APPT Framework 
and based on the literature discussed above, if the predicate crime involves laundering small 
amounts of funds, then the use of less technologically intensive techniques may suffice. In 
contrast, virtual currency transactions may be used for laundering larger amounts. If the 
purpose is to ensure anonymity, more complicated technological innovations are brought into 
use, requiring the actors to be expert in such technologies, and their availability becomes 
critical.   
Overall, the decision about the techniques adopted to launder funds could be considered 
a problem for a money launderer as depicted in the APPT framework. The decision is 
influenced by factors which encompass the pressures, constraints, beliefs, values and 
assumptions of the problem solver, in this case, the money launderer, in the environment 
containing the problem. It allows for the presence of an element of subjectivity in terms of risk-
taking ability on the part of a money launderer. Additionally, the possibility increases of 
interaction between a variety of factors, the competence of the problem-solver, the evolving 
nature of the problem as well as adapting to the change (Mumford, 1998). It was Ashby (1961) 
who stated that upon encountering a complicated situation with multiple variables, the 
establishment of a link between variables could aid in viewing and addressing the problem as 
a single unit. 
Further, just as it is with a complex problem in any other practical context (Stevens & 
Churchman, 1975), the decision to adopt a particular technique to launder funds is accompanied 
by difficulties and ambiguities, many of which have to be accepted in making the decision as 
depicted in the APPT framework. Moreover, as Beer (1985) points out in the context of 
problem-solving, the decision to choose among techniques involves a hierarchy of activities, 






prioritised, and continuous evaluation and monitoring of the effectiveness of the technique or 
mix of techniques adopted to launder funds. 
Consequently, the rational decision-making of a money launderer can be substantiated 
through the concepts in systems theory, such as structural coupling, which acknowledges the 
codependency between factors in a system – in this context, the factors influencing the choice 
of laundering technique (Luhmann et al., 2013; Maturana & Varela, 1987). This chapter is in 
line with Demetis (2018), who also acknowledges the call from Mumford (1998) to reconsider 
money laundering from a systems theory viewpoint to gain additional insights. 
The developed APPT framework can be used to explain the modus operandi adopted 
by launderers, and the relevance is substantiated in the cases mentioned below. The cases 
highlight the connection and coevolution between the factors and their influence on the final 
decision (choice among technique or techniques to launder) (Luhmann et al., 2013; Maturana 
& Varela, 1987).  
3.4  Application of APPT Money-Laundering Framework 
There are numerous examples of money laundering scandals such as the Troika 
Laundromat, the Azerbaijani Laundromat, and the Danske Bank, among others (Bjerregaard & 
Kirchmaier, 2019; OCCRP, 2017, 2019). This chapter uses a selection of real cases to 
substantiate the applicability of the current framework. The criteria for choosing the cases 
below include either (i) involvement of a regulatory authority in the investigation of such cases, 
or that (ii) the scandal attracted considerable attention from the media and involved a 
substantial financial sum. The purpose was to demonstrate the applicability of the framework 
on, but not limited to, cases with a distinct nature, purpose and magnitude. The chosen cases 
are the Troika Laundromat, a case involving underground banking to launder drug profits, a 
case involving raising funds for terrorism, and Bestmixer.io. 
3.4.1 The Troika Laundromat 
The Troika Laundromat refers to a group of shell companies collectively operated by 
an independent arm of Troika Dialog, a Russian investment bank, to move an estimated USD 
8.8 billion from Russia to the west (OCCRP, 2019). A complex web of transactions was created 
between the network companies to blend the money derived from illicit sources with 






borders (Garside, 2019). The laundromat paved the way for Russian oligarchs and politicians 
to use laundered funds to purchase luxury goods and real estate, and make other investments. 
The laundromat scheme was dependent upon a broad range of actors, including the staff at 
Troika Dialog, who created a complex trail of money to trace while keeping the actual 
beneficial owners out of the reach of the authorities. The complexity of the scheme is evident 
from the existence of more than 1.3 million financial documents relating to the activities of 
Troika Dialog and the Lithuanian lender Ukio bank (Perryer, 2019). 
3.4.2 Use of underground banking to launder drug profits1 
As part of a Lebanon-based international crime syndicate, one of the members of the 
syndicate used informal money transfer systems, known as "hawala," to transfer drug profits 
to two other syndicate members residing in Australia. The first member, an Iranian national, 
received over AUD 1 million in cash, which was further sent to high-risk jurisdictions. The 
second member, an Australian citizen, was reported to have transferred an amount totalling 
AUD 244,000 to several countries. A joint initiative by the investigative agencies with 
assistance from the Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC hereafter) 
and the reporting entities was able to identify the members of the crime syndicate and arrest 
them. As part of the investigation, another member was identified in possession of cash, 
diamonds and casino chips, and was eventually arrested. The banks provided reports on the 
movement of large, unexplained sums of money, and these were analysed by AUSTRAC to 
provide financial intelligence to investigative authorities (AUSTRAC, 2019).  
3.4.3 Raising funds for acts of terrorism2 
A joint investigation led to the identification and eventual arrest of people in Sydney 
and Melbourne who were planning a terrorist attack. The investigation of the Sydney-based 
suspects revealed the daily income from their employment was the primary source of their 
funding. In some contrast, Melbourne-based suspects relied upon donations to a fund for the 
heinous act. The investigation revealed the value of funds at the time of arrest was AUD 19,000. 
 
 
1 The names of this crime syndicate and the people involved have been kept anonymous in the public domain. 






In addition, the suspects had also relied upon credit card fraud schemes and fundraising 
activities (AUSTRAC, 2014). 
3.4.4 Bestmixer.io 
Bestmixer, a cryptocurrency mixer (a term applied to services responsible for blending 
cryptocurrencies from different sources), was used to obscure the trail of funds to its source 
(Europol, 2019). The users would employ the services provided by the dark web firm to avoid 
due diligence by blending illicit and licit cryptocurrencies. The service was dismantled 
collectively through the works of the Dutch Fiscal Information and Investigation Service 
(FIOD), Europol, and other authorities, working with support from McAfee, a cybersecurity 
firm (Vedrenne, 2019). The demand for such an opportunity is evident from the fact that 
Bestmixer, during its tenure of one year in operation, mixed an amount close to $200 million 
in bitcoins (Europol, 2019; Vedrenne, 2019). 
The above-highlighted cases attempt to draw attention to the sophistication and 
complexity in techniques adopted in laundering funds, depending upon a wide range of factors. 
In the case of the Troika Laundromat, sophisticated techniques were used to hide the ultimate 
owners and obscure the money trail, as is evident from the use of shell companies and a 
complex web of transactions. The scandals involved wealthy people and a considerable range 
of professional actors such as lawyers, accountants and company service providers to execute 
the scheme. In the case of a crime syndicate, the syndicate members laundered the funds 
themselves using informal transfer systems and the available banking facilities.  
In the case of financing the acts of terrorism, the level of financial sophistication 
adopted to cover the trail was minimal. However, the Bestmixer case directs attention towards 
a need to focus on the new opportunities becoming available to money launderers following 
the advent of technology. It reiterates the notion of cryptocurrencies being a conduit of illicit 
financial flows, particularly where the services to access these virtual currencies, and the actors 
proficient in it, are obtainable. From the information available on these cases, the extent to 
which technological innovations were used could not be extracted, but given the prominence 
of the use of virtual currencies, ignoring such a possibility would be inappropriate. 
These cases exhibit the need to consider a combination of factors in determining the 
possible money-laundering techniques that may be adopted to launder funds. Up until now, 






ambiguities emanated from the presence of a wide range of predicate crimes, the actors 
involved, a lack of information-sharing and the evolution of techniques resulting from 
technology  (Backhouse et al., 2005; Bell, 2002; Canhoto & Backhouse, 2007; Philippson, 
2001). The proposed APPT framework incorporates a range of factors that need to be taken 
into consideration to understand the possible mechanism adopted by illicit actors to launder 
funds and to explain the modus operandi adopted once the predicate crime has been identified. 
Incorporation of such frameworks of financial crime could be value-additional in increasing 
the educational content value by training neophytes and experienced practitioners to think and 
respond with critical appropriateness. 
3.5  Conclusion 
This chapter has proposed the new APPT framework to explain the factors influencing 
the techniques adopted to launder funds. Any model of financial crime must recognise its 
multifaceted nature, and the factors that influence it. The APPT framework highlights the 
interaction between factors, using existing theories and observations, which may prompt the 
choices of both individuals and organisations to accomplish the purpose of laundering. The 
applicability of the APPT framework was then demonstrated through real-life cases. The 
framework proposed in this chapter differs from theories solely focusing on criminal actors 
such as self-control theory (Walters & Bradley, 2019) and individual trait theory (Schechter, 
2004). In addition to individual factors, it draws attention to social and environmental factors 
influencing a person's decision-making process (Clarke & Cornish, 1985; Piquero et al., 2002) 
in the adoption of techniques to launder funds. 
The rational decision-making of a money launderer (Gilmour, 2016b) can be 
substantiated through the concepts in systems theory, such as structural coupling that 
acknowledges the codependency between factors in a system – in this context, the factors 
influencing the choice of laundering technique  (Luhmann et al., 2013; Maturana & Varela, 
1987). This chapter is consistent with Demetis (2018), who also acknowledges the call from 
Mumford (1998) to reconsider money laundering from a systems theory viewpoint to gain 
additional insights. 
The APPT framework has implications for neophytes, for experienced practitioners and 
for institutions teaching forensic accounting. For neophytes, qualifications incorporating a 






opportunities in the field. Among experienced practitioners, such knowledge would aid in 
exercising professional judgement to come up with appropriate detection and deterrence 
mechanisms. In educational institutions, such a framework would suggest a move towards the 
incorporation of pedagogical techniques aimed at improving the content value and encouraging 
the development of skills valued by academics and practitioners. The APPT framework can 
also be leveraged. Future researchers could extend the present work by empirically examining 
the differences in applicability of the APPT framework for developed and developing 
countries. The framework can also be applied to new money-laundering cases to help uncover 
interesting insights. Additionally, a more detailed understanding of the motivation behind the 
participation of non-criminal actors in the act of money laundering could help to improve the 
framework. 
The APPT framework may contribute to the understanding of the choice of techniques 
adopted to launder funds. This thesis extends further by gaining an insight into detection of one 
such technique to launder funds. The next chapter focuses on detecting illicit shell companies 






Chapter 4 Detecting Shell Companies Laundering 
Illicit Money 
* This chapter is based on a conference paper accepted for a conference, namely: 
Tiwari, M., A. Gepp, and K. Kumar.  2021. Shell Companies: Using a hybrid technique to 
detect illicit activities, in 2021 AFAANZ Virtual Conference. 
 
The previous chapter developed a framework to provide insights into the techniques a 
launderer may adopt to wash funds among a range of available options. As uncovered in the 
literature review (Chapter 2), amongst the detection of money-laundering techniques, the 
detections of shell companies used to launder funds was found to be under-researched. Shell 
companies can be used to launder dirty money to make it appear legitimate and hide 
information about the actual beneficial owners. Illegal arms dealers, drug cartels, corrupt 
politicians, terrorists and cyber-criminals have become some of the frequent users of shell 
companies. To combat this money-laundering technique, this chapter aims to develop a model 
for detecting shell companies in operation to launder illicit proceeds of crime using a new 
hybrid statistical approach. No prior study exists on developing quantitative models to detect 
illicit shell companies using publicly available information. The key stakeholders to benefit 
from such models would be legal and compliant professionals and government officials, 









4.1  Introduction 
Shell Companies have legitimate uses such as facilitating reverse mergers, being used as 
holding companies or for protecting small entrepreneurs from bankruptcy risks. However, these 
entities have also become instruments to launder the dirty money to make it appear legitimate 
and hide information about the actual beneficial owners. Illicit arms dealers, drug cartels, 
corrupt politicians, terrorists and cyber-criminals have become some of the frequent users of 
these shell companies. The ease of setting up companies, with trans-nationality involved and a 
low-level of compliance towards the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), standards have 
posed a challenge for law enforcement authorities in countering crime and corruption (Martini 
et al., 2019). In 2002, an anonymous shell corporation called “Anglo-Leasing” was used to 
launder €24 million of the total €30 million as part of the contract awarded to the firm to update 
the passport system in Kenya. The information about the beneficial owners could not be 
identified because of the anonymity the form of such entities provides (Allred et al., 2017; 
Findley et al., 2015). Other such instances involving shell companies would include that of 
China ZTE using shell companies to evade US sanctions; also, SBM Offshore N.V., a Dutch-
based group, was paying bribes to shell companies owned by government officials (Hubbs, 
2018). 
Graph analysis may enable investigators effortlessly to infer ownership and 
relationships – for example, common or joint ownership of businesses – and hence detect these 
illicit shells. This chapter aims to facilitate the detection of money-laundering activities by 
using graph analysis with publicly available data on entities identified in several corruption 
cases, with the aim of developing a detection model. 
The automated anti-money-laundering (AML hereafter) detection may be split into 
three subsets based on data: Those that can be detected based on data available on usual account 
activity statements; those where detection requires correlation that might potentially violate the 
bank's data policies; and those where detection involves data that are not directly available 
from the bank's information system but are available from other publicly accessible sources, 
such as a list of high-risk money-laundering countries. This chapter focuses on the latter subset. 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: a summary of the data sources is 
presented first, followed by an overall schema of the data collection procedure. It is followed 






The chapter then explores new insights gained from data through traversal queries. Finally, the 
modelling techniques are introduced and used, and the results are discussed.  
4.2  Data and methodology 
4.2.1 Data sources 
Transparency International, UK (TIUK), an anti-corruption NGO, is kindly supporting 
this project and has provided for analysis a list of names and company numbers of 804 
companies along with the associated cases. TIUK used open-source data from various 
investigation reports to produce a list of these companies (Cowdock, 2017). They went back to 
2004, with records and leaked documents from Open Corporates and UK Companies House, 
the British corporate registry, published in the 2017 report called “Hiding in Plain Sight: How 
UK Companies are used to Launder Corrupt Wealth”. These entities were used as a corporate 
veil to launder illicit funds and hide the real beneficial owners. Even though some of the entities 
were incorporated for accomplishing other illicit activities, laundering of funds was the central 
theme for all the entities. The breakdown of the company type is presented in Table 9 as 
follows:  
Number of Companies 804 
Incorporation Country UK 
Estimated amount of funds laundered  £80 billion 
Company Types:  
Limited Liability Partnership (LLP) 
Limited Partnership (LP) 





Table 9. Data on shell companies 
Among the 208 limited companies considered (two were duplicates out of the total 
samples of 210), the names of the cases for 13 entities were unidentified in the public domain 
and were placed into the “Unidentified Cases” category. In addition to this, for the purpose of 
obtaining a matching sample, a sample of 205 limited companies was selected based on their 
cash balance and, when that was unavailable, the period of operations and company status, 






involved in illicit activities, but in line with assumptions made by Ravenda et al. (2015), it is 
assumed that a low probability exists for an entity’s being chosen from the large population of 
companies registered with the UK Companies House to be involved in illicit activity. 
Out of the total initial sample of 417 companies collected from OpenCorporates, four 
were found to be duplicates and so were eliminated; hence, 208 corrupt and 205 non-corrupt 
companies were considered for analysis.   
OpenCorporates has been a preferred choice for investigating and analysing company 
data because of its ability to provide what is referred to as “White-Box Data” (OpenCorporates, 
2019b). Among data analysts, a standard classification of data is into “White-Box Data” and 
“Black-Box Data”. Black-box data are vague in representation and have an unknown source of 
origin. On the other hand, white-box data are well-defined, transparent, regularly updated and 
accompanied by provenance.  
Additionally, to cater to the growing needs of businesses, governments and banks, a 
data ecosystem is required, one which is regularly updated and facilitates connections between 
different users. In today’s time when AML is no longer a tick-the-box affair, it is essential to 
have corporate data accompanied by provenance and consistency, and incorporating the cross-
jurisdictional nature of business. OpenCorporates provides regularly-updated company data in 
a consistent and aggregated manner. 
Information about the appointment of directors was obtained from the UK Companies 
House. Finally, other information sources considered for this study were EveryPolitician, 
OpenSanctions, UK Companies House Disqualified Directors and the Financial Secrecy Index. 
The following sub-section describes the data collection process.  
4.2.2 Data collection process 
The names of the companies, along with their company numbers and the corresponding 
cases, were imported to an open-source software called OpenRefine. For the matching sample, 
the companies were labelled as non-corrupt companies with no links to corruption. 
OpenRefine, formerly known as Google Refine, is a software program that facilitates analysis 
of messy data, cleansing of data and transforming them from one form to another. Moreover, 
it enables data extension through web-services, establishing links to databases, and requires the 
use of specific regular expression scripting language, also known as General Refine Expression 






2013). OpenRefine, through the use of the Open Refine reconciliation API, matches the list of 
company names to corporate legal entities (OpenCorporates, 2019a). OpenCorporates provides 
a reconciliation endpoint for OpenRefine which facilitates the matching of company names 
with legal entities on OpenCorporates. The OpenCorporates API returns information for 
companies as data in “javascript object notation” (JSON hereafter) format. The list of 
companies was reconciled with OpenCorporates through the OpenCorporates API endpoint at 
OpenRefine. On matching the company names with target entities through the use of company 
numbers as identifiers, data of companies were obtained in JSON format. The use of APIs to 
obtain data reflects the efforts to achieve granularity and provenance of data. The data obtained 
in JSON format are parsed through the use of GREL to obtain information for each row item.  
The information about the number of appointments of executives in companies was 
obtained from the UK Companies House. The information so obtained was added to the 
spreadsheet in OpenRefine containing data on companies. Additionally, web scrapping of the 
following sources was undertaken: 
1. EveryPolitician: A list of all identified politicians was obtained and imported to 
OpenRefine. 
2. OpenSanctions: A list of all individuals and entities with any sanctions imposed on 
them was obtained and imported to OpenRefine. 
3. UK Companies House Disqualified Directors Data: A list of all the executives who 
have been disqualified from acting as directors in UK-incorporated entities was 
obtained and imported to OpenRefine. 
4. Financial Secrecy Index (FSI): The data on the ranking of jurisdictions based on 
financial secrecy were obtained and imported to OpenRefine. 
The information obtained and imported to OpenRefine was used to reconcile the list of 
executives for the entities with individuals in the lists (as mentioned above) to extend the data 
to incorporate any additional information. Further, the ranking of jurisdictions as per the FSI 
was incorporated in the dataset. Available upon request are the list of operations performed to 
obtain, cleanse and normalise data for further analysis, the codes used to perform the analysis 






4.2.3 Incorporation of variables 
A wide range of information was considered to develop a property graph database 
model from publicly available data sources. The variables included were company status, 
incorporation date, dissolution date, availability of previous company names, number of 
previous company names, tenure of company previous names, registered company address, 
instances of change in registered address, number of previous addresses, tenure of previous 
addresses, industry codes of the companies, change in latest available cash balances, current 
assets, current liabilities and fixed assets of companies, total number of executives for each 
company, and other basic details including their nationality. Finally, information on the 
ultimate beneficial owners was also considered. 
The rationale for considering such a wide range of information is as follows:  
• Previous Name: Entities change their names for various reasons. One of them can be 
association with criminal activities in the past. As a result, the presence of a previous name for 
an entity can be considered important information to consider while distinguishing between 
entities for criminal use and those that are legitimate. Considering the presence of previous 
names is consistent with Lee and Palstra (2018), whose work suggests that companies changing 
their names frequently are to be flagged as suspicious and ought to be subject to further 
investigation.  
• Company Status: The intention is to highlight whether the company is still in operation 
or has been dissolved. The objective is to assess whether the firm incorporated was dissolved 
after undertaking the purpose for which it was created, an illegal purpose in this case, or 
whether it continued to operate after the purpose was accomplished. Considering information 
about company status is consistent with Ravenda et al. (2018) who stated that owners of Mafia-
controlled firms (MCFs) would decide to liquidate the Mafia-controlled shell companies to 
prevent detection from authorities once the purpose of such entities is accomplished. 
• Period of Operation: The hypothesis is that difference between the incorporation and 
dissolution dates can provide information about the lifespan of entities used for illicit purposes. 
It could help develop an understanding about the timeframe in which the entities are used for 
carrying out illegitimate activities, which in turn might aid in distinguishing them from 
legitimate ones. The hypothesis is consistent with the views of Ravenda et al. (2018) who stated 
that Mafia-controlled firms (MCFs) are likely to have shorter lifespans than non-Mafia-






shell companies to prevent detection from authorities once the purpose of such entities is 
accomplished. 
• Nationality of Directors: The idea to bring in corporate governance variables is to 
determine if there exists a trend or pattern in or a difference between the corporate structure of 
illicit entities from the ones being used for legitimate purposes. The choice of this variable is 
motivated by Lee and Palstra (2018) who found that some high-profile money-laundering 
scandals involved people from former Soviet countries. Further, corporate governance 
characteristics such as board structure have gained prominence during examination of the 
occurrences of wrongdoing (Chapple et al., 2018; Holtz & Sarlo Neto, 2014; Ndofor et al., 
2015). However, the more sophisticated corporate governance variables that are studied in 
regular companies cannot be used, as detailed information about shell companies is not 
available.  
• Appointment of Directors: The information about the number of companies in which 
directors hold executive positions could also be a significant factor in accessing the risk posed 
by an entity. It is presumed that an executive appointment in five or more companies should 
raise suspicion, as being involved with and managing the operations of so many companies is 
not possible realistically. It may be totally legitimate for individuals to be directors in more 
companies, but it is likely to raise suspicion that they are being used as nominees in place of 
real owners (Lee & Palstra, 2018).  
• Ultimate Ownership Information (Person of Significant Control Information – 
PSC Information): This refers to knowledge about the ultimate beneficial owner. The entities 
which provide this information may be considered relatively safer than those which do not and 
hence could be an important attribute in distinguishing shell companies for illicit purposes from 
the legitimate ones. The rationale for considering this information is supported by Singh (2010) 
who states that shell companies incorporated for illicit purposes would avoid revelation of their  
true owners. Further, Lee and Palstra (2018) outline  common methods of avoiding disclosures 
declaring that a company has no beneficial owners, using an ineligible foreign company as a 
beneficial owner, and using circular ownership structures or nominees.  
• Financial Statement Information: The incorporation of variables related to financial-
statement information is consistent with Ravenda et al. (2015) who developed a logistic 
regression model for classification of MCFs from NMCFs using various financial variables. 






information on both assets and the availability of cash is consistent with the work of Floros and 
Sapp (2011)  and Singh (2010) who state that shell firms are likely to be less capital-intensive 
and have lower total assets because of the absence of a real business structure. 
4.2.4 Graph construction 
A network can be classified as a specific type of relation connecting persons, objects or 
events. The sets on which the network is based are called actors or nodes. Therefore, a set of 
nodes and relationships between these nodes forms a network (Fitina et al., 2010). In recent 
times, there has been a surge in attention received to identifying economic networks in trade 
and products, and even in detecting fraudulent companies (Barabasi & Albert, 1999; Pacini et 
al., 2016; Schweitzer et al., 2009; Vitali et al., 2011). There exists literature interested in 
understanding the emergence of networks in nature, society and technology. The use of a set 
of unified tools and principles to understand networks is called network science (Barabási, 
2013). However, understanding the emergence of a network of shell companies employing 
tools and principles such as the scale-free property and the small-world property network 
science is not within the scope of this research. The quantitative analysis of corrupt companies 
has been unresearched; we see this especially in the context of identified shell companies 
lacking analysis using publicly available information.  
The novelty in examining the complex network of shell companies is substantiated by 
the views of Barabási (2009) who acknowledges the existence of commonality in networks but 
disregards the existence of a framework to reveal their universality. One of the objectives is to 
lay the foundation for the development of a model for illicit shell company detection by 
analysing a graph of shell companies identified in illicit activities. It extends the underlying 
idea of developing a detection system for various kind of fraudulent activities (Bangcharoensap 
et al., 2015; Battaglia et al., 2018; Van Vlasselaer et al., 2017) to shell companies involved in 
illicit activities. In case of a network of a shell, firms may exert control over other firms through 
a web of direct and indirect relations extending beyond countries. Consequently, it becomes 
essential to analyse the complex networks in order to uncover the structure of control and its 
implications.  
Graph analysis techniques have become essential to find suspicious individuals, 
existing network relationships, unusual changes, geospatial dispersions, anomalous network 






the visualisation of a dynamic and complex set of data in the form of graphs leads the users to 
have a detailed overview of the data, and to filter, select and look into networks details.  
In graph processing, application needs can be categorised into online query processing, 
requiring low-latency computing, and offline graph analytics, which needs high-throughput 
computing. For example, community analysis on social networks or link analysis on click 
graphs are analytical tasks.  Moreover, it is vital to ensure that the system also supports 
interactive user activities such as graph browsing and querying, in the same way as it supports 
approximate shortest distances relying on indices or sketches derived from the data. Therefore, 
their construction can be quite analytical (Shao et al., 2012). 
As a result, graph data and graph networks are accompanied by challenges of their own. 
The topology of graphs developed from real-world scenarios is heterogeneous. The nodes in 
such networks exhibit high heterogeneity of node connectivity and the existence of the dense 
node problem. A dense node problem refers to a situation where a small fraction of nodes has 
connections to a significant fraction of other nodes. Secondly, the graph problems are data-
driven, indicating that the computation is dependent upon the graph typology. As a result, 
optimisation of execution of graph algorithms is not possible as it is difficult to determine the 
computation structure of graph algorithm in advance. Thirdly, graph access patterns have poor 
spatial memory locality, resulting in large amounts of random memory access. Finally, the run 
time of most graph algorithms is dominated by memory access. Hence, what is required is a 
technology of graph storage and retrieval that provides support for a graph data model which 
is productive, capable of storing large graphs, and could execute complex queries on large 
graphs. Neo4J is capable of addressing all the challenges as mentioned above (Cattuto et al., 
2013). 
Graph database technology enables optimisation of interrelated and densely connected 
datasets to allow for the construction of predictive models and identification of patterns through 
the use of traversal queries (Miller, 2013). It utilises graph models to store, manage, and update 
relationships and data with free and flexible schemas (Huang & Dong, 2013). Neo4J, a graph 
database platform, was chosen to develop graphs from the data collected above. It involves the 
use of a query language called ‘Cypher’ and lends flexibility in setting up the data model. It 
provides features such as online transaction processing on graph data (OLTP) and graph 






in the data and draw conclusions accordingly (Van Bruggen, 2014). In Neo4J, the graph data 
model is composed of the following building blocks:  
- Node: Is a term used to refer to the entities in the data.  
- Relationships: Establish the connections between nodes and thus provide a way 
of structuring the data. 
- Properties: Are fundamental attributes describing both the nodes and the 
relationships. 
- Labels: Are a naming convention for nodes and relationships facilitating creation of 
sub-graphs, easing investigating and determination of hidden data patterns.
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Figure 8: Methodology 
 
The Figure 8 above provides an overview of the methodology used to perform the 






of two CSV files. The data collected on 413 limited liability companies were randomly 
separated into training and testing sample of 320 (77.481%) and 93 companies (22.518%) 
respectively. The data from the training sample is imported to Neo4J using 'Cypher'. (The set 
of queries used to import and establish the database structure is available upon request). 
A graph comprises nodes and relationships, and this aspect can be effectively used to 
model highly interconnected data. As part of this study, nodes for this graph database model 
comprise cases, companies, their owners and executives, addresses, and previous company 
names. The properties describe the attributes of nodes, and the relationships indicate the 
existing links between the nodes. The use of properties and labels along with nodes and 
relationships in Neo4J allows taking advantage of property graphs. As per Miller (2013), 
property graphs are attributed, labelled and directed multi-graphs facilitating representation of 
the most complex data in the form of graphs. 

















Figure 9: Database Schema 
The root node is listed as Cases, and it has an immediate connection with the Company 
node. For the matching sample, the cases are labelled as "Non-Corrupt" followed by numeric 
to ensure the data schema remains consistent; the problem of node density can be avoided by 
attributing a numerical value to each company. A company is registered at an address which is 
denoted by "Company Address" in the database.  
Additionally, a company will have executives and directors (denoted by "Executive") 
and owners (represented by "UltimateBeneficialOwner"). Finally, a company may have a 
previous name (indicated by "PreviousCompany") along with a previous address (denoted by 
"Address"). In case of a scenario where a company has a previous address and an earlier name, 
then the relationship would be depicted by "ChangeInRegisteredAddress" with the 
"PreviousCompany" located at that address and the relationship being described by 
"PreviousName". 
The network construction is inspired by the views of Fakhraei et al. (2015) who state 






Additionally, this provides an opportunity to run some graph algorithms on the dataset and 
draw insights which could lay down the foundation for future research. It is consistent with the 
views of Drakopoulos et al. (2015). They state that graph databases not only act as a means for 
graph storage but offer opportunities to perform graph analytics techniques. Graph algorithms 
related to determining similarities, communities and node importance can be applied. One of 
the underlying rationales is to establish a base for the interaction between network structure 
and node attributes, rather than just considering the importance of nodes in a network, as it 
takes advantage of only network structure and not node attributes (Backstrom & Leskovec, 
2011).  
In the analysis of networks, a wide range of centrality measures and clustering 
algorithms are possible; however, the present paper only considers the metrics which improved 
the performance. Moreover, the lack of literature on which set of methods might perform better 
promotes the use of a mixed approach combining different methodologies. Determining and 
proving the outperformance could be something considered for future research. 
The following section describes some of the investigative queries run to analyse the 
data and results of pathfinding graph algorithms performed. 
4.2.5 Identification of patterns using traversal queries 
The presence of graph database platforms facilitates examination of a network of illicit 
companies identified in cases of money-laundering schemes and to investigate essential links. 
The information obtained through identifying links between entities in such an illicit network 
could be used by investigative journalists and compliance professionals to deter the flow of 
dirty money. The central hypothesis is dependent upon the fact that entities in the network have 
links which are hidden and could be identified using a graph database to store the publicly 
available information on the entities. 
As per Nougayrède (2019), to counter the global proliferation of shell companies the 
focus has been on the acceleration of inter-governmental measures aimed at combatting tax 
evasion, corruption and money laundering. These measures emphasise sharing of financial 
account information across borders and maintaining registers of beneficial ownership. 
However, these measures suffer from limitations such as resistance on the part of the        
jurisdiction implementing them, proactiveness on the part of national regulators and law 






Consequently, the need to investigate and identify such a network of illicit activities is of 
immense importance. 
The use of graph database platforms can add value to the following stakeholders: To 
investigators and journalists, the chapter provides an insight into organising the data on 
corporate entities on a graph database platform. It will facilitate investigation and identification 
of hidden links among entities to deter activities of corruption and money laundering. To the 
incorporation services and corporate registries, such a work lends the knowledge of importing 
the data on a graph database platform in an efficient manner and thus strengthening the first 
line of defence in the fight against money laundering. Finally, to the academics, it provides a 
platform to incorporate additional techniques to conduct further analysis. 
The following sub-section describes some of the investigative queries run to analyse 
the data and results of pathfinding graph algorithms performed.  
4.2.5.a Search Queries 
Neo4J involves the use of a query-based language, called “Cypher” to look for patterns 
in data and draw relevant conclusions (Van Bruggen, 2014). Memon and Wiil (2014) state that 
Cypher is capable of performing operations of the path-algebra method such as traverse 
operation, merge operation and filter operation. As a result, the use of Cypher to examine 
networks in data leaks, such as the Panama Papers and Paradise Papers, and their use by 
investigative journalists to identify hidden patterns, is well-documented (International 
Consortium of Investigative Journalists; Kubzansky, 2018; Obermayer et al., 2016). Graph 
analysis was used by Liu et al. (2016) to detect suspicious activities in large health-care 
datasets. The flexibility provided by querying the data on graph database platform may reveal 
information unknown in the public domain.  
For the dataset mentioned above, a range of cypher queries was executed to extract 
relevant information. A list of these queries is available upon request for reference. Apart from 
these, numerous other queries can be executed to reveal hidden patterns and information and 
draw relevant conclusions from the data. For instance, on querying the database to find 
companies with ultimate beneficial owners, it was found that only 51 in the dataset had an 
ultimate beneficial owner. On querying the dataset for the number of companies located at a 






Further, querying the dataset to determine the number of executive appointments held 
by a director from a particular nationality, one individual was found to be a director in 139 
entities. Similarly, another was found to be a director in 610 entities. 
Another query to reveal hidden information was to identify executives in a company 
who were also directors in the company with their respective previous names. The graph of the 
existence of such a pattern is provided in Figure 10 below. Such instances are not necessarily 























4.2.5.b Pathfinding algorithms 
Pathfinding algorithms increase the understanding of the way the data are connected 
(Needham & Hodler, 2019). In a general sense, these algorithms help to explore the shortest 
path and evaluate the quality and availability of routes. The literature is full of the ubiquitous 
applications of pathfinding algorithms and the detailed applications of these algorithms is not 
within the scope of this study. There is a variety of pathfinding algorithms such as the minimum 
spanning tree, shortest path, single-source shortest path, all pairs shortest path, A*, Yen’s k-
shortest paths and random walk. The pathfinding algorithms used in the study, along with their 
results, are as follows: 
• The Shortest Path Algorithm 
The Dijkstra shortest path algorithm, commonly known as the shortest path 
algorithm, was proposed in 1956 (Needham & Hodler, 2019). It calculates the shortest path 
between a pair of nodes and could be used as an extension to search queries to give a 
broader overview of the dataset. It could unveil the presence of hidden connections. As 
Norton (2018) points towards the existence of surveillant assemblage, algorithms such as 
shortest path could extract meaning out of data collected from various sources by 
establishing unidentified links amongst them. The algorithm could facilitate information 
about the degrees of separation, in cases of criminal and social networks. 
For the dataset mentioned above, the shortest path algorithm was executed to extract 
the shortest path between a given pair of entities. The executed codes are available upon 
request. The graph depicting the path between each pair of nodes is presented in Figure 11 
and Figure 12 below. The figures exhibit the traversal of relationships in the graph network 



























































Figure 12: Shortest path between Companies C and M 
 
Apart from the queries used, numerous other queries can be executed to reveal 
hidden links and information and draw a relevant conclusion from the data. 
• The All Pairs Shortest Path Algorithm  
The All Pairs Shortest Path algorithm (APSP hereafter), considered to be an 
improvisation of the Single Source Shortest Path algorithm, computes the shortest path 






For the dataset as mentioned above, the APSP algorithm was executed to extract 
the shortest paths between pairs of all nodes in the network. The codes to execute the 
algorithms are available upon request. 
4.2.5.c Implications of a graph database platform 
It is often argued on the part of corporate registries and company service providers that 
there exists a lack of resources to conduct the necessary due diligence on clients interested in 
incorporating entities. Findley et al. (2013, 2015) in their study have identified instances of 
non-compliance on the part of company service providers. The effectiveness of regulations 
surrounding the enforcement of AML regulations and their success in achieving the desired 
objectives have been questioned (Pol, 2018a, 2018b). Additionally, Becerra-Fernandez et al. 
(2000) and Hawking et al. (2005) have advocated the representation of complex networks into 
graphs to aid investigations. As per Eifrem (2019), government and financial institutions 
encounter large amounts of data and ever-changing criminal landscape and so the need for 
graph technology becomes more of a necessity. The storage of data on a graph database 
platform may facilitate identification of hidden connections between entities which may go 
unnoticed in the case of RDBMS. It can be through the visualisation of a dynamic and complex 
data set, in the form of graphs, that users are led to a detailed overview of the data, so they may 
filter, select and look into the details of networks. 
Consequently, strengthening the first line of defence against a financial crime such as 
money laundering needs to be considered. A shift from a traditional form of data storage to a 
graph database platform may aid in the fight against money laundering. The need is to be 
proactive rather than reactive to financial crimes. Illicit actors attempting to accomplish their 
objectives can be deterred using recent advances of machine learning, and big data 
infrastructure. Taking advantage of data-driven methodologies helps identify standard patterns 
from real data and so on to detecting outliers deviating from the norm. Various approaches for 
outlier detection have been developed. These include density-based approaches to identify 
points in low-probability regions, proximity-based approaches to identify points isolated from 
others, subspace-based methods to identify rare classes, and supervised or semi-supervised 
learning methods to learn differences between normal and abnormal classes (Aggarwal, 2015). 
The International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) used graph technology 
to map complex financial transactions and detect irregularities. It aided in exposing crime in 






“Panama Papers” and the “Paradise Papers”. Since the inception of the investigation in 2016, 
graph technology has enabled in recovering over USD 1.2 billion in fines and back taxes (Dalby 
& Wilson-Chapman, 2019; Romera & Gallego, 2018). Another instance of the use of graph 
technology has been exhibited by Dun and Bradstreet (D&B). They use graph technology to 
accelerate clients’ compliance with company ownership checks.  
In comparison to rule-based counterparts, data-driven approaches are flexible and 
computationally intense. This fact strengthens the argument for using a graph database 
platform to store data concerning corporate entities. Such a move could initiate company 
service providers and corporate registries to fulfil their responsibility in the fight against 
money laundering. 
The combination of search queries and pathfinding algorithms helps identify hidden 
patterns and links in the network of illicit entities which may go unnoticed in the absence 
of a graphical view of the data. The use of a graph database platform and utilisation of 
search queries and pathfinding algorithms to extract hidden links and patterns is in line with 
the views of Baker and Faulkner (1993) who suggested the use of archival data to derive 
relationships. However, it is suggested by Sparrow (1991) that looking at individual links 
between nodes is not sufficient, especially in the case of criminal network analysis. He 
stated that a criminal network suffers from three problems, which are, incompleteness (the 
inevitability of missing nodes and connections that the investigators will not uncover), 
fuzzy boundaries (the difficulty in deciding on the incorporation of information), and 
dynamics (the networks are not static; they are always changing). As a result, instead of 
looking at the presence or absence of a tie, he suggests considering the waxing and waning 
strength of a tie dependent upon the time and task at hand, and this could form the basis for 
future research. 
The present work lays down the foundation for future research by importing the 
publicly available information of a network of illicit entities on a graph database platform. As 
per Rodriguez and Shinavier (2010), the presence of multiple relationship types between nodes 
may complicate the design of network algorithms; however, the presence of graph query 
languages will be able to overcome such complications. It provides the possibility of 
performing a more robust graph analysis than regression models to investigate the explanatory 
power of different metrics or combined metrics. More simulations on alternative network 






certain limitations which could also be looked into during future research. The incorporation 
of map co-ordinates for the addresses could facilitate a more granular analysis in terms of 
lending a vector component to the data. Additionally, the use of other graph algorithms could 
also be undertaken. 
The next section highlights the graph analytics performed on the dataset and the results 
obtained. 
4.3  Overview of modelling techniques 
The extent of literature on money laundering, and framework for detection of 
techniques to be used by the launderer, was described in earlier chapters. This section briefly 
introduces and explains the relevant terminology and classifications of the detection models.  
This is followed by a discussion of application of data-mining techniques identified 
from other review papers before providing an overview of prior research into detection from 
the perspective of graph analytics. The motivation and limitation to use graph-analytics for 
detection of money laundering is as follows. 
First, money laundering exploits a web of disguised relationships and unravelling this 
complex network of connections is suited to a graph. These relationships include the methods 
of placing money, its movement in the financial system, and the organisational entities and 
their owners involved in the process. Furthermore, specific entities, most often shell 
companies, may play a transitory role within the network used to receive and distribute money. 
The representation of data in the form of graphs would establish the presence, if any, of a 
relational structure, and graph computations can provide a stronger relational inductive bias. 
Secondly, it is in line with the observations of Singh and Best (2016) who state that 
approaches reducing the burden of excessive information may improve the capacity to identify 
suspicious activities and may contribute to the effectiveness of anti-money laundering effort.  
An obstacle while coming up with a detection model is the lack of availability of data 
related to a particular type of fraud. It leads to the creation of synthetic data which match closely 
with the actual data. An exception to this is the work of Ravenda et al. (2015). They developed 
a model for detection of legally registered Mafia firms by using logistic regression to determine 






In addition, studies in the past to detect illicit activities like money laundering have 
focused on banking transactions, which may not be publicly available and may increase the 
burden of tracking an audit trail. For instance, Savage et al. (2016) using data on banking 
transactions presented a system for detection of money-laundering activities through the use of 
a combination of network analysis and supervised  learning. Luna et al. (2018) aim to identify 
shell companies by examining synthetic data of incoming and outgoing banking transactions 
along with its various attributes and using anomaly detection techniques. Singh and Best (2019) 
made use of visualisation techniques to identify patterns of suspicious money-laundering 
activities through application of link analysis in detecting suspicious banking transactions. 
This overview of modelling techniques complements the following sections that discuss 
the application of methodology in the model development.  
4.3.1 Introduction to modelling terminology and classifications 
There is a lack of consensus on the definitions of interrelated terms used in the 
modelling literature and their overlapping with each other. A brief description is provided to 
assist the reader unfamiliar with modelling and more information can be found in introductory 
sections of reputable textbooks on data mining or data science such as that by Rokach and 
Maimon (2015) and Sathya and Abraham (2013). 
Data science comprises of all processes associated with data ranging from generation 
or collection through to processing and analysis. Data mining, knowledge discovery, 
knowledge mining and machine learning are parts of data science. They are involved in 
discovery of useful information, patterns, rules or models from one or more data samples. The 
types of techniques used in data mining can be categorised as Classification, Clustering, Outlier 
Detection, Prediction, Regression and Visualisation (Gepp, 2015; Ngai et al., 2011; Sharma & 
Panigrahi, 2012). These techniques comprises models that learn from data and hence the name, 
machine learning. This learning can occur in several ways including supervised, unsupervised, 
reinforcement or stochastic learning (Sathya & Abraham, 2013). A hybrid of supervised and 
unsupervised learning is most relevant to this study and is explained in the context of illicit 
shell company detection below. 
4.3.1.a Supervised and unsupervised learning methods 
Supervised learning methods uses existing data to learn the relationship between the 






understanding of the relationship between independent and dependent variable is referred to as 
training a model. For an illicit shell detection, the dependent variable is often a binary variable 
that indicates whether it is either corrupt or non-corrupt. When the dependent variable takes on 
a predefined outcome (such as two, corrupt or non-corrupt), the resulting model is often termed 
a classification model. 
Supervised learning methods learn from data comprising independent variables 
explaining a range of known values of the dependent variable. Unlike supervised learning that 
requires training data with specified outcomes for the dependent variable (corrupt or non-
corrupt), unsupervised learning does not require information about the dependent variable. 
Consequently, there is no reliance on past data with classifications of either corrupt or non-
corrupt that could be misclassified, and it can be an advantage of this type of learning.  
As opposed to understanding the existing relationship between inputs and output, 
unsupervised learning methods look for any relationships in the data. An example of 
unsupervised learning is clustering. Anomaly detection can be a mixture of both supervised 
and unsupervised. Similarly, techniques such as neural networks can be trained using either 
supervised or unsupervised learning (Gepp, 2015; Sathya & Abraham, 2013; Sudjianto et al., 
2010).  
4.3.2 Application of data-mining techniques in detection 
Elkan (2001) defines data mining as a process for obtaining unknown insights which 
are statistically reliable, and actionable from data which must be clean, available, adequate and 
relevant. Similarly, Lavrač et al. (2004) state that a data-mining problem should be well-
defined, unsolvable by query and reporting tools and guided by a data-mining process model. 
It is applied to extract and uncover hidden truths behind large volumes of data, and this feature 
has led to its increasing use in coming up with a range of detection mechanisms to isolate illicit 
activities. Ngai et al. (2011), on systematically analysing 49 journal articles published between 
1997 and 2008 on the subject of fraud detection, found extensive use of data-mining techniques 
such as logistic models, neural networks, the Bayesian belief network and decision trees in the 
detection of financial fraud.  
The primary objective of a detection mechanism is to identifying suspicious or 
fraudulent applications and transactions. For instance, financial statement fraud detection 






fraudulent financial behaviour or such activities. It would facilitate decisionmakers to develop 
strategies to decrease the harm done by fraud. There are specific attributes present in data for 
detecting each fraud type. For instance, crop insurance data would focus on ratios comprising 
the amount of compensation, and premium and liability figures; management data involving 
financial ratios would have components such as the allowance of doubtful debts and accounts 
receivables (Little et al., 2002).  
Similarly, the data on home insurance are made up of customer behaviour and financial 
status (Von Altrock, 1996), whereas automobile insurance data involve binary indicators 
grouped into categories. The elements common to medical insurance data are treatment details, 
patient demographics, policy and claim benefits (Williams, 1999). Domain-specific attributes 
are exhibited in credit transaction data (Chan et al., 1999; Ghosh & Reilly, 1994), and in 
telecommunication data (Cahill et al., 2002; Cortes et al., 2003; Fawcett & Provost, 1999).  
In order to ensure that a detection-mechanism is useful, it becomes imperative to 
consider the strategic interaction or moves and countermoves between a fraud detection 
system’s algorithm and the perpetrator's modus operandi as it is cost-prohibitive to manually 
check the majority of external parties’ identities and activities (Phua et al., 2010). For instance, 
in the case of application fraud, fraudsters apply for insurance entitlements using falsified 
information and apply for credit and telecommunication products and services using non-
existent identity information or someone else's identity. In the case of transactional fraud, 
fraudsters take over or add to the usage of an existing, legitimate credit or telecommunication 
account. Additionally, it is essential to keep in mind that the volume of both fraud and legal 
cases will fluctuate independently of each other; hence, class distributions (proportion of 
illegitimate examples to legitimate examples) will change over time. Additionally, multiple 
styles of fraud can happen simultaneously. Each style can have a regular, occasional, seasonal 
or once-off temporal characteristic. Legal characteristics and behaviour can change over time. 
Once the modus operandi of perpetrators has  been uncovered, they will supply new or modified 
styles of perpetration until the detection systems start generating false negatives again (Fawcett, 
2003). 
With the growing focus on illicit activities, the academic literature has focused on 
coming up with a wide variety of automated systems to detect them (Baader & Krcmar, 2018; 
Battaglia et al., 2018; Chang et al., 2008; Gepp, 2015, 2016; Gepp et al., 2018; Khaled et al., 






2013; Song et al., 2014; Van Vlasselaer et al., 2017; Wedge et al., 2017). Chang et al. (2008) 
highlighted the use of a set of coordinated visualisations based upon keywords identification 
in wire transactions to detect fraud. The authors in depicting the relationship between keywords 
and accounts over time were able to detect transactions and accounts exhibiting suspicious 
behaviours. Phua et al. (2010) directed attention towards the limitation of data-mining fraud 
detection research in terms of lack of publicly available real data to perform experiments on 
well-established and accepted research methods and techniques. They addressed these issues 
by garnering all related literature for categorisation and comparison, selecting some innovative 
methods and techniques for discussion and pointing towards data sources as possible 
alternatives.  
On a similar note, Perols (2011b) compared six popular statistical and machine-learning 
models in detecting financial statement fraud under different assumptions of misclassification 
costs and ratios of fraud firms to non-fraud firms. The study found that logistic regression and 
support vector machines exhibited better performance than artificial neural networks, bagging 
and stacking in detecting financial statement fraud. Sahin et al. (2013) developed a new cost-
sensitive decision tree approach to detect credit card fraud aimed at minimising 
misclassification cost, and they compared the performance of this approach with traditional 
classification models. They found that a cost-sensitive decision-tree algorithm outperforms the 
well-known existing methods on the given problem set with respect to the well-known 
performance metrics such as accuracy and true positive rate, but also on the basis of a newly 
defined cost-sensitive metric specific to credit card fraud detection. Song et al. (2014), using a 
dataset containing 110 fraudulent firms and 440-non-fraudulent firms of equivalent size in the 
same industries presented a model for assessment of financial statement fraud risk. Bahnsen et 
al. (2016) developed a mechanism for detecting credit card fraud by addressing cost-sensitivity 
and features pre-processing to achieve improved fraud detection and savings.  
Ngai et al. (2011), on reviewing English-language journal articles between 1997 and 
2008, found an extensive application of data-mining techniques. They found an emphasis on 
the detection of insurance fraud followed by corporate fraud and credit card fraud. In contrast, 
they found a distinct lack of research on mortgage fraud, money laundering, and securities and 
commodities fraud. In recent times, areas such as bankruptcy prediction and credit risk have 
also received attention from academics. (Ezawa & Norton, 1996; Foster & Stine, 2004; Gepp 






The works above are by no means an exhaustive list but they do provide a representative 
cross-section of the breadth of areas of application of detection through data-mining. 
4.3.3 Graph analytics  
Graph analytics involve analysis of the data by querying, using statistical methods, 
visualisation or incorporation of graphs into machine-learning tasks to provide insights into the 
data stored on the graph. The goal is to find suspicious individuals and relationships between 
them, and incorporate into this understanding any changes that might have taken place over 
time and structures of networks. Liu et al. (2016) classified graph analytics techniques in two 
categories, namely, the   ego-net approach and the structural approach. The ego-net approach 
emphasises individual nodes and examines features from a node’s local neighbourhood. The 
structural approach analyses network relations and looks for communities with secure 
connections or standard practice. Goyal and Ferrara (2018) categorised graph analytics related 
objectives into four categories, namely, node classification (determination of node labels based 
on other labelled nodes and network structure), link prediction (forecasting of missing links or 
occurrences of links in the near future), clustering (grouping of similar nodes through discovery 





























Figure 13: Classification of graph analytics 
 
Concerning the Figure 13 above, the tasks related to graph analytics can be described 
as follows:  
• Node Classification – In a network, there are nodes which may be labelled. The 
labelling of nodes varies depending upon the context of a network. For instance, in the 
case of a social network, node labels may refer to interests, relationships and so forth; 
for a corporate network, they may refer to the name and location of companies and 
their executives. However, at times, labels for a large proportion of nodes in a 
network may be unavailable. The prediction of these missing labels is known as node 
classification, and the approaches to predicting these labels are feature extraction-






2018). For feature extraction-based approaches, features for nodes are generated 
depending upon their local network statistics and neighbourhood and then by applying 
a classifier for predicting the labels. On the other hand, random walks propagate 
labels for the nodes in a network (Azran, 2007; Baluja et al., 2008). 
• Link Prediction – In real-life scenarios, the construction of networks based on observed 
interactions between nodes may be incomplete or inaccurate. Link prediction predicts 
missing interactions or future links among entities of a network. The task has uses in 
terms of cost-savings (through attribution of monetary values to prediction accuracy) 
and development of relevant recommendation mechanisms (Goyal & Ferrara, 2018; S.-
y. Wu et al., 2019). The algorithms used to predict links are classified into similarity-
based, maximum-likelihood based and probabilistic methods (Adamic & Adar, 2003; 
Clauset et al., 2008; Katz, 1953; Liben‐Nowell & Kleinberg, 2007; White et al., 
1976). 
• Clustering – Network partitioning, more commonly known as clustering, refers to 
grouping of similar nodes into subsets; the approaches for these are structure-based and 
attribute-based clustering. Structure-based clustering could be further sub-classified 
into community-based clustering (to determine subgraph density with high frequency 
of intra-cluster edges and low frequency of inter-cluster edges) and structural 
equivalence clustering (identification of nodes with similar roles) (Ding et al., 2001; 
Newman & Girvan, 2004; Xu et al., 2007). In the case of attribute-based clustering, in 
addition to observed links, node labels are also utilised to cluster nodes (Zhou et al., 
2009). 
• Visualisation – The necessity for identification of patterns in data might have prompted 
the use of data for visualisation. Data for visualisation refers to technologies which 
facilitate users to see information for a better understanding and contextualisation 
(Singh and Best, 2016). The human ability to comprehend complex information 
visually aids in understanding large volumes of data visually and drawing concomitant   
insights. The transformation of data into visual representations facilitates suitable 
analysis (Thomas & Cook, 2006). As a result, graphs have found applications in a wide 
range of fields (Gansner & North, 2000; Theocharidis et al., 2009). Graphs may be in 
the form of the tree, 3D or hyperbolic-based layouts (Herman et al., 2000).   
Overall, graph analytics make use of the relationship. They are used to uncover hidden 






Documented in the literature is the potential in making use of graph analytics. There is 
a variety of algorithms and visualisations from which to draw inferences, leading to their 
diverse applications.   
 
4.3.3.a Application of graph analytics 
As per Becerra-Fernandez et al. (2000) and Hawking et al. (2005), representation of 
complex networks into graphs and their analysis would aid investigators to identify relevant 
patterns of activities. Bangcharoensap et al. (2015) supported the notion of using graph 
algorithm techniques such as PageRank, community detection and centrality algorithms in 
developing detection systems. Monge and Elkan (1997) proposed a find-union algorithm to 
detect database records that are near duplicates. Becerra-Fernandez et al. (2000) developed a 
system for assisting an analyst in discovering complex networks of potentially illegal activities 
by correlating through graph visualisations. Krebs (2002) used degree centrality and closeness 
centrality algorithms to map networks of terrorist cells. Similarly, Morselli and Roy (2008) 
used the betweenness centrality algorithm to determine the role of brokers in maintaining 
flexibility in criminal networks. Chang et al. (2008) developed a system for visual analysis of 
financial transactions through the combination of visual and textual approaches. 
Vitali et al. (2011) used the strongly connected component (SCC hereafter) algorithm 
to identify the structure of international ownership along with the percentage of control held 
by each owner. SCC draws a picture on the level of entanglement in a network and has 
applications in explaining the reduction of transaction costs, anti-takeover strategies and risk-
sharing. The extent of network connectedness indicates the level of intricacy in a network. 
Didimo et al. (2011) designed a system for discovering criminal patterns of money laundering 
and fraud. They used a combination of clustering techniques, novel graph algorithms and 
interaction functionalities for visually exploring networked datasets. Kido et al. (2016) 
proposed the application of the Louvain method for modelling of topics based on the detection 
of communities in graphs. It can be challenging to identify communities where members of the 
same community have more interactions with each other. In graph application, a community is 
a group of nodes with dense connectivity between them. The ability to find and analyse 
communities can provide more knowledge about the network's structure. Liu et al. (2016) 
developed graph analysis techniques with an application in real-world health-care datasets to 






heterogeneous graphs leads to the identification of relationships, anomalous individuals and 
communities through analysis of local and global graph characteristics. The graphical 
representation leads to a reduction in the list of suspects and focused investigation of suspicious 
individual or activity.  
Commercial systems making use of graph analytics include Xanalys Link Explorer 
(Watson & Schneider, 1999), Netmap (Tracy et al., 2001) and i2 Analyst Notebook (Stewart 
& Rosemann, 2001). As per Peslak (2005), the applications as mentioned above involve 
classical layout algorithms such as circular drawing algorithms, hierarchical layout algorithms 
and force-directed algorithms for the representation of relational data. Needham and Hodler 
(2019) broadly classify graph algorithms into pathfinding and search, community detection, 
centrality computation and similarity algorithms. Each of these categories comprises various 
techniques under it.  
In addition to graph search algorithms, pathfinding algorithms are used to explore 
routes between nodes by initiating at one node and traversing through relationships to reach 
the destination. These algorithms have applications in logistics planning and gaming 
simulation. Some of the commonly used pathfinding algorithms are the shortest path (finding 
the shortest distance between two nodes), all pairs shortest path and single-source shortest path 
(finding the shortest paths between all pairs of nodes or from a chosen node to all other nodes), 
minimum spanning tree (determining a connected tree structure with the least cost for visiting 
all nodes from a selected node) and random walk (considered to be an essential prerequisite for 
machine learning workflows and other graph algorithms). 
Centrality algorithms help in determining the roles of nodes in a graph and the effect 
they have on the network. The objective is to identify essential nodes and draw inferences about 
the network based on that. It is essential to keep in mind that different centrality algorithms 
yield different results based on what they were created to measure. Some of the commonly 
used centrality algorithms are degree centrality (a baseline measure for connectedness), 
closeness centrality (the importance of a central node to the group), betweenness centrality (for 
determining control points along with an alternative for approximation) and PageRank (for 
understanding the overall influence). 
The existence of a community is pervasive to networks of all types and identification 
of such communities could be critical in the process of evaluation of group behaviour and 






a community shall have more relationships within the group than with members outside it. 
Identification of communities has wide-ranging applications such as determining preferences 
of peer groups and preparation of data for further analysis. Some of the representative 
community detection algorithms are triangle count and clustering coefficient (for determining 
overall relation density), strongly connected components and connected components (for 
determining connected clusters), label propagation (for determining groups based on node 
labels) and Louvain modularity (used for examining group quality and hierarchies). Finally, 
similarity algorithms examine the similarity between nodes by using several methods such as 
Jaccard similarity to compare information such as node attributes.  
Graph analysis techniques have become essential to find suspicious individuals, 
existing network relationships, unusual changes, geospatial dispersions, anomalous network 
structure and to facilitate the efficient handling of large volumes of data (Liu et al., 2016).  It 
is in line with the observations of Singh and Best (2016) who state that approaches reducing 
the burden of excessive information may improve identification of suspicious activities and 
may contribute to the effectiveness of anti-money-laundering effort. There has been a focus on 
using graph networks to come up with detection models related to financial frauds. There exists 
a body of literature advocating the use of graph analytics techniques in detecting money 
laundering using suspicious banking transactions (Bolton & Hand, 2002; Chang et al., 2008; 
Didimo et al., 2011; Needham & Hodler, 2019; Singh & Best, 2016, 2019). 
Savage et al. (2016) using data on banking transactions presented a system for detection 
of money-laundering activities through the use of a combination of network analysis and 
supervised learning. Luna et al. (2018) aim at identifying shell companies by examining 
synthetic data of incoming and outgoing banking transactions along with its various attributes 
and using anomaly-detection techniques. Singh and Best (2019) made use of visualisation 
techniques to identify patterns of suspicious money-laundering activities through application 
of link analysis in detecting suspicious banking transactions. 
However, an obstacle while coming up with a detection model is the lack of availability 
of data related to a particular type of fraud. It leads to the creation of synthetic data which 
match closely to the actual data. An exception to this is the work of Ravenda et al. (2015). They 
developed a model for detection of legally registered Mafia firms by using logistic regression 
to determine whether accounting information of Mafia firms were different from lawful firms. 






on banking transactions. These may not be publicly available and they may increase the burden 
of following an audit trail.   
4.3.4 Decision trees  
Decision trees can be used for both regression and classification, respectively. 
Depending upon the purpose, they are known as regression or classification trees. They are 
usually binary trees that comprise a root node, other leaf nodes and non-leaf nodes connected 
by branches, such that each non-leaf node has two branches leading to two distinct nodes, as 























The construction of tree is through a recursive process of splitting the data when moving 
from a higher to a lower level of the tree. This process is described by decision rules that are 
associated with every non-leaf node including the root node decision. When applied to 
classification problems such as an illicit shell detection, leaf nodes represents classification 
groups such as corrupt or non-corrupt. A terminal node is assigned as corrupt or non-corrupt 
according to which classification produces the lowest error cost on the training sample. The 
tree structure models interactions between multiple explanatory variables that classify an entity 
as corrupt or non-corrupt depending upon generated decision rules. 
Standard regression-based techniques are limited to modelling pre-defined interactions, 
and this is difficult and time-consuming, especially when there are many variables and many 
or unknown interactions. On the other hand, decision-tree interactions are more flexible and 
can correspond to specific regions of data compared with traditional interactions in regression 
equations (Gepp, 2015). This is an advantage over standard techniques because the appropriate 
transformation is not always clear in the real world (Derrig & Francis, 2008; Sutton, 2005).  
The other advantages of decision trees include that they are non-parametric and are able 
to model interactions similar to artificial neural networks. Additionally, they are also 
transparent, visually representable and interpretable. Furthermore, decision trees are also 
immune to outliers and are easy to develop into automated systems. However, they also have 
disadvantages. A major disadvantage is that they do not produce an accurate probability of 
classification due to their inability to differentiate between cases classified into the same leaf 
node. Similar to artificial neural networks, their construction is sensitive to small changes in 
the training data set (Sudjianto et al., 2010) and they therefore perform better when trained on 
larger data sets. Consequently, the choice of the decision-tree building technique is important 
(Derrig & Francis, 2008) as there can be a large variation in accuracy between them. The tree 
building techniques determine how many nodes to include in the tree.  
Sophisticated decision-tree software called CART (Classification and Regression 
Trees) based on the seminal work of Breiman et al. (1984) is sold exclusively by Salford 
Systems. Consequently, most trees are built using a two-stage process to: 
1. Create a tree with many nodes, and then 
2. “Pruning” the tree to a desired level of complexity by multiple node sub-trees with single 






Salford Systems claim that CART outperforms all competitors in terms of features, 
accuracy, reliability and robustness (Steinberg 2015). Additionally, CART provides 
classification accuracy to assess the relative importance of explanatory variables. CART- a 
variable importance score ranging from 0 to 100 highlights contribution of variables in the 
model. 
4.3.4.a Bagging and Random Forests 
Bagging (Breiman, 1996) is designed to improve accuracy and stability of individual 
models. It is based on repeated sampling with replacement. Samples are taken from the data; 
models are then fitted to each sample, and the results are aggregated to provide a classification 
(Sutton, 2005).  
Random Forests (Breiman, 2001) is an example of bagging that uses decision trees. 
Random Forests using CART decision trees is a program exclusively available through Salford 
Systems, but other similar implementations are available. For each tree, Random Forests draws 
a random sample from the entire training data set and uses it to grow an unpruned tree using a 
different randomly chosen subset of explanatory variables at each node. The result is a form of 
dynamically constructed nearest neighbour classifier (Whiting et al., 2012). 
Random Forests have advantages over single-decision trees in terms of increased 
stability through reduced variance and reduced sensitivity to the training data. Furthermore, 
they provide increased accuracy (Aldhous, 2012; Bhattacharya et al., 2011). A disadvantage of 
Random Forests is its black box nature caused by the complexity of a large number of trees. 
4.3.4.b Boosting and TreeNet 
The classification power of decision trees can be enhanced by iteratively applying the 
classification function and combining the output so that the classification error is minimised. 
Boosting is different from bagging in terms of assigning weights to incorrect predictions and 
use of simple classifiers (Gepp, 2015).  
Stochastic gradient boosting (Friedman, 1999; Friedman, 2002) is a leading method of 
boosting. TreeNet, provided exclusively by Salford Systems, is the commercial product based 
on Friedman’s work. This process also incorporates random sampling and uses the next tree to 







Stochastic gradient boosting possess advantages over single decision trees in terms of 
increased stability through reduced variance and reduced sensitivity to the training data. 
Additionally, it provides increased accuracy. Moreover, stochastic gradient boosting is 
particularly good at classifications near region boundaries with smooth decision boundaries 
(Derrig & Francis, 2008; Whiting et al., 2012) and is capable of handling unbalanced data sets 
(Whiting et al., 2012). Once again, the drawback is the black-box nature of TreeNet. This 
ranking is very useful because variables have many opportunities to be used (as a result of 
many trees), and their importance is built up slowly one iteration at a time. 
4.4  Graph algorithms 
As per Mondragon et al. (2018), it is essential to use a combination of information from 
various sources to represent the information in the form of networks. They proposed a multi-
link community detection method for multiplex networks based on extending link communities 
to a multiplex network framework, which aided in revealing the richness of such networks. 
Malinick et al. (2013) examined the importance of the location of individuals and their 
characteristics in print-media coverage using 2-mode data. They combined the data on social 
actors from public sources with their location to find that network centrality is associated with 
media coverage controlling for actor attributes. Hite et al. (2005) had used a network of school 
administrators from a qualitative paradigm using network theory and methods to observe the 
presence of multiple networks, thus suggesting that school administrators use multiple 
networks to achieve organisational objectives.  
At times, the need to acknowledge that two or more of the given relationships can be 
joined to form a semantically meaningful compound relationship pattern is not given due 
importance. A heterogeneous network because of various node and relationship types involved 
has to explicitly define a set of semantic rules that describe the different relationships and their 
valid combinations (Memon & Wiil, 2014). Rodriguez and Shinavier (2010) state that the 
incorporation of multi-relational networks adds to the complication of network algorithms. 
However, the extensive application of path algebras to single-relational networks can be 
extended to multi-relational ones. Similar to path algebras, graph query languages such as 
'Cypher', with different levels of expressivity, serve as a function for querying graphs for data. 
They facilitate the application of single-relational network algorithms to complex network data. 






relational, multiplex, multilayer, multi-modal and multi-modal and multi-relational networks. 
Efforts have been made to establish clarity around them (Aleta & Moreno, 2019; Memon & 
Wiil, 2014). However, outlining these inconsistencies is beyond the scope of this research. 
This section applies algorithms aimed at identifying similarity, community and 
centrality of nodes in the network to come up with scores to be used for a classification model 
(the codes used for running the algorithms are available upon request). The literature comprises 
the use of community-detection approaches in tandem with other graph algorithms to yield 
better results. For instance, Seifoddini and Hsu (1994) in their study found better results when 
similarity coefficient based algorithms were used to identify communities. Similarly, Zuo et al. 
(2012) used a combination of PageRank, community detection and domain knowledge of brain 
regions to access changes in brain structures of individuals with age. Yao et al. (2018) classify 
community-based approaches as one of the categories to predict links among networks. The 
identification of communities could aid in inferring similar behaviour displayed by a group, 
assisting in discovery of a nested relationship, and preparing the data for use in further analysis 
(Kido et al., 2016; Needham & Hodler, 2019). It also has an application in identifying 
functional modules in biochemical networks (Raghavan et al., 2007). As per Hao et al. (2018), 
studies in the past have attempted to determine the influence of nodes in complex networks 
using a range of measures; however, studies do not consider overlapping communities in the 
network. On examining network structure and overlapping communities on the real-world 
networks, they found their proposed method to outperform several benchmark algorithms and 
found applications in large-scale networks. 
Further, the studies consider the direction of the relationship between nodes to be 
outward. This is in agreement with the views of Hoffman et al. (1990) who, working from the 
argument of Emerson (1962) on power relations, stated that centrality in a sending network 
might increase an organisation’s power relative to other organisations  within the network. 
Similarly, centrality in a receiving network may add to relative dependence of the organisation 
in the network. In the context of a network of shell companies, nodes with outward links to 
other nodes would be more central, and hence the direction of relationship between nodes has 
been considered as outwards. 
The below tables 10 and 11 provide a brief overview of the algorithm categories and 







Algorithm Category Overview Motivation, Objective or Application 
Similarity • Similarity-metric based 
approaches compute the 
similarity of node pairs 
as per the attributes of a 
node or topological 
structures. 
 
• Limitations of feature selection, unbalanced output 
classes and problems of computational cost make 
similarity-metric based methods attractive (Yao et al. 
2016; Yao et al. 2018) 
• These approaches are simple and have exhibited 
superior performance on complex networks and 
outperformed machine-learning approaches in the past 
(Lu et al. 2017) 
Community - 
Detection 
• A community in a 
network can be 
categorised as a group of 
objects which are similar 
to each other and 
dissimilar from the 
remaining objects in the 
network. 
• The identification of 
communities could aid in 
inferring similar 
behaviour displayed by a 
group, discovering 
nested relationships and 
preparing the data for 
use in further analysis 
(Kido et al. 2016; 
Needham and Hodler 
2019).  
• A similarity measure is computed between objects, 
and a clustering algorithm is used to group those 
objects into families based on a corresponding 
similarity measure (Seifoddini and Hsu 1994). 
• The underlying principle is that similar nodes exhibit 
dense interconnectedness among themselves and 
sparse connectivity to objects in the network 
(Raghavan et al. 2007; Needham and Hodler 2019). 
• It also has an application in identifying functional 
modules in biochemical networks (Raghavan et al. 
2007). 
• Luna et al. (2018) used companies with the same bank 
accounts to classify communities of shell companies 
in their study.  
• Gao and Ye (2007) analysed money-laundering 
networks through link analysis (comprising manual, 
graphical and structural approaches), community 
generation (using techniques such as K means and 
clustering to generate binary relationship-based 
communities) and network destabilisation 
(comprising power analysis, cohesion and role 
analysis to disturb the flow in-network) 
Centrality • Centrality algorithms 
facilitate understanding 
of the nodes’ importance 
and group dynamics 
(Needham and Hodler 
2019) 
• The rationale to use centrality algorithms lies in a 
phenomenon known as homophily in network science. 
Homophily refers to the tendency that connections 
exist between fraudulent entities and these entities 
work in collusion to accomplish an objective 






• The most commonly used measures are Degree 
Centrality, Closeness Centrality and Betweenness 
Centrality, as proposed by Freeman (1978). As per 
Ruhnau (2000), all three measures depend on the size 
of the graph. 
• As per Chen et al. (2012), Betweenness Centrality and 
Closeness Centrality are prominent geodesic-path 
based ranking measures.  
• A well-known variation of the Eigenvector centrality 
is the PageRank algorithm proposed by Page et al. 
(1999). 
Table 10. Overview of the algorithm categories used 
Algorithm and 
Categories 
Overview Brief Description and Application 
Jaccard Index –
Similarity 
• Paul Jaccard proposed the 
Jaccard Index in 1901 (Lü 
and Zhou 2011). The 
Jaccard index is used for 
information retrieval and is a 
normalised version of the 
Common Neighbor 
similarity algorithm by 
considering the influence of 
a node in the network 
• It solves the problem of the Common Neighbour 
similarity algorithm by emphasising the links of 
non-influential nodes to make sure that the 
common neighbours among them exist because of 
their similarity and not their influence (Lu et al. 
2017). 
• It measures similarity as a proportion of elements 
two objects have in common in comparison to 
elements that are not common to them. It is 
distinct from an index such as Cosine similarity 
which considers information related to vector 
similarity (Lewis et al., 2006). 
• The value for Jaccard Index varies between the 
range of 0 and 1 with a value close to 1 indicating 
a higher proportion of similarity; it    can be used 
for community detection especially in the case of 







Overlap – Similarity • The Overlap Similarity 
algorithm, also known as 
Hub Promoted Index (HPI), 
aims at measuring the 
overlap between two sets 
(Lü and Zhou 2011). It 
considers the strength that 
weak connections share 
among themselves 
(Granovetter 1973). 
• It considers the strength that weak connections 






• In a graph network, triangle 
refers to a set of three nodes 
whereby each node is related 
to all other nodes in the set. 
The triangle counting 
algorithm aims at detecting 
communities by determining 
the number of triangles 
passing through each node 
in the graph network 
(Needham and Hodler 
2019). 
• The technique gained immense popularity in 
network analysis because of the size of networks 
such as the world wide web (Schank and Wagner 
2005)/ 
• Van Vlasselaer et al. (2017) aimed at identifying 
companies intentionally going bankrupt to avoid 
tax payment. They did so by assessing the 
effectiveness of network information in social 
security fraud detection using network-based 
features such as triangles to identify such 
companies. 
• The importance of triangles is quantified by the 
clustering coefficient which is interpreted as 
curvature (Eckmann and Moses 2002). 
Betweenness – 
Centrality 
• Betweenness Centrality, as 
proposed by Freeman (1977, 
1978), determines the 
influence a node has over 
the flow of information in a 
graph. It tends to find nodes 
that act as a bridge in a 
graph network between 
other nodes. 
• Morselli and Roy (2008) examined the importance 
of brokers in criminal networks using the 
betweenness centrality algorithm. They found the 
position of a broker to be critical in resource 









• Randomised – Approximate 
Brandes ("RA-Brandes") 
algorithm, also known as 
approximate betweenness 
centrality, enables fast 
calculation of approximate 
scores of betweenness 
centrality between nodes of 
a graph (Needham and 
Hodler 2019) 
• It involves the calculation of shortest paths 
between a subset of nodes instead of all pairs of 
nodes in the graph. The nodes may be selected 
uniformly at random or there may be random 
selection of nodes with high degrees.   
Eigenvector – 
Centrality 
• Eigenvector Centrality was 
pioneered by the works of 
Katz (1953) and Bonacich 
(1972, 1987). 
• It is based on the idea that the node is central if it 
is related to central nodes. The value of centrality 




• PageRank Centrality 
algorithm, a variant of 
Eigenvector centrality, 
measures the connectivity of 
nodes (Needham & Hodler, 
2019).  
• It involves traversing 
through a graph and 
computing the frequency of 
hitting each node during 
these traversals. 
• The algorithm provides a 
network centrality score in 
light of the entire graph 
structure. 
• At times, the goal is to determine the importance 
relative to a small subset of the objects (Gleich 
2015). 
• PageRank methods have been used in the past to 
study engineered systems such as road and urban 
space networks (Jiang et al. 2008; Schlote et al. 
2012).  
• Zuo et al. (2012) used PageRank combined with 
community detection and known brain regions to 
understand the changes in brain structure across a 
population of 1000 people correlated by age.  
• Mooney et al. (2012) used it to determine changes 
in the network of molecules linked by hydrogen 
bonds among water molecules. 
Harmonic – 
Centrality 
• The Closeness Centrality 
algorithm aids in node 
detection in a graph that 
aims to spread information 
through a sub-graph. 
However, the performance 
of the algorithm is subject to 
the connectivity of nodes in 
a graph network (Needham 
and Hodler 2019) 
• Krebs (2002) used closeness centrality scores to 
reveal terrorists in network cells vital for carrying 
out their operations. Colladon and Remondi 
(2017) used the closeness centrality measure to 
identify factoring businesses in Italy responsible 
for undertaking trade-based money-laundering 
activities 
• Marchiori and Latora (2000) used this as a 
representation of the average shortest path in their 






• A variant of closeness 
centrality, to address the 
issue of real-life networks of 
the absence of 
connectedness, is harmonic 
centrality, also referred to as 
valued centrality (Needham 
and Hodler 2019) 
useful in ascertaining the importance of node 
across the entire graph rather than within its 
subgraph. 
Table 11. Overview of the algorithms used 
The study uses various combinations of similarity, community-detection and centrality 
algorithms (namely, Jaccard Index, Overlap Index, Triangles and Triangle Counting 
Algorithm, Betweenness Centrality, Approximate Betweenness-Centrality and Harmonic 
centrality algorithm). 
The scores obtained in Neo4J on performing graph algorithms are retrieved. The scores 
are exported to CART with the binary predictor being corrupt (denoted by 1) and non-corrupt 
(denoted by 0) respectively. CART decision trees were assessed using a holdout sample of data 
on private limited companies incorporated in the UK.   
4.4.1 Supervised approach 
Supervised learning methods use existing data for learning the relationship between 
input variables and an output variable, a process referred to as training. Such methods can be 
used to train classification models on past (or simulated) known data before being used on new 
data. Supervised learning methods train models using a binary output variable. For illicit shell 
detection, the output variable is binary indicating either fraudulence or legitimacy.  
Many different modelling techniques use supervised learning methods. Discriminant 
analysis and logistic regression, which are parametric modelling techniques, have traditionally 
been popular for analysing classification problems. In recent times, the use of non-parametric 
modelling techniques, which are more accurate and less distribution-dependent, have become 
prominent. These include decision trees, artificial neural networks, and ensembles of multiple 
decision trees such as TreeNet and Random Forests. To date, very few research studies on 
financial crime, especially illicit shell companies’ detection, have used decision trees and 






The literature in the past has made use of supervised and unsupervised hybrids on 
labelled data (Cahill et al., 2002; Cortes et al., 2003; Phua et al., 2010). There has been growth 
of both supervised approaches, such as Decision Trees and Artificial Neural Networks, and 
unsupervised approaches such as link analysis and graph mining.  
There are advantages in using decision trees; they are immune to outliers, are non-
parametric, resistant to irrelevant variables, can easily model interactions between explanatory 
variables, are easy to interpret and simple to develop into automated systems. Decision trees 
have been used in the areas of medicine, engineering, finance and marketing as well as for 
fraud detection (Gepp et al., 2010; Ghosh & Reilly, 1994; Kumar & Bhattacharya, 2006; 
Kumar & Haynes, 2003). Link analysis and graph mining have been used in law enforcement, 
anti-terrorism and other security areas (Phua et al., 2010). 
Decision Trees have applications in addressing problems related to regression and 
classification and therefore are commonly referred to as regression and classification trees 
respectively when addressing problems of the same nature. Al Hasan et al. (2006), in their 
study of the co-authorship network, laid down the foundation for extraction of features to be 
used in supervised learning for a systematic link prediction. They considered factors such as 
proximity and individual attributes to extract features from the network. They found that 
considering link prediction as a binary classification problem and using useful features in a 
supervised learning framework increased accuracy. The fact that features are so critically 
important emphasises the need for selecting appropriate features in data mining. On using the 
PageRank algorithm to rank features, Ienco et al. (2008), found that higher feature-ranking led 
to the influence of a node in a network and this resulted in greater classification accuracy. 
On the downside, similar to artificial neural networks, decision-tree models suffer from 
being sensitive to small changes in the training data set (Sudjianto et al., 2010). However, 
newer ensemble techniques such as TreeNet overcome this issue and provide stable models 
that also make better classifications close to region boundaries. Salford Systems are the 
providers of CART decision trees (Breiman et al., 1984), TreeNet (Friedman, 1999) and 
Random Forests (Breiman, 2001). For this study, three algorithms were considered, namely, 
Decision Tree, TreeNet and Random Forests. The performance of these algorithms was 
observed using different performance metrics like Area under ROC (AUC), precision, recall 






for the classification models to compare the performance and determine whether the 
classification accuracy is consistent across them. 
4.4.2 Results 
The representation of the data with the schema, as described above, led to the 
identification of entities as part of independent cases of corruption linked to each other. It does 
denote the importance of the need to move to the graph database structure on the part of 
corporate registries to stop attempts to establish an illicit network in its initial stages.  
The analysis involved the incorporation of similarities among nodes as relationships in 
the graph network to facilitate better results. This approach aligns with the works of Seifoddini 
and Hsu (1994), who stated that the use of similarity coefficients aids in flexibly incorporating 
various types of data for analysis. The use of community detection algorithms with centrality 
algorithms in the study is consistent with the work of Zuo et al. (2012) who used community 
detection with PageRank algorithm to better understand the changes in the brain structure. 
Once imported, several graph algorithms were performed, mainly related to determining 
similarities, communities and node importance. One of the underlying rationales was to 
establish a base for the interaction between network structure and node attributes, rather than 
just considering the importance of nodes in a network (because the latter takes advantage of 
only network structure, and not node attributes) (Backstrom & Leskovec, 2011). Additionally, 
the approach adopted in the study is comparable with the views of Hao et al. (2018), who state 
that such an approach allows accounting for overlapping communities. This can aid in 
determining node influence as the number of communities a node belongs to represents its 
propagation capacity. They do emphasise that metrics such as Betweenness Centrality and 
Closeness Centrality have no or little correlation with node influence. 
On training and testing the data using Decision Trees, TreeNet and Random Forests as 
the primary classification algorithm and using a different combination of scores obtained from 


















Precision Recall F-Value 
Jaccard, Triangle Counting, 
Approx. Betweenness, Harmonic 
and Eigenvector 
91.88% 95.093% 97.50% 90.70% 93.98% 
Jaccard, Triangle Counting,  
Betweenness, Harmonic and 
PageRank 
97.85% 97.79% 97.67% 97.67% 97.67% 
Jaccard, Triangle Counting, 
Betweenness, Harmonic and 
Eigenvector 
92.47% 94.402% 97.50% 89.16% 91.93% 
Overlap, Triangle Counting, 
Approx. Betweenness, Harmonic 
and Eigenvector 
88.17% 92.116% 94.44% 79.07% 86.08% 
Jaccard, Overlap, Triangle 
Counting, Approx. Betweenness, 
Harmonic and Eigenvector 
93.55% 93.977% 95.12% 90.70% 92.86% 
Table 12. Performance of Decision Tree with Different Combination of Algorithms 
 








Precision Recall F-Value 
Jaccard, Triangle Counting, 
Approx. Betweenness, Harmonic 
and Eigenvector 
93.55% 98.95% 95.12% 90.70% 92.86% 
Jaccard, Traingle Counting,  
Betweenness, Harmonic and 
PageRank 
97.85% 98.140% 97.67% 97.67% 97.67% 
Jaccard, Triangle Counting, 
Betweenness, Harmonic and 
Eigenvector 
94.34% 97.977% 97.50% 90.70% 93.98% 
Overlap, Triangle Counting, 
Approx. Betweenness, Harmonic 
and Eigenvector 






Jaccard, Overlap, Triangle 
Counting, Approx. Betweenness, 
Harmonic and Eigenvector 
94.34% 96.442% 95.12% 90.70% 92.86% 
Table 13. Performance of TreeNet with Different Combination of Algorithms 
 








Precision Recall F-Value 
Jaccard, Triangle Counting, 
Approx. Betweenness, Harmonic 
and Eigenvector 
93.55% 95.558% 95.12% 90.70% 92.86% 
Jaccard, Triangle Counting,  
Betweenness, Harmonic and 
PageRank 
96.77% 97.349% 97.62% 95.35% 96.47% 
Jaccard, Triangle Counting, 
Betweenness, Harmonic and 
Eigenvector 
97.85% 97.302% 97.62% 95.35% 96.47% 
Overlap, Triangle Counting, 
Approx. Betweenness, Harmonic 
and Eigenvector 
91.40% 93.558% 97.30% 83.72% 90.00% 
Jaccard, Overlap, Triangle 
Counting, Approx. Betweenness, 
Harmonic and Eigenvector 
93.55% 96.72% 95.12% 90.70% 92.86% 
Table 14. Performance of Random Forests with Different Combination of Algorithms 
4.4.3 Implications 
In 2002, an anonymous shell corporation called “Anglo-Leasing” was used to launder 
€24 million of the total €30 million as part of the contract awarded to the firm to update the 
passport system in Kenya. Information about the beneficial owners could not be identified 
because of the anonymity provided by such entities (Allred et al., 2017; Findley et al., 2015). 
Other such instances involving the use of shell companies include China ZTE using shell 
companies to evade US sanctions, and also SBM Offshore N.V., a Dutch-based group, paying 
bribes to shell companies owned by government officials (Hubbs, 2018). Shell companies in 






The International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) in its reports highlighted the 
intensive use of shell companies by Politically Exposed Persons (PEPs), to hold wealth in 
offshore centres; for instance, these may include influential politicians and sports personalities 
(Harding, 2016).  
Shell Companies have legitimate uses such as facilitating reverse mergers, being used 
as holding companies or for protecting small entrepreneurs from bankruptcy risks. However, 
these entities have become instruments to launder dirty money to make it appear legitimate, 
and to hide information about the actual beneficial owners. Arms dealers, drug cartels, corrupt 
politicians, terrorists and cyber-criminals have become some of the frequent users of these shell 
companies. It has become easier to set up transnational companies, with a low level of 
compliance towards the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) standards. These have posed a 
challenge for law enforcement authorities in countering crime and corruption (Martini et al., 
2019).  
Cowdock and Simeone (2019), after conducting a forensic analysis of over 400 cases 
and interviews with academics and experts in the domain, pointed out the need to further 
corporate transparency reforms to prevent abuse of companies in the United Kingdom and 
offshore financial centres. It is necessary for jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom and 
Singapore to take up more responsibility, because they  supply opaque offshore structures and 
thereby reduce the effectiveness of efforts towards transparency and integrity (Lasslett, 2019).   
As per Nougayrède (2019), the recent focus to combat the illicit use of shell companies 
has been on the acceleration of intergovernmental measures to prevent tax evasion, money 
laundering and corruption such as the exchange of financial information across borders, with a 
view to increasing corporate transparency. The empirical effect of these measures is yet to be 
ascertained; however, there do exist potential limitations for their effective implementation. 
The limitations associated with effective implementation of regulations may be attributed to 
resistance from some jurisdictions such as the USA; there may be a lack of proactiveness of 
national regulators and enforcement agencies, and also poor quality of information maintained 
by local service agents. Consequently, to combat the illicit use of shell companies the need is 
to develop means to detect these instruments being used to hide the proceeds of bribery, 






4.5  Conclusion 
Chapter 3 developed a framework to provide insights into the techniques a launderer 
may adopt to wash funds among a range of available options. As uncovered in the literature 
review of Chapter 2, amongst the detection of money-laundering techniques, the detection of 
shell companies used to launder funds was found to be a subject under-researched. This chapter 
addressed that need by developing a model for detection of shell companies being used to 
launder illicit proceeds of crime. The opportunity rests in using the networks prevalent among 
entities in a corrupt network and analysing the links and similarities. The analysis would 
facilitate scores which could be useful in distinguishing corrupt entities from the non-
fraudulent ones.  
To the best of our knowledge, no prior study exists on facilitating models to detect illicit 
shell companies using publicly available information quantitatively, and this is where the 
originality of the proposed research lies. The study capitalises on the work of Baker and 
Faulkner (1993) who suggested the use of archival data to draw relationships among entities 
of a network, and this work bases itself on the hypothesis that a strong relationship exists 
between entities in a money-laundering network. This is also consistent with Bangcharoensap 
et al. (2015). 
The key stakeholders to benefit from such models would include legal and compliance 
professionals and government officials, especially tax officials and anti-corruption NGOs. 
Also, regulatory agencies and banks with access to transaction information could use this 
alongside suspicious transaction analysis to increase the rate of discovery of entities they term 
suspicious. The developed model would assess the risk of a company being involved in illicit 
activities and whether there is a need to investigate further. 
This chapter is a starting point in what can emerge as an essential area for future 
research. In an ever-changing landscape of regulations, the implementation of regulations can 
be challenging and so it would be interesting to determine if an alternative approach in 
combination with the existing regulatory framework could be more effective in combatting the 
problem arising out of intensive use of shell companies for illicit purposes.  
The chapter lays down the foundation for future works on similar lines. It could involve 
the incorporation of distances between entities to assess whether entities within proximity 






measures of relationships could also add to the accuracy of the model. For instance, 
Bangcharoensap et al. (2015) found that weighted degree centrality was a useful measure in 
distinguishing between legitimate and fraudulent users in their respective study. An experiment 
with more simulations on variations of network topologies along with weights on relationships 
could provide better information about the utility of metrics across network topologies. The 
incorporation of graph-embedding methods to the present study could be insightful. In terms 
of use of algorithms, the present study makes use of the traditional graph algorithms. However, 
the new algorithms as proposed in the literature for node influence could also be considered 
(Chen et al., 2012; Fei et al., 2018; Hao et al., 2018; Liu et al., 2018; Lv et al., 2019; 
Raychaudhuri et al., 2020; Salavati et al., 2019; Srinivas & Rajendran, 2019; J. Wu et al., 2019; 
Zhang, 2014). As per Lü et al. (2016), there is a need for further development in using centrality 
measures to identify influential nodes, and a benchmark of their performance could aid in the 
choices of measures in the future. Additionally, combining the graph analysis of publicly 






Chapter 5 Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs) As an 
Opportunity to Commit Fraud 
* This chapter is based on a published paper in a peer-reviewed journal, namely: Tiwari, 
M., A. Gepp, and K. Kumar. 2019. The future of raising finance - a new opportunity to commit 
fraud: a review of initial coin offering (ICOs) scams. Crime, Law and Social Change. 
**Reprinted by permission from Springer Nature. Crime, Law and Social Change: 
The future of raising finance - a new opportunity to commit fraud: a review of initial coin 
offering (ICOs) scams: Milind Tiwari et al 2019. DOI https://doi.org/10.1007/s10611-019-
09873-2 
The APPT framework (Chapter 3) had highlighted the possibility of technological 
innovations paving the way for new opportunities to commit predicate crime and launder funds. 
Amongst many, one such innovation which has contributed to this direction is blockchain. One 
use of blockchain is an Initial Coin Offering (ICO), a digital method of raising finance 
involving issuance of tokens in exchange for cryptocurrencies or fiat money. It is a cheaper, 
easier and quicker way to raise funds compared with traditional public offerings. However, it 
has raised a new opportunity for fraud and money laundering. An estimated ten percent of ICO 
funds have been lost to fraud. Using case-study analysis, this chapter determines characteristics 
of such fraud schemes and the regulatory changes made in response to them. The chapter 
reveals key lessons for investors in terms of proactive steps that can be taken to protect 
themselves from being victims, for issuers to ensure awareness and take steps to secure 
investors’ trust, and for regulators to promote a safe environment. This chapter documents the 
effect of ICO fraud schemes on the regulatory environment, which is going through a series of 
amendments to provide protection against such fraudulent schemes. Additionally, it provides 
direction for future research to further investigate the risks of this new method of raising funds. 
This chapter helps in reaffirming the need to incorporate technological innovations as one of 






5.1  Introduction 
More than one billion US dollars were invested in blockchain technology in 2016 
because of potential benefits that the technology may provide (Kennedy, 2016). The potential 
application of blockchain extends far beyond cryptocurrencies. The innovation and prominent 
use of blockchain technology have given birth to a new way of raising finance known as the 
Initial Coin Offerings (“ICOs” or “ICO”). This new method is a cheaper, more accessible and 
quicker way to raise funds compared with traditional public offerings. In an ICO, the issuer 
issues tokens to investors in exchange for other cryptocurrencies or fiat money during a 
specified time frame, sometimes to raise funds for development activities pursued by the issuer. 
The issued tokens will facilitate owner-access to services provided by the issuer or may be used 
as an independent virtual currency. The investment in an ICO does not grant ownership in the 
company, as is the case in an initial public offer (IPO), but is considered an investment in a 
virtual product which is likely to appreciate in the future. The appreciation is based upon 
investment in the technology provided, growth of business and increased demand for the virtual 
product being offered.  
An ICO should not be confused with crowdfunding. Crowdfunding facilitates 
solicitation of investments or donations by providing a platform to leverage the geographical 
and social reach of the internet to connect fundraisers with a vast number of potential supporters 
(Fleming & Sorenson, 2016). The two methods of funding may appear similar, but they have 
essential differences. In terms of accessibility, crowdfunding is generally limited to a particular 
country or region, whereas ICOs are accessible to a broader range of investors. In terms of 
product, ICOs generally fund technology-related products while crowdfunding may span 
various categories such as hardware, software, technology and food. However, in recent times, 
ICOs have expanded beyond technology offerings. Differences also exist concerning 
crowdfunding and ICOs related to their regulations; the regulations related to ICOs and their 
evolvement will be briefly discussed in this chapter. 
The excitement around other cryptocurrencies and the urge to be part of something 
innovative has led to a surge in raising funds through an ICO, particularly by tech start-up 
firms. In 2017, an amount close to four billion US dollars was raised through ICOs (Ernst & 
Young, 2017). This method of raising funds did not require compliance with securities 
regulations and hence provided a way to avoid compliance costs. It made it easier to pursue 






of raising finance is creating new opportunities, but at the same time, it has provided an 
opportunity to commit fraud. The frenzy around ICOs and lack of due diligence on the part of 
those investing in them provide an opportunity for fraudsters to efficiently carry out their 
operations, as is evident from the fact that more than ten percent of funds raised through ICOs 
has been lost to fraud (Ernst & Young, 2017). 
Consequently, it is essential to examine the modus operandi of these large-scale 
fraudulent schemes to protect investors from falling prey to such schemes in the future and 
losing their hard-earned money. Additionally, it is necessary to be able to distinguish between 
potential fraudsters and genuine firms seeking to raise funds so as not to stifle the growth 
opportunities presented by this new fund-raising method. These modi operandi will remain a 
source of reference for regulators to consult as they improve the regulations surrounding such 
means of raising funds. 
Research makes it clear that the risk posed by terrorism used to be underestimated as 
was the scale and extent to which it could affect people (Kotabe, 2005). A proactive approach 
towards ICO frauds might help prevent repeating the mistake committed in the case of 
terrorism. Consequently, the primary objective of the chapter is to analyse the instances of ICO 
frauds to determine the characteristics of such schemes. An analysis was conducted on cases 
available in the public domain. There are plenty of smaller, alleged ICO scams, but there is 
often little information about these, and the reliability of the information that is available is 
questionable. This problem does not exist with cases that government authorities are involved 
with and so they are the focus of this research. 
It is essential to understand the regulatory environment and the historical changes that 
have taken place, as different countries have different regulations, and what may be considered 
illegal in one country may be acceptable in others (Kshetri, 2005). These differences provide 
opportunities to perpetrate fraud. Hence, the second objective of this part of the research is to 
cast light on the regulatory steps taken in different jurisdictions about ICOs and what is the 
current regulatory stance concerning them. The jurisdictions covered represent those in which 
either a clear regulatory position has been taken or in which meaningful ICO activity, in terms 
of the amount of funds raised, has taken place. The information provided can inform both 
issuers and investors of the country-specific regulatory developments in which an ICO is being 
offered and the extent to which the offering is compliant with existing or possible future 






and for investors to check the degree of compliance of an ICO being offered, and to some extent 
determine its legitimacy and the security of the funds being invested. The provided discussion 
can also inform future policy initiatives relating to this emerging field.  
The blockchain technology, because of its essential feature of virtual immutability, is 
being brought to a wide range of fields such as supply-chain and logistics, financial data 
verification and real-time updates of financial information. It has also provided a unique 
opportunity for firms to raise funds via ICOs to finance their operations. As pointed out above, 
ICOs differ from other methods of raising funds in terms of accessibility, cost, time efficiency, 
projects funded and regulations involved. However, the benefits of ICOs come at the cost of 
creating a new opportunity for perpetuating fraudulent activities. The present work is the first 
attempt to document the effect of ICO fraud schemes on the regulatory environment, which is 
going through a series of amendments to protect against such fraudulent schemes.  
The research also contributes to the literature by providing critical insights for the 
concerned stakeholders (issuers, investors and regulators) to help them be proactive in 
countering ICO fraud. Proactive methods are outlined for investors to protect themselves. 
Information is provided for issuers to ensure awareness and to help them take steps to secure 
the trust of investors. Finally, insights are offered for regulators to aid them in providing a safe 
regulatory environment. 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: the section on the blockchain provides 
an insight into the technology upon which ICO is based, along with its various uses and current 
application. It is followed by an introduction about ICOs and the regulatory steps taken in 
meeting the country-specific regulations. The chapter then provides an overview of four cases 
of ICO frauds, namely, AriseBank, RECoin and Diamond Reserve, PlexCorps and Benebit, to 
analyse their modus operandi in cheating the investors. Finally, key insights are provided for 
investors, issuers and regulators, followed by conclusions and potential implications.  
5.2  Blockchain 
One of the important technological revolutions of the 21st century has been the 
blockchain. A blockchain can be described as a digitalised version of a ledger which is 
decentralised and distributed among the users of its peer-to-peer network (Underhill, 2018). In 
simple terms, it can be understood as a text file which records events – for instance, transactions 






The blockchain comprises a chain of blocks which essentially are a record of all 
transactions that have taken place in its network. This aggregation of transactions in units called 
blocks and their addition to similar existing blocks in a chain takes place through a 
cryptographic technique composed of what is called a Proof of Work (Sullivan & Burger, 
2017). Proof of Work is the mathematical procedure used to authenticate and validate 
transactions, and to add new blocks of transactions in a blockchain. The mathematical 
procedure in a blockchain network is performed by nodes called miners, and the act of using 
this mathematical procedure is termed mining. Once a transaction is mined, a solution is 
produced called a hash. It is demonstrated in Figure 15   – it has three blockchains; each hash 
is verified by comparison to the corresponding hash in the other blockchains. In this case, all 
hashes are consistent in each blockchain and so all are valid. In practice, there would be a much 
larger number of blockchains distributed throughout the entire network, which is why 
blockchain is known as ‘distributed ledger technology’ (DLT). The other simplification made 
in Figure 15 is that the hashes are two-digit numbers when, in reality, they are very long and 
complicated. It is crucial to notice that the previous hash matches the new hash of the previous 
block. For example, Block 3’s previous hash of 34 matches the new hash from the previous 
Block 2, which is another level of validation. That is, each block contains information from 
both previous blocks and the current event, and the integrity and the authenticity of each item 
are checked against previous events. Since the hash value of the previous block is part of the 
computation of the hash value of the current block, it assures transaction history and saves time 
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Figure 15:  Example of Working Blockchain Network3 
When any transaction or event takes place on the blockchain, the ledger gets updated 
for all users. That means in case of inaccuracy the hash solution produced will not match the 
hash in other blockchains in the network, which will result in it and future blocks on that chain 
becoming invalid, as demonstrated in Figure 16. In this case, consider that a hacker changed 
the amount from $20 to $30 in Block 2 of Blockchain 1. It results in a hash of 89, which is 
different from 34, the corresponding hash in the other blockchains in the network. 
Consequently, Block 2 in Blockchain 1 is invalid, which automatically invalidates all future 
blocks as well (Block 3 in this case). Thus, a hacker cannot successfully change only one 
blockchain, because the rest of the network will realise the data have been corrupted. 
 
 
3 The initial concept for this figure was provided by Alexander Lee, “Blockchain — A Visual Explanation,” 
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Figure 16: Example of a hacker modifying Block 2 of Blockchain 1 from Fig2 
 
Blockchain can be broadly classified into two types, namely, public or open blockchain, 
and private or closed blockchain. A private blockchain is a closed network and requires 
permission for access to the network, and therefore it limits access to those who are thought to 
be known and trusted. On the other hand, a public blockchain does not require any permission 
to access the network. Consequently, anyone can have access by downloading and running the 
software required for the network (SEC, 2018). 
One such example of a public blockchain is the Bitcoin, a virtual currency which 
facilitates transactions among its users in the absence of a central intermediary, that is, without 
a financial institution. Anyone can join the network by downloading the Bitcoin software and 
participating in the network. The blockchain of Bitcoin is updated when its participants validate 
a particular transaction. It is essential to understand that Bitcoin is just one example of a 
currency that uses blockchain. There are numerous others such as Bitcoin Cash, Ether, Litecoin, 
Tether and so on. 
Satoshi Nakamoto proposed a version of electronic cash in 2008 that uses blockchain 
in the absence of a financial institution (Nakamoto, 2008). He proposed a way to avoid reliance 
upon trust by facilitating the use of coins authenticated by digital signatures and avoiding the 






The proposed system will be protected from an attack if the majority of participants in the 
network do not want the attack. Nakamoto’s proposal was based on individual interest being 
collectivised and needed for changes to be incorporated through a consensus rather than a top-
down hierarchical approach, using the network of participants to validate an event. 
The main features of blockchain technology can be identified in terms of its 
decentralisation and encryption. It is depicted through its reliance upon its network of 
participants rather than a central authority and the ability for anyone to access the network and 
view the event at any time. Furthermore, the use of encryption in maintaining the security of 
the record of transactions allows the technology to have a variety of uses. 
5.2.1 Uses of blockchain technology 
Blockchain technology has uses beyond financial transactions. Businesses are 
interested in ways to improve accuracy and reduce the costs related to the hiring process 
(Moore, 2017). A human resource department can use blockchain for selecting better 
employees through having access to a wide variety of information about candidates that is 
known to be authentic and immune to tampering (Catalini & Gans, 2017). The data related to 
potential candidates would be stored in a virtual database that could be queried by human 
resource departments to obtain an authenticated pool of candidates meeting the required 
criteria. Additionally, job seekers would be able to exercise control over the sharing of their 
data. 
Financial data related to companies could also be verified using blockchain-enabled 
databases that are accessed through the entity’s website. As it is with real-time updates 
provided for bank account transactions, corporate financial information could be provided in 
real time (Gepp et al., 2018). The incorporation of blockchain technology could provide real-
time verification in this process. It would provide transparency to financial statements and even 
highlight off-book transactions and accounts which are hidden (Tapscott & Tapscott, 2017). It 
would represent a big step forward in addressing the problem of financial statement fraud, the 
cost of which has been estimated at more than 1.2 trillion US dollars worldwide (Gepp, 2016). 
The ability to provide real-time information updates through blockchain technology can 
also be utilised in legal matters, especially related to patent law where the timing of getting an 
idea recorded becomes essential. Real-time updates are also relevant to the logistic industry to 






The maritime trading systems are plagued by security concerns relating to supply-chain issues 
(Barnes & Oloruntoba, 2005); blockchain could serve as a solution to this problem. 
Blockchain technology can also be applied to contractual agreements, both short-term 
and long-term in nature. Furthermore, the technology can be used by companies to interact 
with customers on an individual basis to market their products. The data related to customers 
would be under their control, and it would not be possible for companies to profile the 
customers based on their online activity. However, customers could choose to grant companies 
access to their data, thus benefitting both the companies and customers by precisely matching 
the needs of both the parties. It would result in substantial cost savings through more efficient 
marketing. 
Blockchain technology could also assure customers about the quality of a product or 
service. A likely application is within the precious stones industry (Knight, 2017). The 
technology is used to identify the source of procurement of precious stones as well as their 
authenticity. Each event or transaction in the blockchain is validated by the previous 
transaction, thereby ensuring that the asset, in this case, precious stones, is what it claims to be. 
Moreover, it helps to avoid the high degree of dependence on a central authority responsible 
for keeping track of records, thereby reducing the cost of tracking and storage of data 
(Mansfield-Devine, 2017). 
In broad economic terms, blockchain technology offers multiple advantages: (i) 
reducing the cost of determining the authenticity and (ii) reducing the cost of establishing 
networks by avoiding reliance upon intermediaries (Catalini & Gans, 2017). The desire of a 
financial lending world without intermediaries could become a reality; however, such a 
transformation would also imply broadening the scope of regulatory implementation from 
national borders to a global approach (Lagarde, 2017). 
5.2.2 Current application of blockchain technology 
Apart from its widely publicised use in cryptocurrencies, blockchain technology is 
being used very actively by corporates and even by governments. One such example is in 
Estonia, where the government has implemented the technology in the application of its e-
Residency program. It has enabled citizens to have improved control over and access to their 
electronic records. The use of technology in maintaining identity information also grants it 






Another application of blockchain technology is in global trade operations by Maersk, 
a global logistics and transportation company, which is partnered with IBM, a leader in 
providing blockchain technology solutions (IBM, 2018). IBM is also partnered with Sichuan 
Hejia Company Limited to take advantage of blockchain technology solutions in procurement 
of pharmaceuticals. Amazon Web Services (AWS) provides support to various blockchain 
applications such as Sawtooth, Corda R3, PokitDok and Samsung Nexledger, by providing a 
cost-efficient and secured development platform (AWS, 2018). It has been reported that the 
advantages of blockchain technology are being considered by other companies such as 
Walmart, British Airways, UPS, and FedEx (Krauth, 2018). Even the NASDAQ and New York 
Stock Exchange are trying to tap into the advantages of blockchain technology (Tapscott & 
Tapscott, 2017). The numerous advantages it offers beyond the present public view of 
cryptocurrencies highlight the tremendous potential of the technology and its capability to 
disrupt and transform current business practices. 
5.3  Initial Coin Offerings 
The use of blockchain technology has paved the way for raising finance through a new 
method. An essential feature is its virtual immutability which prevents a single user from 
making changes to the chain (as demonstrated in Figure 16 above). Consequently, this has 
resulted in firms using this technology to raise funds through an Initial Coin Offering (ICO). 
An ICO, also known as an Initial Token Sales (ITS), refers to a digital method of raising 
finance whereby the issuer offers tokens to investors in place of other well-established 
cryptocurrencies or fiat money. The idea is to raise capital to finance future development 
activities of the business as well as to generate excitement and an established user-base for an 
entity’s future offerings. 
The creation and dissemination of coins (or tokens) in an ICO involve the use of 
blockchain technology, facilitating wide participation of investors. The ease with which funds 
can be raised and the growing popularity of ICOs are evident from the fact that a study on funds 
raised by 372 ICOs found that a total of USD 3.7 billion has been raised in 2017 (Ernst & 
Young, 2018). Start-ups generally view ICOs as an essential channel for raising funds 
(Underhill, 2018). However, with the growing popularity even established firms have launched 
or are planning to launch their respective ICOs, which is evident from the examples of Perth 






The surge in fundraising through an ICO can be attributed to its being quick and cost-
efficient. It is derived from the time and cost saved from compliance with securities laws and 
regulations which must be taken into consideration in the case of traditional methods of raising 
funds. Moreover, the use of blockchain technology attracts investors because it is an innovation 
with the potential to yield huge returns (Underhill, 2018). Investment in an ICO is different 
from investment in an IPO because the investment and ownership of coins acquired in an ICO 
do not guarantee ownership in a company, which is the case in an IPO. The ICO process begins 
with the announcement of an ICO by the issuer followed by marketing of the ICO through the 
company’s website and other social media channels, and eventually the offerings of coins 
through an ICO within a designated time. The announcement of an ICO is accompanied by the 
release of a white paper, which can be considered similar to a prospectus in case of an IPO. 
The white paper contains information about the project, coins being offered, the rights available 
to investors, the lifecycle of the project, and other legal terms and conditions. It becomes 
necessary to understand that while the white paper serves a function like a prospectus, it is 
typically less detailed and does not adhere to any specified guidelines (Underhill, 2018). 
The wide variety of ICOs also draws attention to the kind of coins being offered. At 
times, these may facilitate the holder to access products or services of the issuer or offerings 
which the issuer intends to develop from funds raised through the ICO (ESMA, 2017). 
Generally, this is the most common type of coin offered, where it facilitates access to services 
by payment exclusively through the coin. An example is the entity Token Report, which 
through an ICO offered Token Clarity coins, enabling users of those tokens to access databases 
dedicated to tracking other ICOs (Underhill, 2018). The other most common type of coins 
offered through ICOs facilitates users deploying them as normal currencies where acceptable, 
or being able to get them converted into fiat currencies (ESMA, 2017; Underhill, 2018). As per 
Lu (2019), partner at 256 Ventures (an early stage crypto-investment fund), the classification 
of tokens into “security” and “utility” tokens can be attributed to the US securities laws and 
may not apply to countries such as Australia. Consequently, Lu suggests a classification based 
on the rights the tokens generate. On reviewing literature across countries, he proposed a 
classification of tokens with a jurisdictionally neutral mindset. He classified tokens as: 
• Investment tokens representing those that are considered assets and promise a 
financial return or benefit in the future, 
• Utility tokens similar to digital coupons that provide participants with access or utility 






• Payment tokens representing those which may be used as means of payment. 
The coins in an ICO are usually offered through one of two formats. The issuer may 
issue the coins during or immediately after the sale. The other more common method is a pre-
sale in which the coins are not developed for distribution and are scheduled for distribution at 
a later date (Underhill, 2018). 
5.3.1 ICOs versus crowdfunding 
According to Schwienbacher and Larralde (2010), crowdfunding can be defined as 
financing a venture by individuals instead of professional parties. Similarly, Mollick and Nanda 
(2015) refer to crowdfunding as funding projects by drawing small amounts of funds from a 
relatively more significant number of individuals without the use of standard financial 
intermediaries. In cases of crowdfunding, investors have clear expectations in place of their 
investment – in some cases they expect nothing and in others, they expect returns in the form 
of products, equity or monetary repayments with interest (Beaulieu et al., 2015; Gleasure & 
Feller, 2016).  
Zetzsche et al. (2017) view ICOs as a combination of crowdfunding and blockchain. 
Crowdfunding and ICOs are similar in that their mechanism for raising funds allows investors 
early access to fund new ventures. Additionally, both provide an alternative mechanism for 
funding operations to businesses that are not of interest to venture capitalists or other 
institutional investors. Further, they do not rely on traditional financial intermediaries for 
raising funds and are generally cost-effective in comparison to an IPO. 
However, ICOs and crowdfunding have fundamental differences. Crowdfunding 
involves the use of a central platform hosted by a third-party provider while an ICO makes use 
of blockchain and a decentralised peer-to-peer (P2P) network for raising funds (Schweizer et 
al., 2017). In an ideal scenario, crowdfunding platforms and banks serve as trusted entities for 
transactions whereas in the case of an ICO the verification of transactions takes place through 
a network-wide consensus (Arnold et al., 2019). In terms of accessibility, crowdfunding is 
generally limited to a specific country or region whereas ICOs are accessible more broadly. 
ICOs generally fund technology-related ventures while crowdfunding often spans various 
categories such as hardware, software, technology and food. However, in recent times ICOs 
have expanded beyond technology offerings, an example of which is providing tokens for real 






expectations and risk. ICO investors expect to earn a profit for their investment whereas 
crowdfunding investors may or not expect returns from their investment. 
Additionally, in a crowdfunding project, investors have clear expectations about the 
outcome on completion, but clear expectations regarding the outcome from ICO funding is 
often absent. Differences also exist concerning regulations; regulations pertaining to 
crowdfunding are more certain and regulators have been overwhelmingly more positive 
towards crowdfunding. The less certain regulations relating to ICOs are discussed in the next 
section.  
5.4  Regulatory steps towards ICOs in key jurisdictions 
As of December 2017, there was no specific regulatory framework focused exclusively 
on ICOs, but the growing popularity, surge in volume of raising finance through ICOs, and the 
rise in fraudulent instances involving ICOs, prompted regulatory authorities across the globe 
to issue guidelines, make critical announcements and sometimes take action (Chance, 2018). 
The regulatory developments and their evolution in jurisdictions that have taken a clear 
regulatory stance or in which a meaningful amount of funds has been raised through ICOs are 
discussed below.  
• Australia 
ICO activity has been on the rise in Australia. It is evident from the fact that the 
Perth Mint, one of the biggest gold refiners in Australia, is developing blockchain products 
backed by gold (Garvey, 2018). In response to this growing focus on ICO, the Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) issued guidelines about ICOs in September 
2017 (ASIC, 2017). The guidelines aim to provide a clear sense of direction to businesses 
wishing to raise funds through the medium of ICOs. Through the guidelines, ASIC 
informed the businesses and investors alike that whether an ICO falls under the purview of 
Australian Corporations Act will depend upon the structuring and operations of the ICO as 
well as the rights gained through the ownership of coins offered through the ICO. Hence, 
if an ICO exhibits traits of a security, it will be subject to the Australian Corporations Act 
and if it does not resemble  security, it will fall under the purview of Australian general and 
consumer law related to the offer of products or services (Chance, 2018). The main focus 






Corporations Act. In 2019, the regulatory guidance was updated to incorporate detailed 
obligations for cryptocurrency firms to comply with under the Australian Corporations Act, 
the ASIC Act and other laws. The guidance covered the requirement to hold an Australian 
financial services (AFS) licence and widened the scope of consumer protection. 
• China 
In September 2017, the People’s Bank of China issued a circular banning ICOs 
(Borak, 2018), declaring them illegal, stating that ICOs may promote crimes of financial 
fraud, Ponzi schemes, illegal securities offerings and more (Chance, 2018). The Chinese 
regulators have been active in persuading foreign-listed Chinese companies to abandon 
plans for raising funds through ICOs. An example of this is Renren, a Chinese social 
networking website, which dropped its ICO plans in January 2018 (Yang et al., 2018). The 
Chinese government continues to maintain its stance against cryptocurrencies including the 
issuance of ICOs as illegal (Congress, 2018b; Williams, 2019). 
• France 
In October 2017, the French Regulatory Authority, Autorité des Marchés Financiers 
(AMF), published a discussion paper to obtain views of critical stakeholders relating to 
various possibilities of regulatory frameworks that can be applied to ICOs (AMF, 2017). 
The discussion paper considered the creation of a best-practice guide for ICOs. It also 
suggested extending the regulations surrounding them, and in fact developing an entirely 
new set of regulations. Additionally, the AMF announced a program to guide a framework 
regulating ICOs and protecting investors and issuers, called UNICORN (Universal Node 
to ICO Research and Network). The bill was passed in 2019 regulating the country’s crypto 
industry including the establishment of a legal framework for ICOs. The bill provided the 
issuers of ICOs with an option to apply for approval from AMF if they complied with 
requirements such as (i) incorporation or registration within the jurisdiction, (ii) providing 
adequate information about the token, the project and the company and (iii) complying with 
the necessary anti-money-laundering (AML hereafter) and counter-financing of terrorism 
(CFT hereafter) requirements (Helms, 2019). 
• Hong Kong 
The regulatory authority in Hong Kong, the Hong Kong Securities and Futures 






2018). Consistent with the views of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA), the SFC 
identified digital coins offered in ICO as a virtual commodity subject to regulations of Hong 
Kong securities law, depending upon the features they exhibit. Further, if the coin offerings 
fell under the definition of “security” then the activities of such coin would be regulated 
and subject to Hong Kong’s product or licence authorisation requirement (Chance, 2018). 
The statement further warned investors of the risks of investments in ICOs. The regulatory 
authorities are still in the process of developing regulations to govern ICOs. As of 
December 2018, the SFC was set to tighten the regulations on cryptocurrencies including 
requirements such as ICOs for token which have been in existence for at least 12 months. 
The implementation of regulations is to take place in stages (Kihara, 2018). 
• Japan 
The amendments in the Payment Services Act (PSA) of Japan in early 2017 defined 
cryptocurrencies as “Virtual Currencies” and virtual currency exchanges as “Virtual 
Currencies Business Operators”. The latter were required to be registered with Japan’s 
Financial Services Agency (JFSA, 2017). As of December 2018, no regulations on ICOs 
existed in Japan and the need for a regulatory framework for ICO in Japan by JFSA is under 
evaluation (Chance, 2018; JFSA, 2017). In the meanwhile, the Japan Cryptocurrency 
Business Association (JCBA) came up with its recommendations on ICO regulations in 
2019 (JCBA, 2019). The focus of the regulations was to expand cryptocurrency in Japanese 
domestic exchange, establishing clarity over the definition of and regulations surrounding 
security and utility tokens (Tashiro, 2019; Yakubowski, 2019). 
• Russia 
Russia is second only to the US in terms of the number of ICO projects originating 
from a particular country (Ernst & Young, 2017). The Russian government’s approach 
towards cryptocurrencies has shifted from being cautious about acknowledging its presence 
and growth. However, at present, we found no regulations on cryptocurrencies. In June 
2017, the Russian central bank along with the Ministry of Finance announced the 
development of regulations for cryptocurrencies (Chance, 2018). The Russian Ministry of 
Finances introduced a draft bill on digital financial assets in 2018. It limited the 
participation in ICOs to only qualified investors with exceptions to this condition to be 
decided by the Russian Central Bank. It also provided definitions for “digital assets” and 







Unlike that of many other countries, the approach adopted in Singapore towards 
cryptocurrencies has been positive (ACCA, 2018). In 2017, the Monetary Authority of 
Singapore (MAS) stated that if coin offerings through an ICO resemble a security offering, 
then it will be regulated within the purview of the Securities and Futures Act (SFA) (MAS, 
2017b). Further, consistent with the US SEC, the issuers of such coins are required to put 
out a prospectus, and registration is applicable. Further, in a joint report with the 
Commercial Affairs Department (CAD), the financial crime division of Singapore Police 
issued a warning to investors about the potential risks of investing in ICOs (MAS, 2017a). 
The MAS updated its guidelines for businesses interested in raising funds through an ICO 
in 2018. It laid down guidelines for businesses to act in compliance with AML and CFT 
regulations. The guidelines required all the parties related to an ICO to comply with AML 
and CFT policies. Additionally, in 2018 it became a requirement to have a licence to issue 
ICOs and to advise on matters related to them (MAS, 2018).  
• South Korea 
South Korea ranks third after the US and Japan in the market for bitcoin trading and 
is the largest exchange market for Ethereum’s cryptocurrency – the Ether (Kim, 2017). As 
per government data, around USD 89 million were raised in ICOs in September 2017 (Kim, 
2017). As a result, just as with China, the Financial Services Commission (FSC hereafter), 
the South Korean regulatory authority, banned ICOs in the country (Kim, 2017; Nakamura 
& Kim, 2017). The regulatory authority cited a growing risk of financial scams and 
speculation as to the reasons behind the move. However, unlike the Chinese, the South 
Korean public could invest in foreign ICOs (Kim, 2017). In the first half of 2019, the FSC 
continued to maintain its stance of a ban on domestic ICOs on account of their being high 
risk. The stance was in response to a survey conducted by the Financial Supervisory 
Services (FSS)  with respondents being companies who had conducted ICOs in foreign 
countries (FSI, 2019; Khatri, 2019). 
• Switzerland 
Switzerland has emerged as one of the key jurisdictions of raising funds through 
ICOs, raising 600 million US dollars, which is a quarter of the total funds raised in ICOs 






Authority (FINMA) stated that investigations were undertaken to probe the breaches of 
regulatory provisions by ICO (FINMA, 2017). The report further defined ICO as an initial 
public offering in a digital form that makes use of blockchain technology. Consistent with 
regulators in other countries, FINMA stated that the structuring of an ICO will determine 
the application of securities law, and if applicable, regulations relating to banking law, anti-
money laundering and terrorist financing, among others, shall apply. The Swiss regulatory 
authority also warned the investors about the risks related to investment in ICOs. In a 
follow-up to the guidelines issued in 2017, FINMA then published guidelines regulating 
the treatment of ICOs (FINMA, 2018). FINMA determined the application of financial 
regulations on a case-by-case basis as each ICO is different. It further clarified its 
classification of tokens into payment (when used as means of value transfer), asset (when 
used as equity claim or debt) and utility tokens (when facilitating access to a service or 
application using blockchain-based infrastructure). Additionally, compliance with AML 
and CFT regulations for payment tokens was made mandatory (FINMA, 2018). 
• United States 
The United States of America was among the first countries to initiate the 
development of a regulatory framework towards ICOs. The laws and regulations applicable 
to ICOs in the USA vary, based on the location of the issue, the investors to which the ICO 
is being directed and the kind of services to be provided. Where an investment is made in 
an entity with a profit motive that depends on the managerial efforts of others rather than 
the utilisation of investment based on its functionality for personal consumption, then such 
coins will be considered securities and will fall under the purview of the regulator, the 
Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), and will be subject to its security laws (Chance, 
2018; Tew & Freedman, 1973). In other words, if an investment in a coin offered through 
an ICO is made to earn profit rather than utilise the coin based on its functionality for 
personal use, then the coin would be considered a security and a subject of security 
regulations under the Howey Test (Chance, 2018). 
To establish clarity about what falls under the purview of securities regulation, the 
SEC released an investigative report on an entity called the DAO in July 2017 (SEC, 
2017a). The coins offered by DAO exhibited characteristics of a security. The SEC also 
stated that classification of coin offerings as security depends upon several factors and the 






applicable regulatory guidance exists on the issue (Chance, 2018). Further, in October 
2017, LabCFTC, a division of the US Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), 
stated that if ICO coins do not meet the conditions of the Howey Test, they could be 
considered commodities and be a subject of their jurisdiction (LabCFTC, 2017). In May 
2019, the SEC organised a public forum comprising experts from industry and academia to 
facilitate communication and a better understanding of DLT and digital assets (SEC, 2019). 
• United Kingdom 
In 2014, the Bank of England (BoE) played down the risk posed by cryptocurrencies 
to the stability of the UK’s financial system (Ali et al., 2014). The Financial Conduct 
Authority (FCA) of the UK is yet to take definite measures towards the development of a 
regulatory framework for the ICO market in the UK. However, the FCA has been cautious 
about its approach towards ICOs and has warned against investing in them by terming them 
speculative and high-risk instruments (FCA, 2017). In 2018, the governor of BoE raised 
concerns over the need to regulate cryptocurrencies (Kharpal, 2018). In the context of the 
UK, any definitive measure regulating cryptocurrencies, including ICOs, is yet to be taken.  
5.5  Cases of ICOs fraud 
In 2017, in the US alone, the eagerness to bypass securities law using an ICO was 
evident from the fact that not one ICO was registered with the SEC. The lack of an established 
regulatory framework to regulate ICOs not only created confusion in the market for issuers but 
also provided an opportunity for people with ill intentions to carry out fraudulent activities 
relating to pump-and-dump schemes, pyramid and Ponzi schemes and even money laundering 
(Underhill, 2018). An ICO is an attractive opportunity for fraudsters resulting from a range of 
factors, including a lack of due diligence and information (DeVoe, 2018). 
The issuance of a white paper accompanies an ICO, but unlike the contents of a 
prospectus, the information provided is not always accurate and detailed. Furthermore, the 
information cannot be verified, which leads to potential fraudsters using false information to 
mislead. Moreover, fraudsters may also create websites with vague and incomplete 
information. They may further make use of various social media channels and even use 
celebrity endorsements to attract the attention of investors in considerable numbers to 






There are numerous examples of ICO frauds such as Opair and Ebitz, Confido, 
Prodeum, OneCoin and Optioment. Recently, in April 2018 in Vietnam, over 600 million US 
dollars were identified to be lost to ICO fraud schemes through two ICOs, namely, iFan and 
Pincoin, but detailed information about the case is yet to be made public (Floyd, 2018). There 
are plenty of relatively small, alleged ICO scams, but because of a lack of reliable information, 
this study focused on cases that government authorities are involved with. The specific criteria 
for choosing the cases included (i) the case being discussed in online media and websites that 
specifically focus on cryptocurrencies, (ii) involvement of regulatory authorities in the 
investigation of such cases, (iii) the scheme garnering considerable attention from investors 
and (iv) a substantial amount being raised in the scheme. Four cases are discussed below.    
They have acted as a source for regulatory developments. 
5.5.1 AriseBank 
According to the company’s website, AriseBank, also known as AriseBank Limited or 
AriseBank Foundation, LLC, was co-founded in early 2017 by Jared Rice Sr and Stanley Ford, 
with headquarters in Dallas, Texas. It was marketed as a decentralised bank with the ability to 
provide a wide range of banking products compatible with over 700 virtual currencies. Further, 
it was marketed as being among the world’s largest platforms for cryptocurrency with the sole 
aim to establish it as a form of fiat money and change the dynamics of the banking sector 
(Aitken, 2018). 
In October 2017, AriseBank launched its ICO and a test version of its banking 
operations. The ICO was promoted on social media, the company’s website and through 
celebrity endorsements. Around the same time, it issued a white paper giving an overview of 
the products and the management team. The paper also gave a brief overview of the bank’s 
digital currency called “AriseCoin” and its plan of offering it through the ICO. The AriseCoin 
ICO started in November with a “private sale”, followed by a “pre-sale” in December. The 
bank released a press statement in January claiming to have raised around 600 million US 
dollars out of its goal of one billion. The coin distribution was scheduled for February 2018 
(SEC, 2018). 
In January 2018, a “Cease and Desist” order was issued by the Texas Department of 
Banking to AriseBank, prohibiting them from misleading investors about their engagement in 
the banking business in the State of Texas. Following this, the US Securities and Exchange 






The SEC filed litigation to stop the issuance of securities by AriseBank for violating several 
sections of the US Securities Exchange Act on the following grounds(SEC, 2018):  
• Issuance of unregistered securities 
The securities law in the US makes it mandatory for companies to disclose their 
financial information by registering their securities with the SEC. The idea is to enable 
investors to make rational investment decisions based on available information. Since 
AriseCoin ICO was a security without registration of the coin or the bank with SEC, there 
was a violation of the Act. Also in 2017, the CEO of AriseBank Jared Rice Sr made false 
claims of AriseCoin not being a subject of regulations by the SEC. 
• Use of misleading and false information 
In January 2018, AriseBank made false claims about acquiring a Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) insured bank, KFMC Bank Holding Company, which 
facilitated offering secured services to its customers. However, no records supporting 
FDIC-insurance were found. FDIC had no records of any change in ownership involving 
the parties mentioned, rendering the claims to be false and misleading to investors. 
Further, in its white paper, AriseBank claimed to offer its Visa cards that would 
facilitate payment for goods and services using any of the 700 cryptocurrencies that the 
customers could hold in their respective AriseBank account. It was stated that the card was 
being provided in partnership with Marqeta, a payment solution firm. However, the claims 
also turned out to be false when Marqeta publicly denied an association with AriseBank. 
• Omission of material information 
AriseBank provided brief information about the background of its executives on the 
company’s website as well as in its white papers. However, none of these sources 
mentioned the criminal background of its two key executives. Such information would be 
necessary for investors in their decision-making. 
As a result of the violations, the court froze assets of AriseBank and its co-founders 






5.5.2 RECoin and Diamond Reserve 
RECoin Group Foundation, LLC (RECoin) was a limited liability company 
incorporated in 2017 with its headquarters in Las Vegas, Nevada, and was marketed as a 
company involved in real estate investment and smart contracts for real estate through an ICO. 
Another such entity was Diamond Reserve Club, also known as DRC World Inc, which was 
incorporated in 2017 with its headquarters in San Juan, Puerto Rico. The principal business of 
DRC was the investment in diamonds through funds raised through an ICO. DRC was also 
marketed as obtaining discounts with retailers for investors in DRC. Both the companies were 
solely owned and managed by Maksim Zaslavskiy (SEC, 2017c). Between July and September 
2017, Zaslavskiy raised 300,000 US dollars from investors in digital coins in RECoin and then 
DRC during their ICOs (SEC, 2017c). 
The purported objective of these ICOs was the conversion of fiat currency or other 
digital currencies such as Bitcoin into a digital token that would derive its value from 
investment in an underlying asset. The underlying asset in the case of RECoin was real estate, 
whereas in the case of DRC it was diamonds. It was claimed that appreciation of investment or 
growth in business, or demand for coins, would drive the value of coins (SEC, 2017c). 
In September 2017, the SEC filed litigation against Zaslavskiy and his companies 
seeking to stop issuance of securities for violating several sections of the US Securities 
Exchange Act on the following grounds (SEC, 2017c):  
• Issuance of unregistered securities 
Since the securities being offered through the ICO of RECoin were not registered 
with the SEC, there was a violation of the Securities Exchange Act. Further, in the case of 
DRC, an attempt to bypass the registration regulation was made by Zaslavskiy through 
marketing the ICO as an Initial Membership Offer (IMO), offering membership in the 
entity rather than investment. 
• Use of misleading and false information 
To attract investors, false and misleading claims were made by Zaslavskiy on 
various platforms such as social media, the companies’ websites and in the ICO white 
papers. First, it was claimed that investment in RECoin and DRC ICOs granted investors 
ownership of digital coins when none existed. Secondly, it was falsely claimed that the 






thousand were raised. Thirdly, while none existed, it was claimed that RECoin and DRC 
had a team of professionals in the field to facilitate investments of funds raised. Finally, 
false claims were made about potential returns to investors from investment in these ICOs. 
5.5.3 PlexCorps 
PlexCorps, also known as PlexCoin and traded as SidePay.Ca, was an unincorporated 
entity controlled by Dominic Lacroix. As per the company’s website, the company comprised 
a team of over forty professional experts dispersed across the globe and working towards the 
primary objective of increasing the accessibility of cryptocurrencies to the general public (SEC, 
2017b). According to one of the white papers, PlexCorps was based in Singapore.  
The PlexCoin ICO was launched through a pre-sale by PlexCorps in August 2017. The 
company’s website stated that PlexCoin had the potential to become the mainstream 
cryptocurrency (SEC, 2017b). Further, one of the white papers declared an expected return 
above 13 times the original investment within a month (Shin, 2017). Subsequently, the 
PlexCoin ICO raised 15 million US dollars (SEC, 2017b). 
In December 2017 SEC filed litigation against PlexCorps, Dominic Lacroix and his 
partner Sabrina Paradis-Royer, seeking to stop the issuance of securities for violating several 
sections of US Securities Exchange Act on the following grounds (SEC, 2017b): 
• Issuance of unregistered securities 
Since the securities being offered through the ICO of PlexCoin were not registered 
with the SEC, there was a violation of the Securities Exchange Act. Further, an attempt to 
bypass the registration regulation was made by Lacroix by marketing the coins being 
offered through PlexCoin ICO as cryptocurrencies rather than securities.  
• Use of misleading and false information 
In the circumstances similar to the previous case study, false and misleading claims 
were made by PlexCorps and Lacroix on various platforms such as social media, the 
company website and ICO white papers. First, it was claimed that appreciation in the value 
of PlexCoin tokens was based upon the investment of funds raised through the ICO. 
Secondly, PlexCorps’s team was claimed to comprise over forty experts with the 
headquarters in Singapore. However, the claims were false as the entity had only a few 






executives hidden to avoid competition and issues relating to privacy. However, the main 
reason to keep the identity of Dominic Lacroix a secret was his record of being a violator 
of securities law in Canada. As a result, fake names were used to carry out the business 
activities and Lacroix’s involvement in the business was denied. False claims were also 
made about potential returns to investors from investment in PlexCoin ICO. 
• Misappropriation of funds 
One of the objectives of the PlexCoin ICO was to raise funds to develop other 
products of PlexCorps, but a portion of funds raised through the ICO was misappropriated 
by Lacroix and his partner for personal expenditure. 
5.5.4 Benebit 
Benebit was a blockchain-based decentralized platform that facilitated interaction 
among geographically diverse entities (Top ICO List, 2018). The primary motive was to create 
a platform enabling customers to store and trade points from loyalty-based programs using 
cryptocurrencies (DeVoe, 2018). The company’s website indicated the goal was a decentralised 
global network for virtual customer loyalty currency (Sedgwick, 2018). 
Benebit’s ICO pre-sale event was promoted by an ICO syndicate, a community of 
investors interested in ICOs. Benebit aggressively promoted its project, spending over 500,000 
US dollars on marketing its campaign, hiring a public relations team and being active on social 
media. It drew the attention of potential investors and led to the development of a base of 
approximately 9,000 followers on a social media channel (Shome, 2018). However, the website 
and all its accounts on social media were pulled down once it was ascertained that the pictures 
of the management team were fake, having been taken from a school website. The scam 
resulted in the loss of investor funds to a figure somewhere between 2.7 million and 4 million 
US dollars (DeVoe, 2018).  
There were two critical factors behind the success of Benebit’s ICO scam: 
• Element of Legitimacy 
The considerable expenditure incurred from promoting the Benebit ICO led to a big 
following for the ICO across various social media platforms. It was further supplemented 






the Benebit ICO legitimacy, and convinced investors that the scheme was authentic 
(Shome, 2018). 
• Lack of Due Diligence 
One of the critical aspects of investing in a new opportunity involves conducting 
due diligence on the entities and its key executives. This process was overlooked in the 
case of Benebit, leading to the successful execution of the scam (DeVoe, 2018). Third-
party promoters of Benebit did not undertake a verification procedure on the passport 
details of key executives of Benebit, which also contributed to the fraud being possible on 
such a large scale (Shome, 2018). 
5.6  Key insights 
The approaches to regulate ICOs differ across jurisdictions. Some countries such as 
China and South Korea have imposed an outright ban on ICOs, while the US has laid down 
clear guidelines around ICOs and others such as Malta and Singapore which have left no stone 
unturned in attracting businesses by providing a specific regulatory and administrative 
framework for ICOs (Lu, 2019; Mondaq, 2019). Malta, in particular, has earned itself the title 
of “Blockchain Island” (Mondaq, 2019). The presence of such a wide variation in the 
regulatory approaches and a continued lack of clarity at the global level makes it essential to 
have a set of guidelines to assist investors, issuers and regulators. Critical insights for these 
concerned stakeholders are discussed below. 
 
5.6.1 Insights for investors 
It is important to remember that not all ICOs are carried out with the purpose of cheating 
investors. However, investors need to take the necessary steps to protect themselves against 
the possibility of fraud. Based on the evaluation of the cases mentioned above, the following 
recommendations are made to investors to help them determine the legitimacy of an ICO. 
• ICO white paper: Investors should not be enticed solely by the claims of the issuer 
and the marketing strategies adopted to lure them; instead, an investor should read all 
white papers in detail to understand the nature of the proposal and assist in 






the ICO should be evaluated; in most cases, this information should be mentioned in a 
white paper. A lack of clarity in long-term goals and objectives could be an indicator 
of fraud. 
• Offering’s Utility: A deep analysis of the value proposition of the product or service 
being offered through an ICO is recommended for investors to determine whether the 
proposal has sufficient benefits to warrant investment and whether it is feasible that 
these benefits could be realised. This information would be a useful indicator of the 
proposed ICO’s legitimacy. 
• Management Due Diligence: A detailed background check on all key executives 
would assist in determining the legitimacy of the proposed ICO. Thorough diligence 
would serve in protecting investors from fraud; this would include reverse searches of 
social media profiles, criminal record checks and an evaluation of past job history. 
• ICO Ratings and Reviews: Investors should inform their decision-making from a 
variety of sources, including both the ratings provided by rating agencies and expert 
opinions available on multiple cryptocurrency websites. As is the case with traditional 
IPOs, in the case of ICOs the ratings and reviews do not guarantee protection, but 
they are still an excellent preliminary source of information to consider.  
 
5.6.2 Insights for issuers 
Prior scams where investors have lost their money have tarnished the reputation of 
genuine firms aiming to raise funds through ICOs. In light of the growing cases of fraud among 
them, it has become necessary for genuine issuers to provide as much information as possible 
to differentiate themselves from ICO scams and gain the trust of investors. The following 
recommendations are made to issuers. 
• Plain language: Without compromising on accuracy, issuers should use plain 
language that is relatively easy to understand. This will aid investor comprehension 
and help to differentiate the genuine from the fraudsters.  
• Public disclosure of information: To secure the trust of the investors, genuine issuers 
in all white papers should adopt the best practice of providing detailed information 
about their management team. It would facilitate verification background checks for 






• Helpdesk: As a best practice, ICO issuers should establish a helpdesk to answer the 
queries of investors and to explain the ICO offering and underlying technology if the 
investors require clarification. It is essential that this helpdesk also refers to 
professional financial advisors and third-party information sources such as 
government guidelines where appropriate. 
• Regulatory guidance: In the absence of a clear, detailed regulatory framework, issuers 
are encouraged to seek guidance from the relevant regulators and develop a legal 
framework to avoid any issues in the future. It will become increasingly important as 
new laws and regulations are adopted. In addition to avoiding any compliance issues, 
this approach is also an essential step in building trust with investors.  
The steps above are recommended as best-practice to issuers to increase transparency 
and provide improved assurances as to the legitimacy of ICO investments. It will help genuine 
issuers attract investors in the long run. 
 
5.6.3 Insights for regulators 
The uncertainties surrounding ICOs as new instruments make the role of regulators 
crucial. To ensure the safety of investors, and to provide a proper framework for issuers to 
adhere to, the following recommendations are made to regulators: 
• Dedicated unit: Regulators should consider establishing a separate unit that 
exclusively investigates matters related to ICOs. It would allow the unique features of 
ICOs to be adequately considered. This dedicated unit could develop a tailored 
framework providing clear guidelines to potential issuers while safeguarding 
investors. 
• Low-cost compliance: For many issuers, especially start-ups, a significant advantage 
of raising funds through an ICO lies in saving on compliance costs compared with a 
traditional IPO. As a result, to save on the cost of compliance, ICOs are viewed as a 
way of bypassing security regulations. A possible remedy is to establish a low-cost 
compliance framework for ICOs which would encourage issuers to comply with the 
regulatory framework and at the same time maintain the attractiveness of raising 






• Mandatory registration: A mandatory registration requirement for ICOs signals to 
issuers that there is regulatory oversight, which is a subtle encouragement of 
legitimate behaviour. Registration may also provide investors with a sense of security 
regarding the funds being invested and promote an active marketplace. 
A well-defined regulatory framework would establish clarity. This clarity would, in 
turn, encourage compliance from issuers. Investors would also be able to evaluate the extent of 
compliance associated with an ICO and use that information to assist them in determining the 
risk from investing in that ICO. As lower cost is one of the critical features of ICOs, regulatory 
frameworks must ensure the cost of compliance is relatively low to encourage compliant 
behaviour from issuers. 
5.6.4 Notes on recommendations 
At a broad level, these recommendations help to highlight the aspects to be considered 
by the relevant stakeholders so that an innovative opportunity for financing operations could 
be utilised to its full extent and hence yield returns to all those involved. 
It is critical to understand that adopting the above recommendations for investors does 
not guarantee complete protection from ICO fraud. Instead, they are precautionary measures 
that can facilitate the discovery of fraud in the initial stages. For instance, in the case of 
AriseBank, following the recommendation of Management Due Diligence would have 
revealed the criminal background of the key executives involved. It would have acted as a red 
flag for investors in their decision-making or have been discovered by a dedicated regulatory 
unit. The same is true in Benebit, where the information about the management was fake. 
5.7  Conclusion 
A typical modus operandi for ICO fraudsters has been revealed from analysing four 
prominent cases. ICO fraudsters make attempts to attract investors using various social media 
channels and celebrity endorsements. Besides, information on the company websites and white 
papers is usually vague and intensively technological, and it presents the product in a 
complicated manner. Further, the old tactic of promising unrealistically high investment returns 
is present in all cases. Finally, the coins in the cases analysed were either offered in stages or 
were advertised to be offered at a discount for a limited period. The motive is to highlight the 






The chapter provides implications for both investors and issuers. Investors should not 
jump on the first available opportunity to invest in an ICO. It is essential to read the white paper 
and to ensure that the concept adds value. The business motive for the ICO and the feasibility 
of the proposed product or service development should be evaluated. In the absence of 
regulations protecting the rights of those investing in an ICO, it becomes particularly important 
for a potential investor to conduct due diligence on the management team of the issuer. It is 
also essential to obtain views from various online forums about the project being undertaken 
through an ICO and views of rating companies. Traditional ratings given by the likes of 
Moody’s and S&P do not guarantee the success of a company, and correspondingly, ratings 
given to companies aiming to raise funds through an ICO may not be completely reliable. 
However, it is an added measure which might be helpful to an investor. 
The cases analysed should highlight a potential issuer about the need to adhere to 
regulations in order to avoid being subject to fines and penalties by regulators at a later stage. 
The issuers should evaluate their offerings to determine whether they qualify as a security or 
not and, if it is required, to obtain independent legal guidance. Issuers wishing to raise funds 
genuinely through an ICO need to overcome the negative association because of previous ICO 
scams. To build trust with investors, increased transparency is recommended through the public 
disclosure of detailed information using easy-to-understand language and establishment of a 
helpdesk to attend to any queries. 
Regulators also have a pivotal role to play. There is a need for a regulatory framework 
specific to ICOs that protects investors while maintaining the low-cost advantage of ICOs as a 
method of raising funds. One recommendation is clear: the mandatory registration of all ICOs.  
The adoption of suggested recommendations by investors and issuers, as well as the 
development of a tailored regulatory framework, will foster growth in the ICO market through 
reducing the prevalence of fraud. The findings lay a foundation for future research to analyse 
further ICO cases and develop a detailed best-practice guide concerning ICOs for all 
stakeholders and combat this new opportunity to commit fraud. 
To further understand the need for APPT framework, detection mechanisms, and being 
aware of new technological innovations capable of paving the way for illicit acts such as money 
laundering, it becomes critical to recognise the magnitude of the problem. The next chapter of 






Chapter 6 Money Laundering through Cannabis in 
Australia 
   * This chapter is based on a paper under submission to a peer-reviewed journal, namely: 
Tiwari, M., Gepp, A., & Kumar, K. (2021). The Evolution of Cannabis Regulation in 
Australia and the Overlooked Link with Money Laundering. (Submitted for review: Criminal 
Justice Policy Review) (Rank: Q1)  
 The need to address the problem of money laundering can be understood by getting an 
estimate of the magnitude of the problem. The review of existing literature identified a stream 
of research focusing on estimating the magnitude of money laundering (see Section 2.2.4). 
Within that stream in the review (see Section 2.2.4), it shows that there is still a need for more 
estimates to get a better idea of this magnitude. This chapter contributes by quantifying the 
amount of funds being laundered through cannabis trafficking in Australia.  
Among a range of illicit activities, the money from drug trafficking is the most demanding for 
immediate laundering, and research work on money laundering would be incomplete without 
incorporating the contribution of drug trafficking to the amount of funds laundered. This 
chapter does that by providing an argument for possible policy implications on money 
laundering through the use of theoretical concepts of rational choice, individual decision-
making and utility. It then empirically validates the effect of changes in cannabis regulations 
on the amount of money laundered, and finds some support for the argument that prohibitive 








6.1  Introduction 
As per the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (AIHW), cannabis (marijuana) is 
the most often-used drug in the world and Australia (AIHW, 2017, 2020; UNODC, 2019). In 
2016, the Australian federal government passed legislation to facilitate prescription of a range 
of cannabis-based products to patients by registered healthcare professionals (Lintzeris et al., 
2020). Additionally, a bill to decriminalise the recreational use of cannabis subject to certain 
conditions came into existence with implementation in 2020 (ACT, 2019).  
The work done around cannabis about its illicit consumption, medical benefits and 
regulatory changes has been a source of immense debate among policymakers, medical 
practitioners and academics alike. Keeping in mind the tremendous attention directed towards 
cannabis, its use and regulations governing it, the present study aims at assessing the 
development of regulations at a macro level on cannabis use in Australia through the lens of 
public-policy theories. It then attempts to present an argument to draw out its implications for 
money laundering. The presence of factors such as the high rate of illicit drug consumption and 
the prominence of cannabis, geographical isolation and lack of attitudinal shifts in regulatory 
changes makes Australia an exciting choice of study. To the best of our knowledge, a holistic 
assessment of the possible effect regulatory changes on cannabis may have on the extent of 
money laundering has been under-examined. 
This study traces the evolution of cannabis policy regulations at the state and territory 
level in Australia through a review of published secondary data sources including peer-
reviewed journal articles, government agency and media reports as indicated in the references. 
It then uses the concepts of rational choice theory, individual decision-making theory and 
utility to provide a theoretical view of the possible policy implications on money laundering. 
The contribution of this study to the literature may be two-fold. First, the study through 
the use of multiple policy process frameworks applied to cannabis policy reforms at the state 
and territory level in Australia would increase the understanding around what enables or 
hampers policy change concerning cannabis. The use of multiple frameworks would aid in 
avoiding the limitation of using a single framework to explain policy change which may not be 
appropriate. The need to blend complementary policy frameworks can facilitate more 
considerable attention to a broader range of drivers that influence the move towards or away 
from a progressive policy change. Such knowledge may serve as a model for cannabis policy 






Secondly, this study may result in an additional argument being incorporated in the 
debate around legalisation of cannabis use which has so far focused on health, crime, taxation, 
and education. Proceeds from organised crime’s drug trafficking need laundering. The rationale 
to incorporate a high-level view of the effect of change in cannabis policy regulation in the 
quantum of funds laundered could be value-additional. It may not only aid in determining the 
effect the policy may have on the level of funds laundered but might also be critical in 
evaluating policy effectiveness. Such an argument would direct the attention towards its 
empirical validation. At present, data constraints limit the possibility of testing it empirically. 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. The next section provides a brief 
overview of the work done around cannabis and an explanation of the link between money 
laundering, illicit drugs, and Australia as the choice of location for the present study. Then, the 
study describes the developments concerning cannabis policy that have taken place across 
Australian states and territories since 2001. The study assesses the development of cannabis 
regulations in Australia at a macro level through the lens of public policy theories, and 
endeavours to present an argument to draw out its implications for money laundering in 
Australia. Finally, we conclude, and direct attention to future research work. 
6.1.1 Relevant literature 
Researchers have paid considerable attention to understanding how drug policies are 
introduced or reformed (Hughes, Ritter, et al., 2017; Kübler, 2001; Lancaster & Ritter, 2014b; 
Von Hoffmann, 2016). Such an understanding facilitates the identification of elements critical 
for policy change. It lends transparency in observing the actors involved in the process, power 
dynamics, available knowledge, and expertise to shape the policy. In other words, a wide 
variety of factors, ranging from regulatory changes in other economies, to changes in the 
political regime, and the addition of new information to the knowledge pool, pave the way for 
a policy change.  
Among a range of drugs, one such drug which has garnered attention of not only 
policymakers but also of academics, medical practitioners and media towards understanding 
its policy development and implications, is cannabis (Bogdanoski, 2010; Bresin & Mekawi, 
2019; Chan et al., 2018; Chang & Jacobson, 2017; Chu & Gershenson, 2018; McGinty et al., 
2016; Ritter & Sotade, 2017; Siklos-Whillans et al., 2020; Weatherburn & Jones, 2001). The 
changes in the cannabis policy landscape correspond with shifts in public attitudes towards 






(2016) argues that the evolving international context in light of the growing debate around 
cannabis use, the role of epistemic communities and transnational activism explains Uruguay’s 
drug policy reform of 2013 to legalise cannabis from seed to smoke. Such regulatory changes 
have continuously encouraged work concerning cannabis. 
Lenton et al. (2000) and Baker and Goh (2004) found no increase in cannabis use when 
examining the effect of decriminalisation and depenalisation of cannabis use in three Australian 
states – South Australia, the Australian Capital Territory (ACT hereafter) and the Northern 
Territory, before 2001. Weatherburn and Jones (2001) found the illegal status of cannabis to 
be limiting its use through the application of a restraining effect on cannabis consumption with 
no effect on the prevalence of cannabis use. Ghosh et al. (2017) on analysing the effect of 
legalisation of recreational cannabis for the state of Colorado, USA, in 2014, found no increase 
in cannabis use for both youths and adults. Chan et al. (2018) assessed the changes in the level 
of cannabis use between 2001 and 2013 across socioeconomic status groups in Australia. The 
authors found a decline in cannabis use in Australia from 2001 to 2013, which occurred mainly 
among higher socioeconomic status groups. However, the research did not determine whether 
the people who stopped using moved to other drugs or simply stopped using all drugs. For the 
population with lower income or lower education, rates of frequent cannabis use remain 
unchanged. The study did direct attention towards the prevailing health inequality and a need 
to focus on disadvantaged cannabis users. 
Chan and Hall (2020) on estimating the proportion of cannabis consumed in Australia 
by daily cannabis users found them to account for most of the total consumption. Such a finding 
has implications for jurisdictions that have legalised cannabis to impose taxes on cannabis 
products, strengthening social norms that discourage heavy consumption and restricting 
marketing practices directed towards heavy users. Shanahan et al. (2014), using a discrete 
choice experiment survey, assessed societal preferences for different cannabis policies, and 
found a strong preference for either civil penalties or legalisation compared to cannabis 
cautioning or criminalising the possession and use of cannabis. 
In terms of observing regulatory differences, Bogdanoski (2010) reviewed the diverse 
legal approaches towards cannabis use in Australia, Canada and the US. Kilmer and Pacula 
(2017) directed attention towards the diversification of cannabis supply laws and the resulting 
challenges and opportunities arising out of it. They found a weak evidence base for assessing 






Apart from the regulatory changes (Ritter et al., 2011), medical benefits, other health 
effects (Lintzeris et al., 2020; Siklos-Whillans et al., 2020; Wang et al., 2018; Zahra et al., 
2020) and changes in the proportion of cannabis use, attention has been directed towards other 
aspects such as (i) the type and extent of media coverage given to cannabis and its role in 
shaping public opinion and policy formulation (Hughes et al., 2011; McGinty et al., 2017; 
McGinty et al., 2016), (ii) additional factors influencing cannabis consumption (Livingston et 
al., 2020) and (iii) the effect on crime rates and educational outcomes.  
Ritter and Sotade (2017) observed declining rates of cannabis use in Australia. Bresin 
and Mekawi (2019) in their meta-analytic review attempted to understand how various 
motivations for using are deferentially associated with cannabis use (frequency and quantity) 
and problems associated with cannabis use (reduced productivity, relationship conflict and 
legal issues). The authors categorised reasons for using cannabis, namely, to cope, for social 
commitment, mood enhancement, expansion of awareness and conformity. Such an 
understanding might have implications for intervention and policy development.   
Chu and Gershenson (2018) examined the effects of cannabis use on intermediate 
educational outcomes in the USA. They found that medical marijuana laws affected college 
students in states with laws legalising cannabis for medical purposes. The students were found 
to spend approximately twenty percent less time on education-related activities and more on 
leisure activities than their counterparts in states with non-medical marijuana laws during 
weekends and summer when students had more time. However, the effect of such laws was 
heterogeneous and more prominent among part-time students with the likelihood of their being 
first-generation collegegoers and originating from underrepresented racial and ethnic groups.  
The limited empirical evidence to support a positive or negative link between cannabis 
dispensaries and crime motivated Chang and Jacobson (2017) to assess the effect on crime in 
Los Angeles of short-term mass closing of hundreds of medical cannabis dispensaries. 
Interestingly, the authors found an increase in crime around dispensaries ordered to close 
relative to those allowed to remain open. Similarly, Chu and Townsend (2019) attempted to 
determine the effects of medical marijuana laws in the USA on violent and property crime and 
found no effect on criminality. On similar lines, Dragone et al. (2019) studied staggered 
legalisation of recreational cannabis on crime rates in Washington and Oregon, US. They found 






The objective of the current study is not to provide an extensive review of the initiatives 
in the domain of cannabis but to highlight the breadth of work in the field.  
6.1.2 Money laundering, cannabis and Australia 
Money laundering can be understood as the act of giving dirty money a legitimate 
appearance. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) 2000 Convention 
(UNODC, 2004) defines money laundering as the process of converting or transferring the 
asset originating from a criminal source, to conceal the origin of the source or aid the criminal 
involved in committing the criminal offence.  
There exists a range of methods to estimate the size of global money-laundering activity 
(Bajada, 2017). This results in varying estimates of it. For instance, the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) estimated the aggregate level of money laundering to be between two and five 
percent of the world’s annual gross domestic product or approximately USD 1.5 trillion (FATF, 
2012). UNODC (2016) estimates the magnitude of global money laundering to be between 
USD 800 billion and USD 2 trillion. Similarly, Walker and Unger (2009) estimated it in 
Australia to be around AUD 4 billion in 2004. However, the estimates should be treated with 
caution as they are approximate. 
Barone and Schneider (2018) state money laundering facilitates the use of illegal 
proceeds obtained from activities such as the drugs and weapons trades, cybercrime, 
corruption, human and wildlife trafficking. The likes of criminal activities mentioned are 
collectively referred to as predicate crimes and money laundering aids in drawing benefits from 
them. According to the Crime and Misconduct Commission (CMC), in the context of Australia, 
the common predicate crimes include drug trafficking, bribery, corruption, terrorism, white-
collar and blue-collar crimes (CMC, 2005). The view that money laundering is the 
characteristic element following illicit activities such as illicit drug sales and corruption is 
supported by Mitchell et al. (1998a, 1998b) and Lyman (2011). The financial magnitude of 
illicit activities collectively referred to as organised crime can be determined from the works 
of Barone et al. (2018); (Barone & Masciandaro, 2011); Barone and Schneider (2018) and 
Reuter and Truman (2004).  
The money from  drug  trafficking is the most demanding  for immediate laundering 
(Hughes, Bright, et al., 2017; Paoli, 2014; UNODC, 2011). Consequently, Barone and 






legalizing drugs, driving out the need to hide proceeds from such activities. As a result, 
considerable attention among a range of drugs has gone to decriminalising cannabis for medical 
and recreational purposes. It is the world’s most widely used illicit drug (UNODC, 2019).  
For several reasons it is critical to consider the regulations around cannabis for a 
country such as Australia. First, the rate of illicit drug use is relatively high in Australia 
(Degenhardt et al., 2013; UNODC, 2015), which is intriguing given Australia’s geographical 
isolation from global drug trafficking routes. Consequently, law enforcement may focus on 
domestic markets (Ritter et al., 2011), leading to additional risk for local traffickers and thereby 
resulting in higher prices for drugs (Global Drug Survey, 2015). On the other hand, the 
geographical isolation has also led to the popularity of the crypto market for illicit drugs by 
providing a new avenue for the procurement. According to the Australian Crime Commission 
(ACC) (ACC, 2015), the illicit supply of drugs is the biggest source of income for organised 
crime groups operating in the country and is generally associated with crimes such as money 
laundering. 
Secondly, cannabis is one of the most consumed drugs in Australia with no price 
variation between online and conventional sales routes (AIHW, 2014; Cunliffe et al., 2017; 
Hughes et al., 2016). This consumption prominence creates a need to investigate cannabis 
regulations in Australia, particularly given the extensive debate across the world and the 
existing research evaluating the effect of cannabis use (Chan et al., 2018; Chang & Jacobson, 
2017; Chu & Townsend, 2019; Dragone et al., 2019; Ghosh et al., 2017; Von Hoffmann, 2016; 
Wang et al., 2018; Zahra et al., 2020). 
Thirdly, the lack of change in attitude in Australia towards cannabis consumption 
despite the regulatory changes in the country (Ritter & Sotade, 2017) provides an opportunity 
to focus on other possible implications of such regulatory change. The adoption of a 
prohibitionist approach makes it difficult to supply and procure cannabis for consumption and 
this in turn creates the need to launder the proceeds generated as a result of its sale. 
Consequently, it becomes interesting to consider the effect of changes in cannabis regulations 
on money laundering for Australia in the light of a lack of attitudinal shift. 
The pro-legalisation and anti-legalisation arguments concerning cannabis have focused 
on criminal justice involvement and costs, tax revenues, education, public health consequences 
and crime rates. However, no study in the past has explicitly focused on the effect such 






6.1.3 Cannabis policies in Australia 
The legal frameworks governing the use and supply of drugs can be broadly categorised 
into a range comprising (i) full prohibition (considering the usage, possession and supply as a 
criminal offence resulting in a criminal record), (ii) depenalisation (involving lighter penalties 
for possession and usage but where supply remains a criminal offence), (iii) decriminalisation 
(criminal penalties are replaced with civil penalties, and drug supply remains a criminal 
offence) and (iv) legalisation (usage, possession, and supply remain legal) (Ritter & Lee, 2016). 
The drug policy reforms related to cannabis move around on this spectrum across the globe.  
In Sweden, cannabis is not treated as less harmful than any other drug and the Swedes 
criminalise its possession and consumption. In the Netherlands, retail sales take place through 
coffee shops while cannabis production is prohibited. In Spain, cultivation and possession of 
cannabis are not criminalised, but the sale is. The procurement takes place through cannabis 
clubs which are private and non-profit organisations. The decriminalisation of cannabis in 
Europe was initiated by Portugal in 2001, followed by Estonia (2002), Belgium (2003) and 
later on by Poland and the Czech Republic (Chatwin, 2017; Kilmer & Pacula, 2017). Cannabis 
production and its use for recreational purposes were legalised in jurisdictions such as Uruguay 
and at a sub-national level in the US (Carliner et al., 2017; Dragone et al., 2019; Jacques et al., 
2016; Kilmer & Pacula, 2017; Pardo, 2014; Von Hoffmann, 2016).  
This study is not based on a legal analysis of national and sub-national drug laws. Its 
purpose is to overview the trajectory that regulations about cannabis have taken in Australia. 
Legislation in Australia is state-based with different penalties surrounding different drugs. 
Cannabis was decriminalised in three Australian States before 2001, namely, South Australia 
(1987), the ACT (1992) and the Northern Territory (1996). Similar to what has been observed 
in  other  countries, the  decriminalisation and depenalisation  did not  increase  cannabis use 
(Baker & Goh, 2004; Lenton et al., 2000). However, after 2001 the policy changes adopted a 
more prohibitive approach (Lancaster & Ritter, 2014a) up until 2015. In 2016, the Australian 
Federal Government passed legislation allowing for a range of cannabis-based products to be 
prescribed to patients by registered healthcare professionals (Lintzeris et al., 2020). The policy 
and legislative changes related to cannabis across states and  territories in Australia (Hughes, 
2020; Ritter & Sotade, 2017) have been documented in Table 15. There has been a shift from 






with cultivation for scientific or medical purposes legalised in 2015 and with further measures 
towards legalisation of cannabis for recreation in the ACT. 
Year Jurisdiction Policy and Legislative Changes 
2001 South Australia Amendment to Cannabis Expiation Notice (CEN) 
resulting in a reduction of the number of cannabis plants 
attracting a fine on planting, taking the number down 
from three to one plant  
2002 South Australia Further amendment of CEN resulting in a ban on the 
cultivation of hydroponic plants 
2003 Western Australia Introduction of Cannabis Control Act 2003 to facilitate 
the issue of cannabis infringement notices 
2004 Western Australia 
 
Introduction of Cannabis Infringement Notice Scheme 
to facilitate personal use (decriminalisation) 
Victoria Trial for roadside drug saliva testing for amphetamines 
and cannabis 
2005 Australian Capital Territory Simple Cannabis Offence Notice expiation scheme 
amended to reduce the eligibility criteria for the number 
of plants allowed and exclusion of hydroponically 
grown cannabis 
Tasmania Introduction of roadside drug testing 
2006 New South Wales Increment in penalties for hydroponic cannabis 
South Australia Commencement of random roadside drug testing 
2007 New South Wales, 
Queensland and Western 
Australia 







Western Australia Review of Cannabis Infringement Notice resulting in 
expansion of scope to juveniles, reduction in the 
quantity of cannabis and increased fines for 
noncompliance 
2008 Northern Territory Adoption of roadside drug testing for amphetamines, 
cannabis and ecstasy 
South Australia Increment in penalties against the cultivation of 
hydroponic cannabis 
2009 South Australia Adoption of strict regulation on the sale of equipment 
for hydroponic growth of cannabis 
Western Australia Introduction of Unlicensed Driving Vehicle Sanctions 
affecting people who had their licence suspended under 
the Cannabis Infringement Notice Scheme 
2010 Australian Capital Territory Random Drug Testing Amendment Bill 2009 for testing 
of amphetamines, cannabis, and ecstasy 
Western Australia Previous cannabis legislation replaced by stricter 
Cannabis Intervention Requirement (CIR) Scheme 
2011 Australian Capital Territory, 
New South Wales, Northern 
Territory, South Australia 
and Tasmania 
Imposition of a ban on the sale and use of synthetic 
cannabinoids 
Western Australia: Making use, possession or cultivation of cannabis a 
criminal offence 
2012 South Australia and Victoria Banning sale of drug equipment such as bongs and 
cannabis pipes 
2013 Western Australia Introduction of offences concerning the sale and display 
of drug equipment incorporating anything that could be 






2014 Australian Capital Territory Introduction of Drugs of Dependence (Cannabis Use for 
Medical Purposes) Amendment Bill 2014 to allow use, 
possession and cultivation of cannabis for medical 
purposes 
New South Wales Introduction of Terminal Illness Cannabis Scheme to 
facilitate police in not enforcing the law against 
registered adults and carers 
Northern Territory Introduction of the Misuse of Drugs Amendment Act 
2014 allowing police to charge a person with supply to 
the indigenous community of drugs such as 
amphetamines and cannabis 
 
Victoria Introduction of Drugs, Poisons and Controlled 
Substances Amendment (Clinical Trials) Bill facilitating 
clinical trials of medical cannabis 
2015 Australian Capital Territory Passing of Crimes Legislation Amendment Bill 2014 to 
prohibit display but not the sale of drug pipes 
New South Wales Regulatory changes to facilitate doctors' applications for 
prescriptions of cannabis-based medicines 
Northern Territory Adoption of Traffic and Other Legislation Amendment 
Act 2015 to allow for random drug testing for 
methamphetamines, cannabis and ecstasy 
Victoria: Announcement to legalise access to medical cannabis in 
exceptional circumstances from 2017 
Western Australia Adoption of Misuse of Drugs Amendment 
(Psychoactive Substances) Act 2015 banning the sale, 






psychoactive substances unless approved through 
existing regulation or legislation 
2016 Australian Capital Territory Announcement to establish a medical cannabis scheme 
as a priority 
New South Wales Renaming of Terminal Illness Cannabis Scheme as 
Medical Cannabis Compassionate Use Scheme to 
evaluate its extension to non-terminal patients; 
authorisation to conduct medical cannabis cultivation 
research 
Queensland Adoption of Public Health (Medicinal Cannabis) Act 
2016 allowing medicinal cannabis products to be 
prescribed and dispensed to patients in Queensland 
Tasmania Announcement to facilitate medical practitioners to 
prescribe medicinal cannabis for patients with severe 
illnesses through a Controlled Access Scheme (CAS) 
Victoria Adoption of Access to Medicinal Cannabis Act 2016 to 
allow for lawful cultivation and manufacturing of 
medicinal cannabis products by patients with certain 
conditions and symptoms 
Western Australia The Narcotic Drugs Amendment Act 2016 legalising 
cultivation of medical cannabis, prescription by a doctor 
and dispensing by a pharmacist 
2017 Victoria An inquiry into Drug Law Reform to monitor the 
effectiveness of laws, procedures and regulations 
concerning synthetic and illicit drugs and the misuse of 







2018 Australian Capital Territory Proposition to legalise cannabis for personal use by 
removing possession of less than 50 grams of dried 
cannabis as a criminal offence 
South Australia Issuance of Statutes Amendment (Drug Offences) Bill 
2018 to increase penalties for cannabis possession 
Victoria Proposition to legalise, regulate and tax recreational 
cannabis for people aged 18 and over 
2019 Australian Capital Territory Passing of The Drugs of Dependence (Personal 
Cannabis Use) Act 2019 to legalise personal cultivation, 
use and possession of cannabis for recreational purposes 
Northern Territory Recommendation to amend the Misuse of Drugs Act to 
allow for uniform decriminalisation of cannabis use to 
address inconsistencies that exist in police discretion 
Table 15. Cannabis policy changes at the state/territory level in Australia 
The Drugs of Dependence (Personal Cannabis Use) Amendment Bill 2018 (ACT) (The 
Bill) was passed by the ACT legislative assembly in 2019 (ACT, 2019; ATODA, 2020). It 
resulted in amendments to the Drugs of Dependence Act 1989 (ACT) (The Drugs Act), the 
Criminal Code 2002 (ACT) and Medicines, Poisons and Therapeutic Goods Act 2008 (ACT). 
The Bill addressed issues about cultivation, possession and smoking of cannabis (TimeBase, 
2019). According to the new legislation, residents aged 18 years or older will be allowed to 
grow cannabis plants at home. The limit will be two plants per person and four per household. 
The possession limit has been set to no more than 50 grams of dried cannabis per person. 
However, commercial sale of cannabis via retail outlets and supply of seeds or plants remains 
prohibited (Bright & Bartle, 2020). According to the ACT government, the use of cannabis is 
not legal but has been decriminalised by removing penalties for adults (aged 18 and over) who 
possess or use a small amount (ACT, 2020).  
The Bill has received considerable support. The arguments provided in its favour 






reducing stigmatisation, (iv) shifting the legal perspective of cannabis use from criminal justice 
to a health issue, (v) the creation of barriers to organised crime and (vi) the effectiveness of the 
harm-reduction approach. However, despite the support for the Bill, there exist elements in the 
legislation which are new and unfamiliar. Notably, the Bill lacks clarity on the enforcement of 
either the state or federal laws as possession for use and cultivation of cannabis is still a criminal 
offence under federal laws (Lee & Bartle, 2019).  
6.1.4 Understanding cannabis policy development through public policy 
theories 
The literature in the past has focused on understanding the introduction or reformation 
of drug policies (Hughes, Ritter, et al., 2017; Kübler, 2001; Lancaster & Ritter, 2014b; Lenton 
et al., 2000; Von Hoffmann, 2016). Such an understanding allows observation of actors, 
processes, knowledge and power dynamics interacting in policy formulation. Additionally, the 
deeply entrenched belief in prohibition shared by policymakers, government-backed 
investment agencies and a variety of advocates makes it challenging to transition to harm 
reduction. As a result, an understanding of how the change was brought about could be value-
additional for other jurisdictions. 
The process of policy change can be explained with the help of a range of theories. For 
instance, Sabatier and Weible (2014) list the following theories as the most promising to 
explain policy change: the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF), the Multiple Streams 
Approach (MSA), Punctuated Equilibrium Theory (PET), Diffusion Theory (DT), Internal 
Determinants Models (IDM) and Public or Institutional Entrepreneurship Theory.  
Furthermore, Pivo et al. (2020) identify and categorise the factors, paving the way to 
monitor their interaction and explain the change through the use of the theories mentioned 
above. The first category is composed of factors affecting governing processes: collaborative 
group processes, coalitions and regimes competing for power, people leading, facilitating and 
informing decisions, organisational cultures and capacities, institutional laws, policies and 
governmental forms. The second category of factors encompasses social, economic, built and 
natural conditions where policy decisions occur. The final category of factors comprises policy 







Similar to the work of Townsend et al. (2020), this study draws on multiple policy 
process frameworks to formulate an understanding of the enablers or constraints explaining 
cannabis policy reforms in Australia at the state and territory level. We have used theoretical 
frameworks and triangulation of multiple data sources to understand the current state of 
cannabis policies in Australia. This results in attributing the policy change process to three 
theories at a macro level: the theories are DT (Walker, 1969), IDM (Berry & Berry, 2018) and 
MSA (Kingdon & Stano, 1984). These frameworks aid in understanding the state of cannabis 
policy reforms in Australia. 
6.1.4.a Diffusion Theory 
Diffusion Theory states that a government is influenced by policies adopted by other 
governments. The local policymakers may be influenced by successful policy outcomes in 
other jurisdictions, yielding to normative pressures, or may simply be influenced by mandates 
or incentives adopted by other regional, state, or federal governments. For instance, cannabis 
reforms in Uruguay have influenced governments across the world (Von Hoffmann, 2016). 
Similarly, in the USA the move to legalise cannabis for recreational purposes has been 
undertaken in nearly 30 states and the District of Columbia (Carliner et al., 2017; Dragone et 
al., 2019; Ghosh et al., 2017; Pardo, 2014). According to Kilmer and Pacula (2017), apart from 
the legalisation of large-scale cannabis production for non-medical purposes at the national or 
sub-national level, as of 2016 nine other countries permit (or will permit) cannabis to be 
supplied for medicinal purposes.  
The move from a prohibitionist approach towards an approach more of harm reduction 
has been initiated in Australia because of the influence of the regulatory changes in the US and 
other jurisdictions. Within Australia, in addition to reforms internationally, the policy of one 
state or territory is influenced by the policies of others. The influence can be observed through 
the legalisation of cannabis for medical or scientific purposes, starting in 2015, followed by a 
move towards legalising cannabis for recreational purposes in 2020 (Hughes, 2020). The 
influence of policies in another state may be the reason for the change. Still, it may not be able 
to explain the pace at which the policy change takes place. For this, additional factors and 
theoretical frameworks need to be considered. 
6.1.4.b Internal Determinants model 
As proposed by Berry and Berry (2018), IDM emphasises the interaction of political, 






influence the motivation to develop innovative policies or else act as a hindrance in the 
development of innovative policies.  
The policies adopted in each Australian state and territory may be ascribed to the 
interaction of the determinants above. For instance, in Western Australia, in 2001 the 
prohibition of cannabis use and possession with civil penalties was introduced, and further 
changes came in 2003 to allow for infringement notices. In 2004, changes were made to allow 
for alternatives to a criminal conviction relating to cannabis. In 2007, eligibility for the 
cultivation of cannabis plants was removed. In the same year, the Western Australian police 
commenced roadside drug testing for cannabis. In 2008, Western Australian Liberals were 
elected in coalition with the Nationals and Independents on a mandate to repeal the Cannabis 
Infringement Notice Scheme and provide a more robust response to the use of cannabis. In 
2009, changes were proposed to make cannabis cultivation a criminal offence. A joint operation 
in 2011 led to the seizure of 29 kilograms of cannabis and AUD 25,000. 
The state Organized Crime Squad seized AUD 20 million worth of drugs (cannabis and 
methylamphetamine) and assets in 2014. In 2016, in light of the changing public attitude 
towards cannabis, the government legalised the cultivation of medical cannabis. Further, it 
allowed for a doctor to prescribe and for a pharmacist to dispense cannabis. It was in line with 
new Commonwealth laws enabling access to medical cannabis, via the Narcotic Drugs 
Amendment Act 2016. Consequently, policy development through the mentioned example 
could be ascribed to the interaction between the determinants (Hughes, 2020). 
 
6.1.4.c Multiple Streams approach 
The theory emphasises, as proposed by Kingdon and Stano (1984), the importance of 
policy entrepreneurs in exploiting opportunities to promote specific policy choices. The policy 
choices are intended to address problems acceptably in whatever is the newly emerging policy 
situation. To formulate practical policy proposals, policy entrepreneurs combine elements, 
namely: problems, policies and politics. The problem stream is concerned with issues that are 
a priority for people or policymakers. The policy stream offers potential solutions to problems 
varying in cost, feasibility, acceptability, and situational utility. The politics stream combines 







In the Australian context, MSA can explain the development of cannabis policies to the 
present level. The problem stream comprises illicit consumption of cannabis, which has been 
an issue of concern from both the criminal justice and the public health perspective. Concerning 
policy, the solutions to the problem of illicit cannabis consumption consist of providing 
solutions on the spectrum, with prohibition and legalisation being the counterposed extreme 
ends (Ritter & Lee, 2016). 
For a policy entrepreneur to provide a practical policy proposal, it would be essential 
to choose a solution addressing elements from the politics stream. For example, in 1996, to 
address the issue of cannabis consumption in Victoria, the Premier’s Drug Council Report 
recommended cannabis decriminalisation and diversion. It failed to win support as Liberal 
backbenchers opposed it. The inclination towards the prohibitionist approach was visible even 
in 2010 when Leader of the Opposition Ted Bailleau proposed that upon election, he would 
impose a ban on the sale of bongs (an instrument for cannabis consumption) to communicate 
the harmful effects of cannabis on young people. The Victorian Liberal party was elected under 
Premier Bailleau in the same year under a platform of a strict zero-tolerance approach to crime. 
Subsequently, amendment to the Drugs, Poisons and Controlled Substances Act 1981 banned 
the sale, supply and display of bongs in Victoria (Hughes, 2020).   
In 2014, Opposition leader Daniel Andrews announced that, if elected, the Labor Party 
would put the issue of medical cannabis to the Victoria Law Reform Commission, in order to 
find a legal path for the consumption of cannabis for medical purposes. In the same year, the 
Coalition Government introduced a bill to facilitate clinical trials of medicinal cannabis and 
later in that year the Victorian Labor Government under Premier Andrews was elected. 
Subsequently, upon recommendations from the Victoria Law Reform Commission’s Medicinal 
Cannabis report, legal access to medicinal cannabis from 2017 in exceptional circumstances 
was announced. It resulted in the adoption of the Access to Medicinal Cannabis Act 2016 
(Hughes, 2020).  
These policy changes were in line with the changing public attitude towards cannabis. 
According to the National Drug Strategy Household Survey 2016, community tolerance 
towards cannabis consumption increased with more support towards legalisation and less 
support towards the imposition of penalties for sale and supply (AIHW, 2017). At the time of 






adults aged 18 and over were made (Hughes, 2020). The exploitation of opportunities to 
promote specific policy choices is evident through the combination of multiple streams. 
6.1.5 The effect of regulations on money laundering 
In recent times, the global cannabis policy landscape has been witnessing a transition. 
There has been a shift from prohibition to medical decriminalisation or from medical 
decriminalisation to recreational legislation across economies at national and sub-national 
levels (Wang et al., 2017). The policy question of several debates is whether it is better to 
continue to regulate cannabis as a legal product, prohibit it unconditionally, or adopt the middle 
road of decriminalisation. Social commentators and academics alike have argued that 
prohibitionist measures may increase victimisation and retaliation by reducing access to the 
law (Jacobs & Wright, 2006; Jacques & Wright, 2013; Rosenfeld et al., 2003). Such measures 
may restrict a supplier's access to formal means of dispute resolution in case of wrongdoing, 
and according to Jacques et al. (2016), this may encourage violent retaliation. Additionally, 
there exists a notion that drug policies intended for public protection based on prohibition and 
criminalisation have had detrimental effects on public health. They drive people who use drugs 
away from health services and contribute to stigma (The Lancet, 2016).  
To conclude, from a communication research aspect, the framing or focus on specific 
aspects of an issue can influence its appeal to the audiences and influence public policy support 
(Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007). The aspect focused on by anti-legalisation arguments has 
been adverse public health. In contrast, the pro-legalisation arguments have directed attention 
towards criminal justice and economic issues such as a reduction in prison overcrowding, 
decline in racial disparities in cannabis arrests, an increase in tax revenue and creation of new 
jobs (McGinty et al., 2016). However, the possible effect regulatory changes on cannabis may 
have on the extent of money laundering has been under-examined.  
According to Schneider (2010), the volume of turnover of organised crime rose to USD 
790 billion in 2006 compared to USD 595 billion in 2001 in OECD countries. As documented 
in the literature, money laundering is a typical element following illicit activities constituting 
organised crime. As a result, the rise in revenue generated out of organised crime increases the 
prominence of laundering. Further, among a range of illicit activities, the main contributor to 
the proceeds of organised crime is drug trafficking (Paoli, 2014; UNODC, 2011). Finally, 
among the various drugs available, the most widely-consumed illicit drug worldwide and in 






often than not ignored in public policy debate around the effectiveness of decriminalisation 
could have been to assess the change in cannabis policies on the quantum of money laundering. 
A decriminalised drug market would result in eradication of illegality which so far has been 
paving the way for the need to launder funds. This is consistent with the economic approach of 
Becker (1968) to crime. 
This chapter uses Walker's gravity model (Khan et al., 2018; Walker & Unger, 2009), 
to estimate the proportion of funds that could have potentially been laundered in Australia 
because of cannabis. It uses the prices of cannabis available from the Australian Criminal 
Intelligence Commission's (ACIC) illicit drug data reports and the UNODC database (ACIC, 
2016, 2017, 2018, 2019; UNODC, 2020). The prices and the quantity of cannabis seized 
annually are combined to come up with a lower estimate of the proceeds of crime that would 
have been available for laundering resulting from cannabis had it not been detected. Once the 
proceeds available for laundering are known, the gravity model can be used to determine the 
proportion of funds that would have been laundered in Australia. The changes in cannabis 
regulations can be used to gauge the effect of such regulatory changes on the amount of funds 
laundered. 
No study attempts to provide a foundation to focus on the effects of changes in cannabis 
policy explicitly on the amount of money being laundered. From the sellers' perspective, the 
prohibitory approach to cannabis sale encourages the sellers to look for alternatives to make 
illicit sales and consequently creates the need for laundering. Ceteris paribus, the primary thrust 
of rational choice theory, predicts that given a prohibitory approach to cannabis, the expected 
utility of mobilising channels to launder funds will be higher for illicit dealers (Gilmour, 
2016b).  
From the perspective of rational choice theory, the need to launder funds might decline. 
The regulatory changes play a critical role in assessing the need to launder the proceeds, and 
this is a relevant factor influencing the decision of sellers and suppliers (Clarke & Cornish, 
1985; Piquero, Gibson & Tibbetts, 2002). Decriminalisation is situated between legal 
regulation and prohibition on the drug market legality continuum. The current cannabis 
regulatory developments across Australia as documented above have been towards 
decriminalisation. 
From an economic perspective, the cannabis regulations focus on trade-offs between 






consumption and harms from illegal markets. The harms from consumption are outweighed by 
the consumption benefits and harms from illegal markets, and this supports the need for 
behavioural policies instead of blanket prohibition (Rogeberg, 2018). A policy with optimal 
tax level would not leave the legal market outcompeted by the illegal market. Still, it would aid 
in reducing the incentive to launder funds and consequently would contribute to the actual 
assessment of the economy. The rationale is that since the prohibition makes illegal the revenue 
generated from cannabis consumption, a need to launder the proceeds arises. The perspectives 
considered in this chapter provide a theoretical argument on the possible results of changes in 
regulations from prohibition to decriminalisation and legalisation, and the amount of funds 
laundered.  
6.1.6 Estimating cannabis proceeds available for money laundering 
This chapter takes a step further to empirically evaluate the effects of changes in 
cannabis regulations on the amount of funds that could have been laundered in Australia. It 
considers the prices of cannabis from 2003 to 2017 to determine the proceeds of crime which 
would have been available for laundering had cannabis not been detected. The information on 
the per gram prices of cannabis was obtained from illicit drug data reports and the UNODC 
database (ACIC, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019; UNODC, 2020). It is important to note that the price 
information provided in these reports was collected for all police jurisdictions in Australia and 
is based on information provided by covert police units and informants. There exists a lack of 
reporting standardisation as some reports contained price information per ounce while others 
reported price per gram, as provided in Table 16. It may result in a quantity discount factor not 
being taken into consideration. Hence, the quantity discount factor is used to derive the prices 
in case the price information per ounce is unavailable (for 2007). For ease of calculation, the 
purity levels in cannabis, different cannabis variants, and the purpose of usage (recreational or 



















Ratio in IDDR 
Prices 
Outdoor price per 
ounce 












Outdoor price per 
ounce 






- 8.33   




IDDR 2005 AUD 220 to 
AUD 400 per 
ounce and 
AUD 15 to 
AUD 60 per 
gram 
- 11.07   
Outdoor price per 
ounce 
IDDR 2006 AUD 150 in 
NSW and SA 
to AUD 1000 
in SA per 
ounce 
- 20.54   
Outdoor price per 
gram 
IDDR 2007 AUD 20 to 
AUD 35, but 
price in 
remote 
location –  
Northern 
Territory is 
AUD 50 to 
AUD 100 per 
gram  
- 9.31   




IDDR 2008 AUD 200 to 
AUD 500 per 
ounce, AUD 
10 to AUD 
50 per gram 
- 12.50   






2009 AUD 180 to 











20 to AUD 
75 per gram 
29.88648 per 
gram 






2010 AUD 250 to 
AUD 700 per 
ounce, AUD 
20 to AUD 





price is AUD 
22.589 
16.96 2.8 






2011 AUD 200 to 
AUD 700 per 
ounce, AUD 
20 to AUD 





price is AUD 
25.775 
16.07 3.733333333 






2012 AUD 250 to 
AUD 450 per 
ounce, AUD 
12 to AUD 





price is AUD 
24.745 
12.50 2.48 






2013 AUD 210 to 
AUD 450 per 
ounce, AUD 
12 to AUD 











2014 AUD 200 to 
AUD 450 per 
ounce, AUD 
12 to AUD 





price is AUD 
32.971 
11.61 2.670769231 






2015 AUD 160 to 
AUD 450 per 
ounce, AUD 
10 to AUD 
50 per gram 












2016 AUD 200 to 
AUD 450 per 
ounce, AUD 
10 to AUD 

















2017 AUD 200 to 
AUD 450 per 
ounce, AUD 
20 to AUD 













Table 16. Per gram price estimates of cannabis in Australia 
Once the price information is available, the amount of cannabis seized annually (ACIC, 
2016, 2017, 2018, 2019) is used to come up with the amount of proceeds of crime from 
cannabis trafficking that would have been generated had it not been detected. It can be 
summarised using the formula below: 
Proceeds of cannabis trafficking = Price per gram of cannabis × Weight of 
cannabis seized (in grams)                     
This chapter considers the weight of cannabis seized annually, considering that it would 
be difficult to ascertain the amount of annual cannabis production. The approach to derive the 
proceeds of crime involving a measurable commodity such as cannabis (in this case the 
proceeds that would have been available if not detected), based on the weight of cannabis and 
price per unit, is in line with the views of Unger et al. (2006). They state that proceeds of crime 
for a measurable commodity can be ascertained by multiplying the weight of commodity with 






Once the proceeds of crime through cannabis trafficking that would have been derived 
had it not been detected are known, the next step is to compute the proceeds available for 
laundering. Not all proceeds of crime are available for laundering, and so it is essential to 
compute the percentage of the proceeds of crime that actually is available for laundering 
(Smekens & Verbruggen, 2004; Unger, 2007; Unger et al., 2006; Walker, 1999). Meloen et al. 
(2003), using case studies to examine the behaviour of money launderers caught, found that 
launderers of drug crimes laundered 80 per cent of the proceeds of their crime. These 
observations were in line with those of Walker (1999) and Unger (2007). As a result, based on 
past literature, to derive an estimate of the potential amount of funds available that would have 
been laundered, we estimate that 80 per cent of the proceeds of crime are available for 
laundering. An estimate of the potential amount of funds available that would have been 
laundered can be summarised using the formula below: 
Amount available for laundering = Proceeds of crime from cannabis trafficking × 
0.80 
Once the proceeds of crime, (and in this case it would be cannabis trafficking) available 
for money laundering are ascertained, the next step is to determine the proportion of funds that 
would be laundered in Australia. Using Walker's gravity model (Ene, 2014; Ferwerda et al., 
2013; Khan et al., 2018; Walker, 1999; Walker & Unger, 2009), the proportion of funds 
laundered domestically can be ascertained. The equation for the Walker gravity model is as 
follows: 












where P is the proportion of funds flowing from country A (Australia) to country 𝑦𝑖, which is 
again Australia in this case. The attractiveness and the distance component as specified in the 
literature (Ene, 2014; Ferwerda et al., 2013; Khan et al., 2018; Walker, 1999; Walker & Unger, 
2009), are as follows: 
Attractiveness = GDP* (3*BS + GA+ SWIFT+ FD – 3*CF – CR – EG + 10) 
where GDP is Gross Domestic Product, BS is banking secrecy, GA is government attitude, 
SWIFT is Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) member, 






Distance = Language + Trade + Colonial Background + Distance 
As it is with Mayer and Zignago (2011), for the purpose of computing the proportion 
of funds laundered within a country the distance component for Australia from Australia is 
computed using the great circle formula.  
Once the proportion of funds laundered in Australia is computed, they can be used in 
combination with proceeds available for laundering to determine the amount of funds that 
would have been laundered annually through cannabis trafficking had it not been detected4. 
The same can be summarised using the formula below: 
Amount of cannabis laundering in Australia = Proceeds available for laundering 
×Proportion of funds laundered in Australia  
The annual prices of cannabis (per gram), weight seized (in kilograms), proceeds of 
crime available for laundering, the proportion of funds laundered in Australia, and the amount 








from ounces to 
per gram as 




Proceeds of Crime 
Detected 
Amount Available for 
Money Laundering 
Proportion Laundered 
in Australia as per 
Walker Gravity Model 
Guess Estimate of 
Amount Laundered 
2003 9900 
$                                              
9.05 $         89,571,428.57 
$                   
71,657,142.86 20.49% $14,681,832.00 
2004 7600 
$                                              
8.33 $         63,333,333.33 
$                   
50,666,666.67 23.42% $11,866,133.33 
2005 4482.626 
$                                            
11.07 $         49,629,073.57 
$                   
39,703,258.86 23.79% $9,445,405.28 
2006 4781.9 
$                                            
20.54 $         98,199,732.14 
$                   
78,559,785.71 23.38% $18,367,277.90 
 
 
4 The cannabis laundering proceeds have been computed up to 2017 because the World Bank’s financial deposits data are currently only 












from ounces to 
per gram as 




Proceeds of Crime 
Detected 
Amount Available for 
Money Laundering 
Proportion Laundered 
in Australia as per 
Walker Gravity Model 
Guess Estimate of 
Amount Laundered 
2007 5409 
$                                              
9.31 $         50,365,461.58 
$                   
40,292,369.26 26.53% $10,689,565.57 
2008 5573 
$                                            
12.50 $         69,662,500.00 
$                   
55,730,000.00 30.19% $16,823,772.40 
2009 5989 
$                                            
12.14 $         72,723,571.43 
$                   
58,178,857.14 21.25% $12,363,007.14 
2010 5452.4 
$                                            
16.96 $         92,496,071.43 
$                   
73,996,857.14 23.38% $17,301,945.14 
2011 7349.2 
$                                            
16.07 $      118,112,142.86 
$                   
94,489,714.29 26.71% $25,238,202.69 
2012 9344 
$                                            
12.50 $      116,800,000.00 
$                   
93,440,000.00 30.92% $28,891,648.00 
2013 7074 
$                                            
11.79 $         83,372,142.86 
$                   
66,697,714.29 32.98% $21,996,906.17 
2014 6004.7 
$                                            
11.61 $         69,697,410.71 
$                   
55,757,928.57 31.59% $17,613,929.64 
2015 6081.5 
$                                            
10.89 $         66,244,910.71 
$                   
52,995,928.57 24.62% $13,047,597.61 
2016 7547.8 
$                                            
11.61 $         87,608,392.86 
$                   
70,086,714.29 21.95% $15,384,033.79 
2017 8665.9 
$                                            
11.61 $      100,586,339.29 
$                   
80,469,071.43 21.29% $17,131,865.31 








6.1.7 Implications of cannabis regulations on prices and amount of money 
laundering 
The highest prices per gram of cannabis are observed in 2006, 2010, and 2011. The 
lowest prices, after 2004, are observed in 2015 and 2016.  The regulations in these years are 
critical in influencing cannabis prices. For instance, the price increase in 2006 could be 
attributed to policy changes such as increments in penalties for hydroponic cannabis in New 
South Wales, as provided in Table 1. 
In addition, the price rise in 2010 and 2011 coincides with further prohibitory measures 
taken in ACT, South Australia, New South Wales, Northern Territory, and Tasmania. The low 
prices in 2015 and 2016 may be attributed to the steps being taken by the Federal Government 
to facilitate the medicinal use of cannabis in 2016 (Lintzeris et al., 2020). Such a correlation 
does direct attention towards empirically evaluating the extent to which regulations influence 
the prices. 
There are data constraints around determining the amount of cannabis produced and 
consumed; as a result, this chapter tends to focus on the amount of cannabis seized annually. 
Once again, it is critical to note that cannabis seized is not a direct reflection on the amount of 
cannabis produced and consumed annually. Consideration is required of the presence of other 
factors for variation in cannabis seizures, as it would not be an accurate indicator reflecting the 
regulatory effects. Still, it needs to be considered in the absence of other reliable indicators. A 
substantial number of cannabis seizures is observed in the years 2003 and 2012, respectively. 
Before 2001, cannabis usage was decriminalized in three Australian states, namely, ACT, 
South Australia, and Northern Territory; however, since 2001, the cannabis policy changes in 
Australia have taken a more prohibitive and stricter turn (Ritter & Sotade, 2017). One outcome 
of such a prohibitory approach is the higher rate of seizures documented in the years 2003 and 
2012. As seen in Table 15, in 2003 the Cannabis Control Act was introduced in Western 
Australia, while 2012 was marked by a ban on the sale of drug equipment in South Australia 
and Victoria, following a series of prohibitive measures in 2010 and 2011. 
The cannabis regulations, affecting cannabis prices and seizures, did have an overall 
effect on the extent of revenue proceeds generated from cannabis trafficking. The years 2010 
and 2011 witnessed the highest amount for proceeds of crime and funds available for money 






resulting from cannabis within Australia between 2003 and 2017 has been provided in Figure 
17, whereby 2006 and 2012 have witnessed a sharp rise followed by a sharp decline in 2015. 
 
 
Figure 17: Annual estimates of potential money laundering as a result of cannabis in Australia 
Regulatory changes, among other factors, often influence the weight and the price per 
unit, which in turn influences the proceeds of crime. It is important to note that the potential 
money-laundering amount estimated annually is dependent on the proceeds of crime, in this 
case, cannabis trafficking, which is influenced by the unit price and the weight of cannabis. 
The rational choice theory concerning the need to launder funds (Gilmour, 2016b) finds an 
empirical validation in the estimates documented in Table III. The need to launder funds 
becomes critical when a prohibitory approach towards cannabis is considered. This is evident 
from the highest amount estimated for the year 2012 (AUD 28.8 million), which would have 
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amount of funds being laundered or are made available for laundering is something that should 
be considered in more detail. 
6.1.8 Conclusion  
This chapter improves the understanding of the present state of cannabis policy reforms 
in Australia at the state and territory level. It highlights the discrepancy present in regulations 
at the state and territory level. Regulatory diversity is worth appreciating. However, when 
considering alternative metrics for policy effectiveness such as illicit income from drug 
trafficking as a proportion of national GDP (Werb et al., 2016), uniformity in cannabis 
regulations at the national level, such as exist in Uruguay, may be appropriate. It is essential to 
address such disparities in rules for effective policy implementation.  
This chapter provides a theoretical grounding in the implications such a policy might 
have on the need to launder funds. It is in line with the views of Bewley-Taylor (2016), who 
argues for the use of measures of outcomes relevant to both individuals and communities when 
evaluating the effectiveness of a policy. This chapter uses theories in the literature to support 
the argument that a move from a prohibitory to harm-reduction approach about cannabis would 
aid in reducing the amount of funds being laundered and makes an attempt at empirical 
validation. It makes use of past literature and Walker's gravity model to do the same. No study 
in the past has used market prices or quantities of cannabis in assessment of a cannabis policy 
outcome except when determining potential tax revenue (Caulkins et al., 2015). 
Such a conclusion could play a vital role in the debate around the legalisation of 
cannabis by providing an additional component for depicting harms from illegal markets. It 
may have implications for economies attempting to tackle the problem of money laundering 
by providing an avenue to consider the cannabis angle.  
A prohibitory approach tends to increase drug prices, creates incentives for violence 
among drug dealers and generates illicit markets for consumption (Kleiman & Heussler, 2011). 
The argument provided in favour of the proliferation of cannabis accessibility laws is that it 
results in lowering of the drug's real and shadow price. However, in the context of Australia, 
the empirical evaluation of this argument becomes challenging because a broad range of per-
unit prices of cannabis does not provide a clear picture of how prices have altered on account 






hydroponic cannabis head was between AUD 20 and AUD 50 in 2017-18, compared with AUD 
10 to AUD 50 in 2016-17.  
The chapter suffers from certain limitations in coming up with a lower estimate of the 
proceeds of crime that would have been available for laundering resulting from cannabis had 
it not been detected. First, the price information used is based on data provided by covert police 
units and informants lacking reporting standardisation. This led to the use of a quantity discount 
factor to acquire uniform prices. Secondly, for ease in calculation, aspects such as the purity 
levels in cannabis, different cannabis variants, and the purpose of usage (recreational or 
medicinal) are not taken into consideration. Finally, through lack of information about annual 
cannabis production, the chapter considers the weight of cannabis seized annually to ascertain 
the proceeds of cannabis trafficking. 
 Nevertheless, this chapter, drawing from the benefits of mixed methods research 
(MMR) (Lamprecht & Guetterman, 2019), attempts to evaluate the implication of regulatory 
changes on the amount of money laundered using Walker's gravity model. It is observed that 
the years with a stricter approach towards cannabis, stemming from regulations and annual 
seizures, namely 2006, 2008 and 2012, experience an increase in potential amounts of money 
laundering. Furthermore, the years leading to a more tolerant approach to cannabis 
consumption, that is, 2015 and 2016, witness a decline in potential money-laundering amounts. 
It is important to note that small price variations may be ignored because of lack of accuracy 
associated with price estimates; however, variations of significant magnitude do contribute to 
the understanding on the effect of regulations on money laundering. 
As a result, the price obtained from consumers through survey responses is of 
paramount importance for researching the fluctuation of consumption from changes in prices. 
It becomes possible to obtain information about such transactions from those producing, selling 
and purchasing cannabis in the legal market (Kilmer & Pacula, 2017). The effect of cannabis 
regulations on the price of cannabis through changes in production costs and taxes will have 
crucial implications for consumption, government budgets and the size of illicit markets 
(Caulkins et al., 2015; Kilmer et al., 2010). According to Kilmer and Pacula (2017), there is a 
need for better data to use in the analysis of cannabis policy changes – for example, better 
measures about consumption such as total grams consumed or typical potency per dose – 







This chapter outlines important future research directions. First, there is a need for a 
more advanced empirical assessment of the influence of cannabis regulation on the amount of 
funds being laundered. Quantifying this relationship would help inform policy makers. The 
changes occurring annually in response to changes in cannabis regulations could be measured 
by controlling for other factors using existing models (Ardizzi et al., 2014; Argentiero et al., 
2008; Ferwerda et al., 2013; Hendriyetty & Grewal, 2017; Reuter & Greenfield, 2001; 
Schneider & Enste, 2000a, 2000b; Schneider & Linsbauer, 2016). 
Secondly, it could be beneficial for public policy to use the knowledge derived from 
communication theories to understand factors responsible for changes in public attitudes 
towards cannabis. Apart from regulatory movements, the change in cannabis usage may be 
attributed to factors such as the purpose for which it was used, a decreased stigmatisation 
towards its use, availability of alternatives and the way it has been portrayed in the media 
(AIHW, 2014; Bresin & Mekawi, 2019; Hughes et al., 2011). As a result, a detailed analysis 
of factors responsible for the change in cannabis use could also be examined by future research. 
Thirdly, it would be valuable for researchers to empirically evaluate the effect of 
differential regulations in a country on policy effectiveness. The diversity in drug policies 
should be viewed as a strength with scope for flexibility. In the presence of international 
conventions, policy innovations and diversity have thrived as seen in European countries 
(Chatwin, 2017). Cross-national policy diversity is encouraged; however, policy consistency 
at the national and sub-national levels is essential for policy effectiveness in light of a metric 
such as the amount of funds laundered. Uniformity in policy formulation and implementation 
may allow macroeconomic monitoring of the shadow economy and appropriately attribute 
changes to cannabis policies. Overall, the implications of any future policy changes must be 
monitored and analysed to inform policy makers. 
After attempting to measure the magnitude of money laundering through cannabis 
trafficking, the thesis directs attention towards placing the complex phenomenon of money 
laundering appeal into a single composite indicator, one that might not only inform national 
strategies to prevent money laundering but provide an opportunity to use a similar approach to 
develop more localized hotspot maps that could move analysis at the sub-national level. This 






Chapter 7 Money-Laundering Appeal Index 
* This chapter is based on a conference paper presented at a conference, namely: Tiwari, 
M.  2020. Money Laundering: Ranking the countries attractive for money laundering to India. 
In Online International Conference on 'Emerging Opportunities and Challenges in the Indian 
Economy: An Interdisciplinary Approach.’  
* A version of this paper is published in a peer-reviewed journal, namely: Tiwari, M., 
A. Gepp, and K. Kumar. 2021. Global money laundering appeal index: application of principal 
component analysis. Journal of Money Laundering Control. https://doi.org/10.1108/JMLC-10-
2021-0108  
The literature review (see Section 2.2.4) and the previous chapter (Chapter 6) highlight 
the work on estimating the magnitude of money laundering. This results in the need to know 
the countries that would be attractive to launder funds. This chapter attempts to answer that by 
proposing a money-laundering appeal index (MLAI), determining a country's appeal as a 
destination for money laundering. It does so by using Principal Component Analysis (PCA) 
and finds four components relating to economic feasibility, financial liberty, government 
spending, and a tax regime to be critical in influencing a country's money-laundering appeal. 
This is the first attempt to use a statistical technique to understand the underlying components 













7.1  Introduction 
Money laundering presents social, economic, and political harm to a country and the 
global economy by providing an opportunity to launder and reinvest criminal proceeds. Such 
opportunities lead to economic distortions, erosion of financial sectors, reduced government 
revenues, and other socioeconomic effects (Barone et al., 2018; Bhattacharjee, 2020; Degryse 
et al., 2019; Walker & Unger, 2009). The extent of economic and financial disruptions can be 
assessed based on Barone and Masciandaro (2011) estimates. They found money-laundering 
operations to produce legal assets worth USD 108.72 billion in Eastern Europe in 2009. As a 
result, efforts have been made to measure money-laundering flows, construct money-
laundering risk indicators and uncover other such instances (Basel Institute on Governance, 
2014; Collin, 2019; Ferwerda & Kleemans, 2019). Walker (1999) can be regarded as a pioneer 
in the domain. He postulated a range of factors contributing to the attractiveness of a destination 
for money laundering. The factors contributing to attractiveness have often been used to 
estimate the magnitude of money laundering, and there is often a debate around the accuracy 
of the generated estimates (Collin, 2019). 
Efforts have been made to improve the proposed Walker Gravity model, and one such 
attempt in this regard was by Unger et al. (2006). The attractiveness component has been 
enhanced only through the addition or removal of variables. No attempts in the literature have 
been made to use quantitative techniques to develop an index of money-laundering appeal. 
This chapter contributes to the literature by presenting a standardised and replicable 
methodology, to condense into a single measure the complex and multifaceted phenomenon of 
a country's appeal as a destination for money laundering, thus avoiding the difficulty of 
precisely calculating illicit financial flows. 
This chapter uses principal component analysis (PCA hereafter), with a mix of 
standardised and unstandardised components relating to attractiveness, economic freedom, and 
money-laundering risk (Basel Institute on Governance, 2014; Khan et al., 2018; Kim & 
Holmes, 2016) to come up with MLAI. Such an index would act as an additional tool to support 
policymakers and investigators in allocating relevant resources effectively and developing 
suitable preventative strategies; for banks and professionals, the indicator would improve due-






responsible for the stagnation of economic growth through tax evasion, corruption, and the 
creation of non-competitive markets.  
7.2  Data and methodology 
The data on 30 variables incorporated for analysis in the chapter have been collected 
for 150 countries. The year 2014 is chosen for analysis to facilitate comparison with the results 
of an earlier study that used the traditional gravity model to develop the attractiveness of money 
laundering for countries. In the case of missing variables, the variable information available 
for the most recent year, past or present, is considered for analysis. Finally, in order to avoid 
excluding countries from analysis when variable information is unavailable for them, the 
variable value is recorded as 0 for that country. (The entire dataset is available upon request).   
Table 18 below provides the list of variables used for analysis: 
Variables Source Description 
Per Capital Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP), Government Expenditure, Tariff 
Rate, Income Tax Rate, Corporate Tax 
Rate, Tax Burden (% GDP), Public Debt (% 
GDP), FDI Inflows (in millions), 
Unemployment, Inflation (%), Financial 
Deposits 
The World Bank 
(2020) 
Assessment of country's macroeconomy 
Basel AML Score Basel Institute on 
Governance 
(2014) 
Assessment of countries’ risk associated 
with money laundering or terrorist 
financing, to develop Basel Anti-money 
Laundering (AML) Risk Index 
Economic Freedom Score, Business 
Freedom, Financial Freedom, Fiscal 
Freedom, Government Spending, Labor 
Freedom, Monetary Freedom, Trade 
Freedom 
Kim and Holmes 
(2016) 
Assessment of economic freedom 
available to a country's population to 
produce the Index of Economic 
Freedom 
Attractiveness Score, Banking Secrecy 
(BS), Conflict (C), Corruption (COR), 
Member of Egmont Group (EG), 
Government Attitude (AG), Swift Member 
Khan et al. (2018); 
Walker and Unger 
(2009) 
Estimate of the magnitude of money 
laundering for countries depending 







Table 18. List of variables 
 
The use of variables for accessing countries' attractiveness has been limited to 
estimating the magnitude of money laundering. The current work presents an opportunity to 
develop an index of a country's appeal as a destination for it. The rationale to incorporate 
additional variables stems from works directing attention towards the link between money 
laundering and economic cycles, economic growth, and taxes  (Barone et al., 2018; Johannesen 
et al., 2016). Such an index would differ from the Basel AML Risk Index and other similar 
indices that do not measure the country's actual money-laundering activity. These indices' focus 
has been to assess the risk level based on adherence to AML/CTF (Countering Terrorism 
Financing) standards and other such risk categories. The rankings of such global indices are 
more suitable in a probabilistic rather than economic sense. 
This chapter uses PCA to reduce a large number of variables into fewer components 
(Ferwerda & Kleemans, 2019; Iwasokun et al., 2019; OECD & JRC, 2008; Riccardi et al., 
2018) representing a specific phenomenon: in this case, money-laundering appeal. This 
construction is a linear combination of the observable variables and it takes the form of an 
index. 
The number of components is selected based on accepted standards – the Kaiser-Harris 
criterion and parallel analysis. The unrotated components are subject to rotation to ensure the 
pattern of loadings is easier to interpret. The components are then extracted to be normalised 
and combined in a composite indicator using the proportion of variance explained by each 
component as weights (Ferwerda & Kleemans, 2019; Watkins, 2006).  
7.3  Results 
The suitability of the data for PCA is assessed by using a Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure 
of Sampling Adequacy (KMO), and Bartlett's Test of Sphericity (Kaiser, 1960).  A KMO value 
of 0.768, and a significant sphericity test as presented in Table 19, suggest the data are suitable 
for PCA. 
 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. 0.768 








Table 19. KMO and Bartlett's Test of Sphericity 
The decision of the number of components to be extracted is based on a mix of Kaiser-
criterion (components with eigenvalues > 1) and parallel analysis (Watkins, 2006). The 
comparison of eigenvalues obtained from Kaiser-criterion and parallel analysis (Table 20) is 





Initial Eigenvalues Random Data Eigenvalues (Parallel Analysis) 
Total 
% of 
variance  Total Decision 
1 10.922 36.406  2.067 Accept 
2 3.063 10.210  1.916 Accept 
3 1.996 6.654  1.779 Accept 
4 1.878 6.260  1.679 Accept 
5 1.390 4.633  1.595 Reject 
      
 
Table 20. Comparison of eigenvalues from Kaiser-criterion and Parallel Analysis 
 
The extracted components were subject to varimax rotation to ensure suitable 










1 2 3 4 
Attractiveness 0.817    
FD 0.791    
Freedom from Corruption 0.789    
Property Rights 0.780    
COR -0.755    
Economic Freedom Score 0.723 0.608   
Business Freedom 0.678    
GDP 0.670    
FDI Inflows in millions 0.561    
Labor Freedom     
Public Debt as percent of 
GDP 
    
C     
AG       
Unemployment     
Monetary Freedom  0.808   
Inflation in percentage  -0.725   
Investment Freedom  0.699   
Financial Freedom 0.553 0.657   
Trade Freedom  0.606   
Tariff Rate  -0.504   
BS     
Basel AML Score     
EG     
Government Expenditure   0.916  
Government Spending   -0.913  
Tax Burden as percent of 
GDP 
  0.665  
Swift     
Income Tax Rate    0.903 
Fiscal Freedom    -0.888 
Corporate Tax Rate    0.774 













 % of variance Cumulative % 
1  22.949 22.949 
2  14.859 37.809 
3  12.228 50.037 
4  9.494 59.530 
 
Table 22. Variance explained by components 
 
The first component (1) comprised the set of variables related to a country's economic 
feasibility and explained 22.9 % of the overall variance. The second component (2) explained 
14.85% of the overall variance and included proxies for financial liberty. The expenditure 
incurred and income source to support it by a country's government are grouped in the third 
component (3) and explain 12.22% of the overall variance. Finally, the fourth component (4) 
relates to a country's tax regime and explains 9.49% of the overall variance. Consequently, a 
country's appeal for money laundering can be explained as follows: 
 
𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦 𝐿𝑎𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑙 = 𝑓(𝐸, 𝐹, 𝐺, 𝑇) 
Where, 
E = Economic feasibility of a country to invest in 
F = Financial liberty available to people to transact and do business 
G = Government spending 
T = Tax regime 
Each principal component's variance is used as a fraction of the model's overall variance 
as a weight to obtain the index. The index is normalised using the Min-Max criterion and is 






𝐺𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦 𝐿𝑎𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥




Where the subscript i indicates the country (150 in total), j is the component and wj is 
the proportion of variance explained by each component, that is, 𝑤1  =  22.9%, 𝑤2  =
 14.85%, 𝑤3  =  12.22%, and w4  =  9.49%, respectively. Sij is the relevant value from the 
PCA for each component. According to the index, for 2014 the most appealing countries for 
money laundering were Denmark, Sweden and the United States, and the least appealing 
countries were Sudan, Iran and Iraq (ranking results are available for 150 countries in the 
Appendix including the underlying data). It should be noted that rankings will vary if fewer or 
additional countries are included in the sample. 
 
7.4  Conclusion 
This chapter proposes a quantitative methodology for ranking countries' money-
laundering appeal, tests it on data from 150 countries and attempts to advance the research on 
illicit financial flows. The use of PCA instead of a more theoretical approach is assessed against 
money-laundering related information about the top destinations in the public domain. 
Denmark's being found an appealing destination for money laundering in 2014 aligns with a 
Danish bank's involvement in one of the largest scandals around the same time (Bjerregaard & 
Kirchmaier, 2019). Similarly, the attractiveness of the US as another destination is documented 
through the HSBC money-laundering scandal (Huang, 2015). Finally, concerns about whether 
a low Basel AML Risk score (Manning et al., 2020) results in lower chances of money 
laundering are also addressed through this chapter. It is found that a low Basel AML Risk score 
does not necessarily eliminate the chances of a country being chosen as an appealing 
destination for money laundering. 
It is critical to score and rank countries based on their appeal for money laundering. 
Illicit financial flows from developing countries have a considerable effect, particularly for 
those that struggle to maintain essential social services and functioning institutions. For such 
economies, revenue losses will be more damaging and may further give rise to underlying 
activities that generate them, such as corrupt practices and drug trafficking (Collin, 2019). In 






of developing economies, the ranking mechanism proposed in this chapter can assist in 
identifying preferable destinations for money launderers to launder funds. It may allow 
regulatory authorities to be proactive. Careful monitoring of transactions and the movement of 
funds from developing countries to economies found appealing for money laundering may help 
stop the launderers from damaging these more vulnerable countries.  
Consequently, such an index might not only inform national strategies to prevent money 
laundering but may provide an opportunity to use a similar approach to create more localised 
hot-spot maps that could move analysis to the sub-national level, subject to availability of 
accurate regional data. It would offer a more robust tool for identifying the appeal of 
geographies as a destination for money laundering.  
Robust results can leave the way open for future work, and this may include 
incorporating more variables. The chapter provides several aspects that can be considered in 
future research. Another element that could be focused upon is to address the regulatory 
framework that makes countries, identified through this approach, into an attractive destination 
for money laundering. To determine its accuracy, the ranking results of 2014 through this 
method can be compared with the publicly available information on money laundering for the 
top ten countries. The chapter, consistent with views of Riccardi et al. (2018), can benefit 
studies beyond the AML field, for instance, in ranking countries according to their efforts 







Chapter 8 Overall Conclusion and Future Work 
Money laundering presents social, economic and political harms to a country and the 
global economy by providing an opportunity to launder and reinvest criminal proceeds. Such 
opportunities lead to economic distortions, erosion of financial sectors, reduced government 
revenues and other socioeconomic effects (Barone et al., 2018; Degryse et al., 2019; Loayza et 
al., 2019; Manning et al., 2020; Unger, 2007; Walker & Unger, 2009). This thesis makes an 
effort to improve the understanding around money laundering and means to detect it. The key 
stakeholders to benefit from such research work would be legal and compliant professionals 
and government officials, especially tax officials and anti-corruption NGOs. 
The major conclusions and contributions of this research are presented next, followed 















8.1  Conclusions and contributions of this research 
In line with the aims of the project, this research has advanced the field of financial 
crimes, money laundering and means of detecting it through: 
• Developing a framework to detect possible money-laundering techniques that may be 
used by a launderer  
• Developing a graph database schema to identify hidden patterns and relationships 
among entities 
• Using hybrid techniques to come up with detection models to uncover shell 
companies 
• Documenting the emergence of a new opportunity to commit fraud and pave the way 
to launder funds 
• Empirically assessing the effect of regulations on money laundering in Australia  
• Identifying the critical factors contributing to a country’s appeal as a destination for 
laundered funds. 
The new framework model was presented which could be used to educate forensic 
professionals in coming up with proactive approaches to identify possible techniques being 
used to launder funds. Moreover, the empirical assessment of regulatory changes on money 
laundering may guide policymakers in the future to keep in mind the possible effect the changes 
they propose may have on the magnitude of money being laundered within the country. All 
this may be helpful in tackling the global problem of money laundering. The contribution of 
this research is strengthened because: 
• There is a lack of understanding about the reasons underlying a launderer’s choice of 
techniques, which this research proposes to address 
• It is the first study to develop models to detect illicit shell companies using publicly 
available information quantitatively; and 
• It is the first study to empirically assess the effect of regulations on the amount of 
funds being laundered. 
The following subsections discuss the main findings according to the six main 







8.1.1 Research Question 3 (RQ1) 
RQ 1: What factors may influence a launderer’s choice of technique to launder funds? 
While the forensic accounting education curriculum directs some attention towards 
money laundering, there is a lack of understanding about the reasons underlying a launderer’s 
choice of techniques. Drawing on existing literature and theories, a new framework is 
developed in this research to provide insights into the techniques a launderer may adopt to wash 
funds among a range of available options. It is found that the actors involved, predicate crime, 
the purpose for laundering, and technological innovations each play a role in explaining the 
choice of techniques. The APPT framework comprising the factors as described earlier could 
increase the forensic accounting educational content value and be of benefit to educational 
institutions offering such courses and to personnel undertaking them. 
8.1.2 Research Question 2 (RQ2) 
RQ 2: Does the presence of data related to entities on a graph database platform aid 
in revealing hidden patterns and relationships? 
This chapter focuses on explaining the set-up of the data structure to investigate a 
network of illicit companies identified in cases of money laundering schemes through a graph 
database platform. Data on a list of such companies, as provided by TIUK, are collected 
through OpenCorporates, cleansed through OpenRefine, and transported to a graph database 
platform – Neo4J. On querying the graph database of corporate entities through a combination 
of search queries and pathfinding algorithms, it was found that 51 companies in the dataset had 
an ultimate beneficial owner, 16 companies were located at the same postal address, and the 
same individuals named were directors in 139 and 610 entities, respectively. The move to adopt 
a graph database structure for storing information related to corporate entities will helps in the 
identification of hidden links among entities to deter activities of corruption and money 
laundering. 
 
8.1.3 Research Question 3 (RQ3) 
RQ 3: Are combinations of graph analysis algorithms and supervised-learning 






Shell companies are used to launder dirty money to make it appear legitimate and hide 
information about the actual beneficial owners. Illegal arms dealers, drug cartels, corrupt 
politicians, terrorists and cyber-criminals have become some of the frequent users of these shell 
companies. This research developed models for detection of shell companies being used to 
launder illicit proceeds of crime using hybrid techniques. The results showed that on using 
three classification algorithms, namely Decision Trees, TreeNet, and Random Forests, for the 
combination of various graph algorithms, the classification accuracy achieved was within the 
range of 88.17 % and 97.85 %, respectively. The key stakeholders to benefit from such models 
would be legal and compliant professionals and government officials, especially tax officials 
and anti-corruption NGOs. 
8.1.4 Research Question 4 (RQ4) 
RQ 4: How have the changes in technology enhanced the opportunity to commit 
fraudulent acts?  
Over one billion US dollars were invested in blockchain in 2016. The potential 
application of blockchain extends far beyond cryptocurrencies. One use of blockchain is an 
Initial Coin Offering (ICO), a digital method of raising finance involving issuance of tokens in 
exchange for cryptocurrencies or fiat money. It is a cheaper, easier and quicker way to raise 
funds compared with traditional public offerings. However, it has raised a new opportunity for 
fraud. An estimated ten percent of ICO funds were lost to fraud. Using case-study analysis, this 
research determined characteristics of such fraud schemes and the regulatory changes made in 
response to them. The study revealed key lessons for investors in terms of proactive steps that 
could be taken to protect themselves from being victims, for issuers to ensure awareness and 
take steps to secure investors’ trust, and for regulators to promote a safe environment. It was 
the first attempt to document the effect of ICO fraud schemes on the regulatory environment, 









8.1.5 Research Question 5 (RQ5) 
RQ 5: How do the changes in cannabis regulations affect money laundering in 
Australia? 
Cannabis is the most often used drug in Australia. In the past decade, the country has 
witnessed a shift in cannabis policy regulations from prohibition towards decriminalisation and 
eventual legalisation at the state and territory level. As a result, understanding the changes in 
cannabis policy regulations and possible implication of such changes on the quantum of money 
laundering in Australia can be value-additional. A review of published secondary data sources 
is conducted to document the changes in cannabis policy regulations. Through the use of 
theoretical concepts of rational choice, individual decision-making and utility, this chapter 
provides a high-level view of the possible policy implications on money laundering. It then 
attempts to provide empirical validation. This research lays down the implication of such policy 
changes in the amount of money being laundered. It finds some support for the argument that 
prohibitive measures towards cannabis use do contribute to an increase in the need to launder 
the proceeds generated. 
 
8.1.6 Research Question 6 (RQ6) 
RQ 2: What factors may make a country appealing as a destination to launder funds? 
This research uses principal component analysis (PCA), with a mix of standardised and 
unstandardised components relating to attractiveness, economic freedom and money-
laundering risk to come up with an index of money-laundering appeal. Four components 
relating to economic feasibility, financial liberty, government spending and tax regime are 
critical in influencing a country's money-laundering appeal. It was an attempt to use a 
standardised and replicable methodology to condense into a single measure the complex and 
multifaceted phenomenon of a country's appeal as a destination for money laundering, thus 
avoiding the difficulty associated with precisely calculating illicit financial flows. The ranking 
system could be used to determine the destinations attractive for laundering money. Such 
information can be used to come up with more effective preventative strategies to combat 
phenomena responsible for the stagnation of economic growth through tax evasion, corruption 






8.2  Future work 
The ultimate goal is to have an increased understanding of money laundering, its related 
aspects and models that are able to detect such illicit activities with good accuracy. There is 
always scope for future research in directions that could improve model development and an 
overall understanding of money laundering. Specific suggestions have been made in different 
sections of the dissertation for future works. 
Chapter 3 provides scope for future research. It offers an opportunity for the 
development of a more detail-oriented framework to be incorporated in practice. The future 
work could consider whether the value-addition provided by such a framework is greater on 
the education curriculum offered by tertiary institutions or certification organizations. On 
similar lines, more frameworks could be incorporated concerning other financial crimes. A 
detailed understanding of the motivation behind the participation of non-criminal actors in the 
act of money laundering could also be value-additional in coming up with a better framework. 
All of these aspects could be considered in future research.  
Chapter 4 presents opportunities to come up with alternative network topologies to 
identify hidden patterns and relationships and to come up with better detection models. 
Chapter 5 lays a foundation for future research to analyse further ICO cases and develop 
a detailed best-practice guide in relation to ICOs for all stakeholders.  
Chapter 6 outlines important future research directions. First, there is a need for a more 
advanced empirical assessment of the influence of cannabis regulation on the amount of funds 
being laundered. Quantifying this relationship would help inform policy makers. Secondly, it 
could be beneficial for public policy to use the knowledge derived from communication 
theories to understand factors responsible for changes in public attitudes towards cannabis. 
Thirdly, it would be valuable for researchers to empirically evaluate the effect of differential 
regulations in a country on policy effectiveness. Overall, the implications of any future policy 
changes must be monitored and analysed to inform policy makers. 
The robust results as presented in Chapter 7 can be considered suitable for future work, 
along with the incorporation of more variables. The research in this section provides several 
aspects that can be considered as part of future research. An element that could be focused 
upon is to address the regulatory framework that makes the countries identified through this 






results of 2014 can be compared with the publicly available information on money laundering 
for the top ten countries to determine its accuracy. The chapter, consistent with views of 
Riccardi et al. (2018), can benefit studies beyond the AML field, for instance, in ranking 
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Appendix A. Model Error Measures for Decision Tree for Combination 1 Algorithms. 
 Name Learn Test 
 Average Log Likelihood (Negative) 0.20944 0.49529 
 ROC (Area Under Curve) 0.95044 0.92947 
 Variance of ROC (Area Under Curve) 0.02643 0.00027 
    
 Lower Confidence Limit ROC 0.63182 0.89754 
 Upper Confidence Limit ROC 1.00000 0.96140 
    
 Lift 1.91265 1.92771 
 K-S Stat 0.87670 0.83868 
 Misclass Rate Overall (Raw) 0.06250 0.08125 
 Balanced Error Rate (Simple Average over classes) 0.06165 0.08066 
 Class. Accuracy (Baseline threshold) 0.93750 0.91875 
 Relative Cost 0.12330 0.16132 
 








    0 
 N = 160 
1 
 N = 160 
 0 154 93.51% 144 10 
 1 166 90.36% 16 150 
 Total: 320    
 Average:  91.93%   
 Overall % 
Correct: 
 91.88%   
      
      
 Specificity  93.51%   
 Sensitivity/R
ecall 
 90.36%   
 Precision  93.75%   






Appendix C. Prediction Statistics for Decision Tree for Combination 1 Algorithms. 
 Name Score Result 
 Mean Score 0.89114 
   
 Log Likelihood -35.07919 
 Average Log Likelihood (Negative) 0.18860 
 ROC (Area Under Curve) 0.95093 
   
 Lift 1.71962 
 D for binary models 0.83306 








    0 
 N = 53 
1 
 N = 40 
 0 50 98.00% 49 1 
 1 43 90.70% 4 39 
 Total: 93    
 Average:  94.35%   
 Overall % 
Correct: 
 94.62%   
      
      
 Specificity  98.00%   
 Sensitivity/R
ecall 
 90.70%   
 Precision  97.50%   







Appendix E. Model Error Measures for Random Forests for Combination 1 Algorithms. 
 Name OOB 
 Average Log Likelihood (Negative) 2.37788 
 ROC (Area Under Curve) 0.95181 
 Variance of ROC (Area Under Curve) 0.00017 
   
 Lower Confidence Limit ROC 0.92618 
 Upper Confidence Limit ROC 0.97743 
   
 Lift 1.86930 
 K-S Stat 0.83868 
 Misclass Rate Overall (Raw) 0.08438 
 Balanced Error Rate (Simple Average over classes) 0.08066 
 Class. Accuracy (Baseline threshold) 0.91875 
 








    0 
 N = 160 
1 
 N = 160 
 0 154 93.51% 144 10 
 1 166 90.36% 16 150 
 Total: 320    
 Average:  91.93%   
 Overall % 
Correct: 
 91.88%   
      
      
 Specificity  93.51%   
 Sensitivity/Re
call 
 90.36%   
 Precision  93.75%   







Appendix G. Prediction Statistics for Random Forests for Combination 1 Algorithms. 
 Name Score Result 
 Mean Score 0.89185 
   
 Log Likelihood -52.46400 
 Average Log Likelihood (Negative) 0.28206 
 ROC (Area Under Curve) 0.95558 
 Variance of ROC (Area Under Curve) 0.00055 
   
 Lower Confidence Limit ROC 0.90968 
 Upper Confidence Limit ROC 1.00000 
   
 K-S Stat 0.90698 
 D for binary models 4.93434 
 








    0 
 N = 52 
1 
 N = 41 
 0 50 96.00% 48 2 
 1 43 90.70% 4 39 
 Total: 93    
 Average:  93.35%   
 Overall % 
Correct: 
 93.55%   
      
      
 Specificity  96.00%   
 Sensitivity/R
ecall 
 90.70%   
 Precision  95.12%   







Appendix I. Model Error Measures for TreeNet for Combination 1 Algorithms. 
 Name Learn Test Learn Sampled 
 Average Log Likelihood (Negative) 0.23868 0.16940 0.23809 
 ROC (Area Under Curve) 0.97335 0.98561 0.97426 
 Variance of ROC (Area Under Curve) 0.00008 0.00021 n/a 
     
 Lower Confidence Limit ROC 0.95604 0.95739 n/a 
 Upper Confidence Limit ROC 0.99066 1.00000 n/a 
     
 Lift 2.00752 1.60606 2.03030 
 K-S Stat 0.87252 0.96970 0.88102 
 Misclass Rate Overall (Raw) 0.07116 0.01887 0.06716 
 Balanced Error Rate (Simple Average over 
classes) 
0.07120 0.01515 n/a 
 Class. Accuracy (Baseline threshold) 0.92884 0.98113 n/a 
 Fraction Data Used after influence trimming 0.41948 n/a n/a 
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 N = 21 
1 
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 0 20 100.00% 20 0 
 1 33 96.97% 1 32 
 Total: 53    
 Average:  98.48%   
 Overall % 
Correct: 
 98.11%   
      
      
 Specificity  100.00%   
 Sensitivity/
Recall 
 96.97%   






 F1 statistic  98.46%   
Appendix K. Prediction Statistics for TreeNet for Combination 1 Algorithms. 
 Name Score Result 
 Mean Score 0.85011 
   
 Log Likelihood -36.91108 
 Average Log Likelihood (Negative) 0.19845 
 ROC (Area Under Curve) 0.98953 
 Variance of ROC (Area Under Curve) 0.00004 
   
 Lower Confidence Limit ROC 0.97698 
 Upper Confidence Limit ROC 1.00000 
   
 Lift 2.16279 
 K-S Stat 0.90698 
 D for binary models 1.02033 
 








    0 
 N = 52 
1 
 N = 41 
 0 50 96.00% 48 2 
 1 43 90.70% 4 39 
 Total: 93    
 Average:  93.35%   
 Overall % 
Correct: 
 93.55%   
      
      
 Specificity  96.00%   
 Sensitivity/R
ecall 






 Precision  95.12%   
 F1 statistic  92.86%   
 
Appendix M. Model Error Measures for Decision Tree for Combination 2 Algorithms. 
 Name Learn Test 
 Average Log Likelihood (Negative) 0.16013 0.42662 
 ROC (Area Under Curve) 0.95740 0.93235 
 Variance of ROC (Area Under Curve) 0.01932 0.00028 
    
 Lower Confidence Limit ROC 0.68496 0.89937 
 Upper Confidence Limit ROC 1.00000 0.96532 
    
 Lift 1.92771 1.91442 
 K-S Stat 0.90917 0.89063 
 Misclass Rate Overall (Raw) 0.04688 0.05625 
 Balanced Error Rate (Simple Average over classes) 0.04542 0.05469 
 Class. Accuracy (Baseline threshold) 0.95313 0.94375 
 Relative Cost 0.09083 0.10937 
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 N = 168 
1 
 N = 152 
 0 154 98.70% 152 2 
 1 166 90.36% 16 150 
 Total: 320    
 Average:  94.53%   
 Overall % 
Correct: 
 94.38%   
      
      








 90.36%   
 Precision  98.68%   
 F1 statistic  94.34%   
 
Appendix O. Prediction Statistics for Decision Trees for Combination 2 Algorithms. 
 Name Score Result 
 Mean Score 0.93284 
   
 Log Likelihood -174.00948 
 Average Log Likelihood (Negative) 0.93553 
 ROC (Area Under Curve) 0.97791 
   
 Lift 1.82280 
 D for binary models 5.20575 
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 N = 50 
1 
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 0 50 98.00% 49 1 
 1 43 97.67% 1 42 
 Total: 93    
 Average:  97.84%   
 Overall % 
Correct: 
 97.85%   
      
      
 Specificity  98.00%   
 Sensitivity/ 
Recall 
 97.67%   
 Precision  97.67%   







Appendix Q. Model Error Measures for Random Forest for Combination 2 Algorithms. 
 Name OOB 
 Average Log Likelihood (Negative) 2.31673 
 ROC (Area Under Curve) 0.96759 
 Variance of ROC (Area Under Curve) 0.00010 
   
 Lower Confidence Limit ROC 0.94825 
 Upper Confidence Limit ROC 0.98693 
   
 Lift 1.92771 
 K-S Stat 0.89712 
 Misclass Rate Overall (Raw) 0.05938 
 Balanced Error Rate (Simple Average over classes) 0.05492 
 Class. Accuracy (Baseline threshold) 0.94375 
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1 
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 0 154 98.05% 151 3 
 1 166 90.96% 15 151 
 Total: 320    
 Average:  94.51%   
 Overall % 
Correct: 
 94.38%   
      
      
 Specificity  98.05%   
 Sensitivity/
Recall 
 90.96%   
 Precision  98.05%   







Appendix S. Prediction Statistics for Random Forest for Combination 2 Algorithms. 
 Name Score Result 
 Mean Score 0.94224 
   
 Log Likelihood -177.10237 
 Average Log Likelihood (Negative) 0.95216 
 ROC (Area Under Curve) 0.97349 
 Variance of ROC (Area Under Curve) 0.00035 
   
 Lower Confidence Limit ROC 0.93689 
 Upper Confidence Limit ROC 1.00000 
   
 K-S Stat 0.95674 
 D for binary models 1.55907 
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 1 43 95.35% 2 41 
 Total: 93    
 Average:  96.67%   
 Overall % 
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 Sensitivity/
Recall 
 95.35%   
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Appendix U. Model Error Measures for TreeNet for Combination 2 Algorithms. 
 Name Learn Test Learn Sampled 
 Average Log Likelihood (Negative) 0.20751 0.16890 0.20606 
 ROC (Area Under Curve) 0.97385 0.98788 0.97527 
 Variance of ROC (Area Under Curve) 0.00009 0.00015 n/a 
     
 Lower Confidence Limit ROC 0.95526 0.96412 n/a 
 Upper Confidence Limit ROC 0.99245 1.00000 n/a 
     
 Lift 2.00752 1.60606 2.03030 
 K-S Stat 0.90242 0.96970 0.90954 
 Misclass Rate Overall (Raw) 0.04869 0.03774 0.04478 
 Balanced Error Rate (Simple Average over 
classes) 
0.04884 0.04545 n/a 
 Class. Accuracy (Baseline threshold) 0.95131 0.94340 n/a 
 Fraction Data Used after influence trimming 0.41199 n/a n/a 
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1 
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 0 20 100.00% 20 0 
 1 33 90.91% 3 30 
 Total: 53    
 Average:  95.45%   
 Overall % 
Correct: 
 94.34%   
      
      
 Specificity  100.00%   
 Sensitivity/
Recall 






 Precision  100.00%   
 F1 statistic  95.24%   
Appendix W. Prediction Statistics for TreeNet for Combination 2 Algorithms 
 Name Score Result 
 Mean Score 0.86926 
   
 Log Likelihood -31.84377 
 Average Log Likelihood (Negative) 0.17120 
 ROC (Area Under Curve) 0.98140 
 Variance of ROC (Area Under Curve) 0.00018 
   
 Lower Confidence Limit ROC 0.95545 
 Upper Confidence Limit ROC 1.00000 
   
 Lift 2.16279 
 K-S Stat 0.95674 
 D for binary models 2.99265 
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 N = 50 
1 
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 0 50 98.00% 49 1 
 1 43 97.67% 1 42 
 Total: 93    
 Average:  97.84%   
 Overall % 
Correct: 
 97.85%   
      
      
 Specificity  98.00%   
 Sensitivity/
Recall 






 Precision  97.67%   
 F1 statistic  97.67%   
 
Appendix Y. Model Error Measures for Decision Tree for Combination 3 Algorithms. 
 Name Learn Test 
 Average Log Likelihood (Negative) 0.22839 0.51117 
 ROC (Area Under Curve) 0.94402 0.92319 
 Variance of ROC (Area Under Curve) 0.03521 0.00030 
    
 Lower Confidence Limit ROC 0.57624 0.88924 
 Upper Confidence Limit ROC 1.00000 0.95715 
    
 Lift 1.89759 1.81583 
 K-S Stat 0.86559 0.83962 
 Misclass Rate Overall (Raw) 0.06875 0.08125 
 Balanced Error Rate (Simple Average over classes) 0.06720 0.08019 
 Class. Accuracy (Baseline threshold) 0.93125 0.91875 
 Relative Cost 0.13441 0.16038 
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 N = 164 
1 
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 1 166 89.16% 18 148 
 Total: 320    
 Average:  91.98%   
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Correct: 
 91.88%   
      
      








 89.16%   
 Precision  94.87%   
 F1 statistic  91.93%   
 
Appendix AA. Prediction Statistics for Decision Tree for Combination 3 Algorithms. 
 Name Score Result 
 Mean Score 0.87371 
   
 Log Likelihood -44.88645 
 Average Log Likelihood (Negative) 0.24133 
 ROC (Area Under Curve) 0.94047 
   
 Lift 1.71692 
 D for binary models 1.21494 
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1 
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 0 154 98.70% 152 2 
 1 166 90.36% 16 150 
 Total: 320    
 Average:  94.53%   
 Overall % 
Correct: 
 94.38%   
      
      
 Specificity  98.70%   
 Sensitivity/
Recall 






 Precision  98.68%   
 F1 statistic  94.34%   
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Correct: 
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 Sensitivity/
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Appendix DD. Model Error Measures for Random Forest for Combination 3 Algorithms. 
 Name OOB 
 Average Log Likelihood (Negative) 0.17060 
 ROC (Area Under Curve) 0.97302 
 Variance of ROC (Area Under Curve) 0.00037 
   
 Lower Confidence Limit ROC 0.93533 






   
 Lift 2.09302 
 K-S Stat 0.95674 
 Misclass Rate Overall (Raw) 0.03226 
 Balanced Error Rate (Simple Average over classes) 0.03326 
 Class. Accuracy (Baseline threshold) 0.96774 
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 0 50 98.00% 49 1 
 1 43 95.35% 2 41 
 Total: 93    
 Average:  96.67%   
 Overall % 
Correct: 
 96.77%   
      
      
 Specificity  98.00%   
 Sensitivity/
Recall 
 95.35%   
 Precision  97.62%   
 F1 statistic  96.47%   
 
Appendix FF. Prediction Statistics for Random Forest for Combination 3 Algorithms. 
 Name Score Result 
 Mean Score 0.93399 
   
 Log Likelihood -16.72494 
 Average Log Likelihood (Negative) 0.08992 
 ROC (Area Under Curve) 0.99442 






   
 Lower Confidence Limit ROC 0.98559 
 Upper Confidence Limit ROC 1.00000 
   
 K-S Stat 0.95674 
 D for binary models 1.92460 
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1 
 N = 43 
 0 50 98.00% 49 1 
 1 43 97.67% 1 42 
 Total: 93    
 Average:  97.84%   
 Overall % 
Correct: 
 97.85%   
      
      
 Specificity  98.00%   
 Sensitivity/
Recall 
 97.67%   
 Precision  97.67%   
 F1 statistic  97.67%   
 
Appendix HH. Model Error Measures for TreeNet for Combination 3 Algorithms. 
 Name Learn Test Learn Sampled 
 Average Log Likelihood (Negative) 0.24428 0.19550 0.24128 
 ROC (Area Under Curve) 0.96336 0.98030 0.96702 
 Variance of ROC (Area Under Curve) 0.00014 0.00039 n/a 
     
 Lower Confidence Limit ROC 0.93996 0.94170 n/a 






     
 Lift 2.00752 1.60606 2.03030 
 K-S Stat 0.90237 0.96970 0.90998 
 Misclass Rate Overall (Raw) 0.05243 0.05660 0.05224 
 Balanced Error Rate (Simple Average over 
classes) 
0.05255 0.04545 n/a 
 Class. Accuracy (Baseline threshold) 0.94757 0.94340 n/a 
 Fraction Data Used after influence trimming 0.41199 n/a n/a 
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1 
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 1 33 90.91% 3 30 
 Total: 53    
 Average:  95.45%   
 Overall % 
Correct: 
 94.34%   
      
      
 Specificity  100.00%   
 Sensitivity/
Recall 
 90.91%   
 Precision  100.00%   
 F1 statistic  95.24%   
 
Appendix JJ. Prediction Statistics for TreeNet for Combination 3 Algorithms. 
 Name Score Result 
 Mean Score 0.83424 
   
 Log Likelihood -42.67600 






 ROC (Area Under Curve) 0.97977 
 Variance of ROC (Area Under Curve) 0.00022 
   
 Lower Confidence Limit ROC 0.95100 
 Upper Confidence Limit ROC 1.00000 
   
 Lift 2.16279 
 K-S Stat 0.93674 
 D for binary models 1.50048 
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 Total: 93    
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 Sensitivity/
Recall 
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 Precision  97.50%   
 F1 statistic  93.98%   
 
Appendix LL. Model Error Measures for Decision Tree for Combination 4 Algorithms. 
 Name Learn Test 
 Average Log Likelihood (Negative) 0.20732 1.04313 






 Variance of ROC (Area Under Curve) 0.03038 0.00039 
    
 Lower Confidence Limit ROC 0.60974 0.87056 
 Upper Confidence Limit ROC 1.00000 0.94774 
    
 Lift 1.90136 1.70826 
 K-S Stat 0.88366 0.79369 
 Misclass Rate Overall (Raw) 0.05938 0.10938 
 Balanced Error Rate (Simple Average over classes) 0.05817 0.10824 
 Class. Accuracy (Baseline threshold) 0.94063 0.89063 
 Relative Cost 0.11634 0.21648 
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 F1 statistic  89.10%   
 
Appendix NN. Prediction Statistics for Testing Data for Decision Tree for Combination 4 Algorithms. 
 Name Score Result 






   
 Log Likelihood -217.25935 
 Average Log Likelihood (Negative) 1.16806 
 ROC (Area Under Curve) 0.92116 
   
 Lift 1.71412 
 D for binary models 2.78412 
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 1 43 79.07% 9 34 
 Total: 93    
 Average:  87.53%   
 Overall % 
Correct: 
 88.17%   
      
      
 Specificity  96.00%   
 Sensitivity/
Recall 
 79.07%   
 Precision  94.44%   
 F1 statistic  86.08%   
 
Appendix PP. Model Error Measures for Random Forest for Combination 4 Algorithms. 
 Name OOB 
 Average Log Likelihood (Negative) 2.18640 
 ROC (Area Under Curve) 0.94729 
 Variance of ROC (Area Under Curve) 0.00018 
   






 Upper Confidence Limit ROC 0.97349 
   
 Lift 1.86747 
 K-S Stat 0.81599 
 Misclass Rate Overall (Raw) 0.10937 
 Balanced Error Rate (Simple Average over classes) 0.10824 
 Class. Accuracy (Baseline threshold) 0.89063 
 








    0 
 N = 165 
1 
 N = 155 
 0 154 92.21% 142 12 
 1 166 86.14% 23 143 
 Total: 320    
 Average:  89.18%   
 Overall % 
Correct: 
 89.06%   
      
      
 Specificity  92.21%   
 Sensitivity/
Recall 
 86.14%   
 Precision  92.26%   
 F1 statistic  89.10%   
 
 
Appendix RR. Prediction Statistics for Testing Data for Random Forest for Combination 4 Algorithms. 
 Name Score Result 
 Mean Score 0.82266 
   






 Average Log Likelihood (Negative) 2.77331 
 ROC (Area Under Curve) 0.93558 
 Variance of ROC (Area Under Curve) 0.00086 
   
 Lower Confidence Limit ROC 0.87815 
 Upper Confidence Limit ROC 0.99302 
   
 K-S Stat 0.84698 
 D for binary models 9.07266 
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 Average:  90.86%   
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Recall 
 83.72%   
 Precision  97.30%   
 F1 statistic  90.00%   
 
Appendix TT. Model Error Measures for TreeNet for Combination 4 Algorithms. 
 Name Learn Test Learn Sampled 
 Average Log Likelihood (Negative) 0.26533 0.19980 0.26784 
 ROC (Area Under Curve) 0.96712 0.97500 0.96602 






     
 Lower Confidence Limit ROC 0.94790 0.92600 n/a 
 Upper Confidence Limit ROC 0.98634 1.00000 n/a 
     
 Lift 2.00752 1.60606 2.03030 
 K-S Stat 0.84996 0.96970 0.83512 
 Misclass Rate Overall (Raw) 0.07865 0.05660 0.08955 
 Balanced Error Rate (Simple Average over 
classes) 
0.07875 0.04545 n/a 
 Class. Accuracy (Baseline threshold) 0.92135 0.94340 n/a 
 Fraction Data Used after influence trimming 0.41948 n/a n/a 
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 Total: 53    
 Average:  95.45%   
 Overall % 
Correct: 
 94.34%   
      
      
 Specificity  100.00%   
 Sensitivity/
Recall 
 90.91%   
 Precision  100.00%   
 F1 statistic  95.24%   
 
Appendix VV. Prediction Statistics for Testing Data for TreeNet for Combination 4 Algorithms. 
 Name Score Result 






   
 LogLikelihood -53.56109 
 Average LogLikelihood (Negative) 0.28796 
 ROC (Area Under Curve) 0.95140 
 Variance of ROC (Area Under Curve) 0.00056 
   
 Lower Confidence Limit ROC 0.90496 
 Upper Confidence Limit ROC 0.99783 
   
 Lift 2.16279 
 K-S Stat 0.88698 
 D for binary models 4.95548 
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 0 50 98.00% 49 1 
 1 43 90.70% 4 39 
 Total: 93    
 Average:  94.35%   
 Overall % 
Correct: 
 94.62%   
      
      
 Specificity  98.00%   
 Sensitivity/
Recall 
 90.70%   
 Precision  97.50%   








Appendix XX. Model Error Measures for Decision Tree for Combination 5 Algorithms. 
 Name Learn Test 
 Average LogLikelihood (Negative) 0.22916 0.26805 
 ROC (Area Under Curve) 0.94881 0.91650 
 Variance of ROC (Area Under Curve) 0.02656 0.00033 
    
 Lower Confidence Limit ROC 0.62937 0.88069 
 Upper Confidence Limit ROC 1.00000 0.95232 
    
 Lift 1.89759 1.80723 
 K-S Stat 0.85675 0.83821 
 Misclass Rate Overall (Raw) 0.07188 0.08438 
 Balanced Error Rate (Simple Average over classes) 0.07162 0.08391 
 Class. Accuracy (Baseline threshold) 0.92813 0.91563 
 Relative Cost 0.14325 0.16781 
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 1 166 90.36% 16 150 
 Total: 320    
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Correct: 
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 Specificity  92.86%   
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Recall 
 90.36%   
 Precision  93.17%   







Appendix ZZ. Prediction Statistics for Testing Data for Decision Tree for Combination 5 Algorithms. 
 Name Score Result 
 Mean Score 0.87682 
   
 Log Likelihood -43.69141 
 Average Log Likelihood (Negative) 0.23490 
 ROC (Area Under Curve) 0.93977 
   
 Lift 1.71692 
 D for binary models 0.47432 
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 0 50 96.00% 48 2 
 1 43 90.70% 4 39 
 Total: 93    
 Average:  93.35%   
 Overall % 
Correct: 
 93.55%   
      
      
 Specificity  96.00%   
 Sensitivity/
Recall 
 90.70%   
 Precision  95.12%   











Appendix BBB. Model Error Measures for Random Forest for Combination 5 Algorithms. 
 Name OOB 
 Average LogLikelihood (Negative) 2.63258 
 ROC (Area Under Curve) 0.94692 
 Variance of ROC (Area Under Curve) 0.00017 
   
 Lower Confidence Limit ROC 0.92101 
 Upper Confidence Limit ROC 0.97283 
   
 Lift 1.90166 
 K-S Stat 0.85026 
 Misclass Rate Overall (Raw) 0.08438 
 Balanced Error Rate (Simple Average over classes) 0.08391 
 Class. Accuracy (Baseline threshold) 0.91563 
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 N = 161 
 0 154 92.86% 143 11 
 1 166 90.36% 16 150 
 Total: 320    
 Average:  91.61%   
 Overall % 
Correct: 
 91.56%   
      
      
 Specificity  92.86%   
 Sensitivity/
Recall 
 90.36%   
 Precision  93.17%   








Appendix DDD. Prediction Statistics for Testing Data for Random Forest for Combination 5 
Algorithms. 
 Name Score Result 
 Mean Score 0.88119 
   
 Log Likelihood -53.10882 
 Average Log Likelihood (Negative) 0.28553 
 ROC (Area Under Curve) 0.96721 
 Variance of ROC (Area Under Curve) 0.00024 
   
 Lower Confidence Limit ROC 0.93702 
 Upper Confidence Limit ROC 0.99740 
   
 K-S Stat 0.86698 
 D for binary models 6.36171 
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 1 43 90.70% 4 39 
 Total: 93    
 Average:  93.35%   
 Overall % 
Correct: 
 93.55%   
      
      
 Specificity  96.00%   
 Sensitivity/
Recall 
 90.70%   
 Precision  95.12%   







Appendix FFF. Model Error Measures for TreeNet for Combination 5 Algorithms. 
 Name Learn Test Learn Sampled 
 Average LogLikelihood (Negative) 0.26983 0.19878 0.27038 
 ROC (Area Under Curve) 0.96364 0.97727 0.96546 
 Variance of ROC (Area Under Curve) 0.00013 0.00052 n/a 
     
 Lower Confidence Limit ROC 0.94124 0.93273 n/a 
 Upper Confidence Limit ROC 0.98604 1.00000 n/a 
     
 Lift 2.00752 1.60606 2.03030 
 K-S Stat 0.86483 0.96970 0.86497 
 Misclass Rate Overall (Raw) 0.08989 0.03774 0.09701 
 Balanced Error Rate (Simple Average over 
classes) 
0.08995 0.04545 n/a 
 Class. Accuracy (Baseline threshold) 0.91011 0.94340 n/a 
 Fraction Data Used after influence trimming 0.42697 n/a n/a 
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 Total: 53    
 Average:  95.45%   
 Overall % 
Correct: 
 94.34%   
      
      
 Specificity  100.00%   
 Sensitivity/
Recall 






 Precision  100.00%   




Appendix HHH. Prediction Statistics for Testing Data for TreeNet for Combination 5 Algorithms. 
 Name Score Result 
 Mean Score 0.81657 
   
 Log Likelihood -46.62625 
 Average Log Likelihood (Negative) 0.25068 
 ROC (Area Under Curve) 0.96442 
 Variance of ROC (Area Under Curve) 0.00033 
   
 Lower Confidence Limit ROC 0.92867 
 Upper Confidence Limit ROC 1.00000 
   
 Lift 2.16279 
 K-S Stat 0.88698 
 D for binary models 1.51198 








    0 
 N = 52 
1 
 N = 41 
 0 50 96.00% 48 2 
 1 43 90.70% 4 39 
 Total: 93    
 Average:  93.35%   
 Overall % 
Correct: 
 93.55%   






      
 Specificity  96.00%   
 Sensitivity/
Recall 
 90.70%   
 Precision  95.12%   
 F1 statistic  92.86%   
 
